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NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
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# NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS AND CONDITIONS

BY  
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**NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
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# NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS AND CONDITIONS

## LECTURE I.

### HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE BALKAN SLAVS.

THE word Slavs, as it is usually written in English and other European languages, does not exactly represent the name by which the people to whom it applies designate themselves. In all Slavic languages of to-day as well as in old Slavic writers the name is *Sloveni*. The root of the word is found in the names of Slovenes and Slovaks borne by two Slavic peoples to-day, and the name of Slavonia, which forms a part of Croatia. The derivation of the word is obscure and has given rise to various interpretations. According to some it was originally the name of a country, while others see in it the name of a tribe, which by extension in the course of time was applied to the whole race. Reasoning from the name *Nyemets* which they derive from the Slavic word *nyem* (dumb), applied by Slavs in general to a German, some writers have derived the name *Sloveni* from the word *Slovo* (word or speech) and have explained it to mean the speaking people in contradistinction from the dumb people, or those whose language was incomprehensible to the Slavs.

Besides the name *Sloveni*, the names of *Anti* and *Venedi* are supposed to designate Slavic tribes, and the latter name—Venedi—still survives in the name Wenden or Winden, by which the Germans call the Slavs who live in Saxony and the Eastern Alps.

The Slavic invasions of the Balkan Peninsula began with the sixth century, although there are writers who maintain that Slavs entered the Peninsula before that date on predatory inroads, either by themselves or in company with other tribes. With the sixth century, however, the Slavs began their incursions across the river Danube into the Peninsula not so much with the object of plundering as of settling in it. By the middle of the seventh century they had established themselves so securely over the larger part of the Peninsula, that the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who wrote in the tenth century, in speaking of the conditions in the Peninsula in the eighth century, says that "the whole country was Slavicised and became barbarian," that is, non-Greek. Another Greek writer, towards the end of the tenth century, remarks: "And even now the whole Epirus and nearly the whole of Greece and Peloponnesus and Macedonia are occupied by Slavs." These and other testimonies about the extent of the Slavic settlements in the Balkan Peninsula served as the basis of Prof. Fallmerayer's theory propounded about ninety years ago that the modern Greeks are not the genuine descendants of the ancient Hellenes, but hellenized Slavs. This theory finds now few supporters and has been disproved by later historians as exaggerated, but the evidence of a large influx of Slavs into Greece and the Peloponnesus

is not denied even by those who oppose Fallmerayer's opinion. The Byzantine Emperors made several attempts with varying success at their subjugation. As late as the thirteenth century these Slavs are reported to be "audacious people, who have no respect for the Byzantine Emperor," while even in the fifteenth century their descendants are said to have spoken partly Slavic.

The Slavs who settled in the Balkan Peninsula had a tribal organization based upon the clan system. Such an organization is found also among other Slavs, as for example those living at that time in Russia, of which a Russian chronicle tells us that "they had their own customs, and the law of their fathers and traditions, every one his own habits." There was no political union among the Slavs. They recognized no common ruler, and that is why they are characterized by some ancient writers as "autonomous" or "without chiefs or leaders." Each clan was ruled by its own chief, whose authority was limited by an assembly of elders or of the whole clan. Democratic government seems to have been the prevailing system among them, and one of the native terms for the ruler really means "army leader," which shows that he was more of a military chief than a civil administrator. The three words (*Tsar*, *Kral*, *Knyaz*) that are now in use among the Slavs to express the idea of king and prince are borrowed from foreign languages and are not Slavic. *Tsar* is a contraction of Cæsar, *Kral* is supposed to come from the name of Charlemagne—Carolus Magnus—and *Knyaz* is derived from the same root from which come *König* in German and *king* in English.

Let me say here that the word *Tsar* was by the Russians exclusively limited to the Emperor of Russia. When in 1908 Bulgaria declared herself an independent kingdom and the king assumed the title of Tsar, many people supposed that this was a sign of Bulgarian imperialism—that the Bulgarians wanted to establish an empire on the Balkan Peninsula and that they were really taking away from the glory of the Russian Emperor by taking his title. Well, the simple explanation of the matter is that in the Bulgarian language we have only one word, *Tsar*, for king, so that really the use of the name did not mean imperialism or anything of the kind; it was the only title which we could give to our king, as *Kral* is not in common use among the people.

Living thus politically disunited, the various Slavonic tribes in the Balkan Peninsula came more or less under the influence of Byzantium. Some of them succeeded in maintaining their local independence, while others became subject to the Byzantine emperors. The main concern of the latter was to make the Slavs accept chiefs appointed by the provincial governors of the empire, to do military service and to pay taxes. That this object was not always easily attained is proved by the various wars, which the Byzantine army was obliged to wage against the Slavs. The results obtained by these military expeditions were seldom certain or permanent, for very often the Slavic tribes, overwhelmed by the numerical superiority and better discipline of their enemy, would submit only to rise again the moment a favorable opportunity presented itself. What the final issue of this struggle between the well-

organized forces of the Byzantine empire and the disorganized Slavs would have been is not difficult to surmise. They would have been forced eventually to succumb and be incorporated with the empire. This would certainly have happened, if in the second half of the seventh century the appearance of the Bulgars in the Peninsula had not led to the unification of the Slavs under one ruler, and the foundation of a kingdom, which lasted through various vicissitudes seven hundred years. By this event the foundations of a Balkan Slavic State were laid and a nation that exists to this day was formed.

Within the last five or six years, due to passions stirred up by the late war, a great deal has been written about the origin and nationality of the Bulgarians of to-day. Their Slavic nationality has been denied, and they have been declared to be by origin Turanians, Tartars, Turks, Mongols, Huns, Finns,—anything but Slavs. As these statements, dictated by the spirit of propaganda, have been widely spread both in this country and Europe, and have found credence even among learned men, who should know better, it would be well to examine into their validity and state the historical facts bearing upon the subject.

According to Byzantine historians a band of Bulgar warriors, whose numerical strength is unknown, crossed over the river Danube in 679 from Roumania into the northeastern part of Bulgaria, the present Dobrudja. They easily subdued seven small Slavic tribes living there, and in the course of time extended their conquests westward over other Slavic tribes. All the attempts of Byzantium to prevent their further

extension or drive them back across the Danube failed. The Bulgars maintained their position, consolidated their power as conquerors and out of the disunited Slavic tribes, which they subdued, they formed a state under their rule.

Various opinions have been advanced by modern historians about the race to which these Bulgar conquerors belonged. Some have pronounced them to have been Tartars, others think that they were Finns, while others consider them as Huns, Mongols or Turks. I am inclined to believe that they were affiliated to the Turkish race. One thing is certain; they were *not* Slavs. Everything that we know about their customs, manners and habits, their military and civil organization, the titles of their rulers and nobles, points unmistakably to that fact. The names of the Bulgar Kings up to the middle of the ninth century, when Christianity became the State religion, are distinctly non-Slavic. The reports which are found in Byzantine historians of the eighth and the ninth century about the wars waged by Byzantium against the newly established Bulgarian Kingdom, make a clear distinction between Bulgar and Slavic army detachments. Although the army was under the supreme command of the Bulgar King, the Slavic detachments were evidently commanded by their own chiefs. From this we may conclude that the Slavs, who became subjects of the Bulgar Kings, were not entirely deprived of their communal organization, but shared with their conquerors in the administration. In a document of the eighth century, a distinction is made between the Bulgar and Slav languages, for we are told that the Bulgar King

had among his counsellors men, who were conversant with the Greek, the *Bulgarian* and the Slavic languages.

The Bulgar invaders of the Balkan Peninsula were not a nation. They were a band or a horde of warlike men, superior to the Slavs in military organization and discipline, but inferior to them in almost every other respect. How numerous this band or horde was, is unknown; but an approximate estimate of its numerical strength may be made by comparing it with that of another Bulgar band, which about the same time entered modern Hungary under the leadership of a brother of the man who was at the head of the Balkan Bulgars. This band, it is said, numbered 9,000 men. There is no reason to suppose that the Bulgars who entered the Balkan Peninsula were much more numerous. Granting, however, that they were twice or ten times that number, it is absurd to suppose that a nation like the Bulgarians of to-day, which numbers about six millions, can be the direct descendants of the original Bulgars. Historical facts contradict such a supposition, and prove that the modern Bulgarians take their origin from the numerous Slavs, who in overwhelming numbers inhabited the territory which they occupy at the present day. These facts, briefly stated, are the following:

1. Before the arrival of the Bulgar conquerors and the establishment by them of a Kingdom, in which the Slavic element was by far the most predominant, the Slavs in the Peninsula were in great danger of falling under the rule of the Byzantine emperors. The lack of political and social cohesion among the tribes

rendered them incapable of resisting successfully the influence of Byzantium. With the constitution of a State, in which the disunited Slavs were brought, comparatively speaking, under a well-organized military and civil administration, a center of gravitation was created for them.

Even those Slavic tribes that did not enter originally into the composition of this State did not look upon it with disfavor, for it represented to them not an altogether alien institution, but one in which kinsmen of theirs had a share. Hence, in the further expansion of this Slavo-Bulgar or Bulgaro-Slav Kingdom, we do not find the Slavs outside of the original limits of it offering any violent opposition to its expansion. On the contrary, it commanded their sympathy, and Professor Rambaud, the well-known French historian, is right in saying that every time there was a war between Byzantium and Bulgaria, the Slavs under Byzantine dominion were sure to rebel. To them incorporation with the Bulgar Kingdom was evidently preferable to remaining under Byzantine rule.

2. When in the second half of the tenth century the eastern part of the Bulgarian Kingdom fell under Byzantine rule a long struggle, lasting forty years, was stoutly maintained in the west—that is, in Macedonia—against Byzantine attacks. The center of this western Kingdom was in Macedonia and not in Bulgaria proper, and all chroniclers—Greek, Arab, Armenian and others—speak of it as Bulgarian and of the people who took part in the struggle as Bulgarians. It is positively certain that the original Bulgars never set foot in Macedonia, the population of which was for the



most part Slav. The part which these Slavs took in fighting for the independence of the Bulgarian Kingdom, and the name Bulgarians by which they are designated, proves that the original Bulgars had by that time been thoroughly Slavicized. Their name had become synonymous with that of Slav, and their kingdom in the eyes of the Macedonian Slavs was a Slavic kingdom, a kingdom of their own.

3. When in 885 Methodius, who with his younger brother Cyril had preached Christianity to the Slavs in Moravia, died, his pupils, said to have numbered about 200, were exposed to the persecution of the German hierarchy. They left Moravia and took refuge in Bulgaria, which at that time occupied the position of the most prominent Slavic State. Both the government and the people received them gladly, and they found themselves among their own co-nationals, Slavs like themselves. They brought with them Slavic church books, and many of them were given important appointments in the Church of Bulgaria. These men certainly would not have come to Bulgaria with their Slavic books, if the country had been peopled by a Tartar or Turk population with a language totally unlike the Slavic. In documents of the early part of the tenth century we find the word Bulgarian used for Slavic, and the language of the books spoken of as Bulgarian—that is, the language not of the original Bulgars, but of the Slavs who had assumed the name of Bulgarians.

4. With the introduction of Christianity into Bulgaria in the second half of the ninth century, the foundations of a literature were laid. It was the first lit-

erature to appear among the Slavs. The language of it is purely Slavic, without any Tartar, Turkish or Finnish traces in it. Its productions were freely copied by Serbians and Russians as perfectly intelligible to them. Even to-day this language is called by many philologists and historians Old-Bulgarian, meaning thereby not the language of the original non-Slav Bulgars, but of the numerous Slavs who were their subjects and at the time of the appearance of the literature were already known by the name of Bulgarians.

In presenting these historical facts I hope that I have made it clear why the Bulgarians of the present day cannot be considered the descendants of the original Bulgars, who were so small in number that they were easily assimilated to and swallowed up in the overwhelming Slavic majority. The modern Bulgarian is essentially a Slavic language, akin to the Russian, Serbian, Croat, Slovene, etc. In their popular beliefs, folk-lore, customs and manners the Bulgarians in no way differ from the other Slavs, and have nothing in common with Tartars, Turks or Finns. Serbians, Russians and other Slavs have always recognized them as their brethren, and modern historians and philologists have proved beyond any doubt their Slavic origin. The late Czech historian, Prof. Jiretschek, who was a recognized authority on the history of the Balkan Slavs, says:

"The ancestors of the Bulgarians of to-day are not the small bands of Isperikh's *Bulgars*, who in 679 took possession of Moesia on the Danube, but the *Slavs*, who in the course of the third to the seventh century

had established themselves in Moesia, as well as in Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, ay, almost in the whole Peninsula. The blood of the Finnish Bulgars [he considers the Bulgars Finns], which principally flowed in the veins of the noble families, seems to have long since vanished."

The Greek historian Paparigopoulos of the University of Athens attributes the complete amalgamation of the Bulgars with the Slavs to two causes: first, the Bulgars, being small in number, needed allies; second, though superior to the Slavs by their warlike virtues, they were inferior to them in every other respect; hence they yielded easily to their moral and social influence. This easy and complete assimilation of the Bulgars with the Slavs gave rise to the theory, advanced by some Slavic historians of the last century, one of whom was a Serbian, that the original Bulgars must have been Slavs, for otherwise they could not have been absorbed in a little over a century and a half so completely as not to leave any trace in the language, the folk-lore or the customs of the modern Bulgarians.

What happened to the original Bulgars in the Balkan Peninsula is not a unique ethnographic phenomenon without a parallel in history. Two centuries before, a Frankish tribe under the leadership of Clovis extended its conquests in Roman Gaul and established a kingdom among the Gallo-Romans, whom they subdued. The kingdom as well as the people received the name of the Frankish conqueror and to this day they are known as France and *Français*. The Germans still call France *Frankreich*, the Frank Kingdom, while

the Frenchman still feels pride in his German name and does not consider it a derogation to his nationality to bear it.

The other case is still more to the point, for it is the exact counterpart of what took place in the Balkan Peninsula. Two centuries after the establishment of the Bulgar Kingdom, namely in 862, a band of warlike Northmen or Normans, bearing the name of *Russ* and racially a Scandinavian or Teutonic tribe, came from the north into Russia, subdued the disunited Slavic tribes around Kiev, and laid the foundations of the modern Russian State. As in Bulgaria, so in Russia the names of the first rulers and of many nobles, which have been preserved in the Russian chronicles, are of foreign and not Slavic origin. In a Russian chronicle we have mention made of a delegation of about twenty Russians who were sent to Constantinople, I think it was in the tenth century, to make a treaty with Byzantium. Of the names which are given of these people not a single one is a Slavic name; they are all Teutonic.

The name *Russ* became the general designation for the various Slavic tribes and their country, and it subsists to this day. It would be absurd to assert or maintain that the French and Russians of to-day are Germans or Teutons, because they bear German names. It is equally absurd and historically untrue to apply such a reasoning to the modern Bulgarians. What occurred in these three cases was that a numerically inferior band or horde of conquerors imposed their name upon those whom they conquered, but were swallowed up in the great mass of the vanquished and dis-

appeared. Such is the conclusion which historical facts warrant and which is accepted by all Slav and other historians and philologists of to-day; all else is a perversion of history into which one lands when he tries to distort it and make political capital out of it.

It would be of no particular interest to enter into a full presentation of the history of Bulgaria. We may touch only upon its most salient points. From the beginning of its political existence as a State down to its downfall under the Turks towards the end of the fourteenth century, Bulgaria was engaged with few intermissions in wars against the Byzantine empire. Peaceful relations were the exception, and common action between the two very rare. Twice or thrice Bulgaria was able to extend its dominion over almost the whole Balkan Peninsula as far as the Adriatic sea and northern Greece. This expansion was due to the personal initiative and enterprise of the ruler at the time. On his death, when a weak successor was unable to cope with internal and external difficulties, a collapse came and all of the advantages formerly gained were lost. In the thirteenth century, when Constantinople fell under Latin domination, the Bulgarian kings worked in harmony with the Greek emperor, who had transferred his capital from Constantinople to Nicæa, to drive the Latins out, and had a large share in breaking their power. When the common danger, however, was passed, the former hostile feeling between Byzantium and Bulgaria reappeared. From the second half of the 13th century the Bulgarian Kingdom may be said to have begun its downward course. Internal dissensions and rivalries among the nobility, frequent re-

bellions against the royal authority, court intrigues from within and from without, foreign invasions and wars were gradually sapping the foundations of the State. When in the year 1353 the Turks crossed over from Asia Minor and established themselves at Gallipoli and the Dardanelles in Europe, Bulgaria was in the throes of political agony. Ten years later the Turks occupied Adrianople and in a few years more they had conquered almost the whole of Thrace, from where their irruption into the north of the Peninsula was only a question of time. Their conquest of Bulgaria was facilitated because of the division of the Kingdom into two parts, ruled by two half-brothers, whose mutual relations were unfriendly. In 1393 the Bulgarian capital, Tirnovo, was captured and the country became a Turkish province.

There is a great deal of similarity between the history of the Bulgarians and that of the Serbians. The latter like the former had to wage frequent wars with the Byzantine empire and neighboring countries. Prof. Jiretschek considers the territory between the rocky mountains of Montenegro and its surroundings and the basin of the river Morava as the oldest and most permanent fatherland of the Serbian people. It is what is called to-day Old Serbia, which is found on the river Rasa near the old town of Rasa, the modern name of which is Novi-Bazar, or New Market Town. Specifying more particularly this territory, he says: "Among the Slavic tribes that settled in the Balkan lands, the real Serbians established themselves originally in the interior of the country, and lived away from the Danube and the sea in the valleys of the

rivers Lim, Ibar and western Morava." The name *Serbs*, which originally denoted one of the Slavic tribes, was gradually extended to the neighboring tribes and their kinsmen, so that it was applied sometimes to the Croats and to those living in the Herzegovina of to-day.

About the way the Serbians and Croats came to settle in the Balkan Peninsula, a story is told by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, which most probably is only a legend. The Byzantine Emperor, Heraklios (575-642), wishing to people some regions devastated by former incursions of predatory tribes, invited the Serbians and Croats to occupy them. The probability is that both these Slavic peoples entered the Peninsula at some time or other during the Slav immigration, although they were not known by those names to the Byzantine historians, or the latter knew very little as to what was going on at the time in distant parts of the Peninsula. The names Serbs and Croats are met with for the first time in the ninth century. The introduction of Christianity among the Serbs and Croats is referred by the same historian to the reign of Emperor Heraklios. It is said that priests sent by the Pope of Rome at the emperor's request baptized them. The conversion, if it did really take place, was either not complete or the people soon lapsed into their former heathen practices, for about two centuries and a half later we read of another conversion again by order of a Byzantine emperor. This took place soon after the conversion of the Bulgarians and the translation into Slavic of the church books. Both these events must have helped the firmer establishment of Christianity among the Serbs.

The history of the Serbs before the thirteenth century presents very little interest. The country was divided into small counties ruled over by chiefs, called Zhupans, one of whom, probably owing to his larger possessions, was called the Great Chief. Dissensions and strifes about supremacy or the succession were very frequent among the chiefs, and opened the door to outside interference. Greek and Latin writers speak of the ruler of the country as *archon* or *dux*, whose power was limited by the other chiefs who acted as his advisers, and by the people's Assembly. The government was based upon democratic principles as among the other Slavs. But in the course of time his power grew wider, until towards the end of the twelfth century Stephen Nemanya succeeded in founding a dynasty which ruled over Serbia till the second half of the fourteenth century. With him Serbian history really begins, and under his successors the country acquired the position of a Balkan State with which its neighbors had to reckon. The unification of the region inhabited by Serbians was gradually and successfully accomplished. Nemanya was fortunate in being succeeded by a very able son, who consolidated the work begun by his father and is known in Serbian history as "the first-crowned" King. Quarrels and wars among rival brothers and relatives in the Nemanya family were not wanting, but the dynasty survived them all. Wars against Byzantium, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians and other neighboring countries, as Bosnia, Ragusa, etc., in which the Serbians were involved, were maintained with success and the frontiers of the Kingdom were extended. Under the



rule of Stephen Dushan (1331-1355) Serbian power in the Peninsula reached its highest point. Nearly two-thirds of the Peninsula came under his authority, and in order to assert his preponderating influence, Dushan was proclaimed "Tsar" by a Serbian parliament and assumed the title of "Tsar of the Serbians and Greeks."<sup>1</sup> He also promulgated a code of laws, known by his name, the contents of which prove that Serbia at that time was juridically and administratively a well-organized State. Unfortunately, the grand work accomplished by Dushan could not be maintained and carried on by his successors. Rivalries and jealousies among the various chieftains, dissensions and even wars between pretenders to the Serbian throne, destroyed the political structure that Dushan had erected and divided the country into small and mutually hostile principalities. According to the opinion of a modern Serbian historian (Prof. Stanoyeivitch of Belgrade), the kingdom of Dushan was composed of elements differing in nationality, religion, traditions, culture and political tendencies. His personality alone held together these heterogeneous elements and prevented a decline. At his death, the centrifugal and separatist elements gained the upper hand, and ambitious feudal governors of provinces, which during the reign of Dushan had not had the time to amalgamate, were eager to weaken the kingly power and strengthen their own influence. Serbia, like Bulgaria, was found at the time of the Turkish invasion of the Peninsula a distracted

<sup>1</sup>This title was always assumed by either Bulgarian or Serbian kings whenever they extended their dominion over the great part of the peninsula. They always called themselves "Tsar of the Bulgarians and Greeks" or "Tsar of the Serbians and Greeks."

country, and although it made supreme efforts to withstand the Turkish onslaught, the elements of disintegration were preparing its downfall. In 1389, at the fateful battle at Kossovo Polje, Serbian independence was shattered. For seventy years more Serbia existed as a vassal of the Sultan, bound to pay him tribute and supply him with a military contingent; but in 1459 she lost the few privileges she had and was annexed to Turkey as a simple Turkish province.

The internal history of both Serbia and Bulgaria during the time of Turkish domination till the period of their resuscitation is very imperfectly known. The Turkish conquest forced thousands of people to flee from their homes into neighboring countries, as Roumania and Hungary. In the beginning the Turks respected the communal organizations of the Christians. What they cared most about was that the latter should be submissive, pay their taxes and render all the service that their masters required of them during the almost incessant wars, which they waged for the extension of their dominions. These wars naturally kept the Christian people in constant servitude, for they were obliged to supply the Turkish army, without any remuneration, with food, means of transportation and everything else that they might want. The lawlessness of the troops increased the people's hardships and helped to devastate the regions through which they passed on their expeditions. It was the Sultan's policy, however, to propitiate his Christian subjects as far as he could, because he needed their assistance in his efforts to push his conquests beyond the limits of the Balkan Peninsula.

If we may believe popular tradition, the Christians did not have a bad opinion of Turkish rule, when it was first established among them. According to a Serbian popular ballad the *despot*<sup>1</sup> or ruler of Serbia once asked the famous John Hunyadi, the Hungarian hero, who was trying to persuade him to continue the war against the Turks: "If we are conquerors, what will you do with us?" "You will go to Rome and implore the Pope's benediction," was the reply, meaning thereby that the Serbians would have to become Roman Catholics. Not satisfied with this prospect, the Serbian ruler put the same question to the Sultan, and received in answer the following assurance: "By every mosque there will be a church and every one will be free to bow before the one or to cross himself before the other."

Whether any Turkish Sultan ever made such a generous promise or not is immaterial. The facts are that the Christians for a long time were forbidden to erect new churches, and even the repairing of churches already existing could not be undertaken except on a special permit by the Sultan himself. This permit usually was not readily granted, and entailed a great deal of expense, mostly graft, before it was obtained.

The sufferings of the Christian subjects of Turkey increased in intensity when the former power of the Empire began to wane and internal disintegration, owing to the vices and corruption of the authorities, set in. The Janissaries, who were recruited from Christian children, were the *élite* troops by which the Sul-

<sup>1</sup> Despot is the title that the ruler of Serbia bore at that time. It does not mean a tyrant; it simply means a ruler, and in modern Greek the word is used to designate a *bishop*.

tans won their splendid victories. It was a terrible toll which the poor Christians had to pay, in addition to other taxes and exactions, for three hundred years. The corps, under the loose discipline and bad administration of later weak Sultans, degenerated into a body of legalized plunderers, a terror to the Christians and a standing menace to the Sultans themselves. The testimony of contemporary writers, who had visited Turkey in the sixteenth century, assures us that the Janissary corps at that time was so overwhelmingly Slav that they spoke their respective languages, Serbian or Bulgarian. Many Christians converted to Mohammedanism occupied the highest posts in the administration of the empire as grand viziers—that is, prime ministers—or in the army and navy as officers. Even in the Sultan's court the Slav element predominated and many documents issued by the imperial chancery are extant written in the Slavic language with Cyrillic characters. These high functionaries came mostly from former noble Slav families in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who in order to save their lives and property became converts to Mohammedanism. Some of them, however, who were of obscure origin, by their ability or by the favoritism of the Sultan rose to high positions, for in Turkey public offices were not limited to a standing aristocracy, but were open to all who either by merit or by "pull" could attain to them. It is said that in the sixteenth century, during the grandviziership of the famous Mehmed Sokolli or Sokolitch, by origin a Serbian of Bosnia, half of his council consisted of Mohammedan Slavs. These Christian renegades, among whom there were also Albanians and

Greeks, were really the great factors who rendered the greatest services to the Sultans in the extension of their empire and the administration of it. Von Hammer, the historian, says: "It was a State maxim with the Osmanlis (the Turks), that one had to be the son of a Christian in order to attain to the highest dignities of the Empire."

The ascendancy which these Mohammedan converts acquired in the councils of the Sultans brought no relief to the mass of Christians, who were exposed to oppression. At rare intervals feeble attempts at rebellion against the lawlessness of the military and civil authorities were made, but they were quickly and sternly repressed. As the Christians were forbidden to carry arms, they were helpless before their oppressors. Speaking of Serbia in the 16th century, Ranke, the German historian, quotes a traveller of that time who describes the people as "poor captives, none of whom dared to lift up his head." The same might justly be said of the other Christians in the Peninsula.

The impossibility of obtaining any outside help for their deliverance from the Turkish yoke or of throwing it off by their own unaided efforts, brought about a curious social phenomenon in the life of the Christians, which needs some explanation in order to be understood and appreciated. Its parallel may be found in the story of Robin Hood, so familiar to students of English history. Among civilized people of to-day brigandage is considered as a highly disreputable profession, and the brigand a reprobate and an outlaw of society to be despised and hunted down. Not farther back than the last century, ere any of the

Balkan States had regained their political independence, the Bulgarian *haidout*, the Serbian *haidouk* and the Greek *klephtis*, all meaning a brigand, were regarded by their fellow-countrymen with sympathy and admiration. The people delighted in telling of their deeds, and many a popular ballad, current even to-day, extols them as meritorious heroes.

To a foreigner, unacquainted with the social and political conditions under which the Christians had lived for centuries under the Turkish rule, this attitude towards brigandage and brigands seems a sign of moral depravity. The Christian brigand, however, was not a sneak thief or a vile cut-throat, who took to his profession out of a wanton desire for murder. He was a man who, wronged and outraged in his own person or in that of his family by Turkish misrule and injustice, or unable to bear the sight of Turkish insolence and oppression, preferred to shoulder his gun and lead a life of freedom in the mountains. A Greek folk-song relates how a son, in bidding good-bye to his mother, tells her that he can no longer bear to live under the Turks; he prefers life in the mountains with the wild beasts to living with the Turks in the plains, and begs his mother to pray that he may kill as many Turks as he can.

These brigands used to go in bands under the leadership of a captain chosen by them, with a standard bearer, and their chief object was to keep in fear and respect the Turkish oppressor, and afford protection and defence to the Christian. With the loot which they obtained from the exercise of their profession, they not infrequently, as the popular ballads tell us,

helped poor people in distress or made donations to churches and monasteries. Among the leaders of such brigand bands women also are mentioned, and some of them are represented to have been superior to the men in valor, and very dextrous in the manipulation of weapons. In the struggle for independence of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, these so-called outlaws took an active part and rendered valuable service as leaders of insurgent bands. With the extinction of Turkish rule the profession of the brigand has fallen into disrepute, and if at any time wicked and lawless men, actuated by ferocious instincts, have taken to it, they have been quickly and summarily dealt with, because their conduct found no support among the people.

The Serbians who, at various times since the conquest of Serbia by the Turks, emigrated into Hungary, took an active share with the Austrian army in trying to stem the tide of Turkish invasion. They formed the so-called military boundary and had to bear the first impact of the Turkish attacks. It was among them that the spirit of freedom was more or less maintained. To the Montenegrins (who belong to the Serbian race) belongs the greatest praise for the determination with which they have striven to resist the establishment of Turkish rule in their country. The history of Montenegro is almost an uninterrupted series of wars waged against the attempts of the Turks to plant their flag upon its rocky mountains. Favored by the nature of their country, the brave mountaineers have desperately defended themselves and the Turks have never succeeded in really subduing them and establishing their rule over the country.

The existence of a large Serbian population in Austria was of great service to Serbia in her efforts to regain her political independence in the early part of the last century. In comparison with the condition of the Serbians under the rule of Turkey, that of the Serbians in Austria was vastly better. Civil and military offices were open to them, and many of them gained distinction, especially in the army. During the wars which Austria was obliged to wage for the recovery of her territories from the Turks, Serbia was occupied and held, off and on, by Austrian troops. A great number among these troops were Serbians, and the contact with them must have awakened among the people of Serbia ideas of political freedom and national self-assertion. In the successful issue of the Serbian struggle for independence in the first quarter of the nineteenth century and in the organization of a Serbian government the Austrian Serbians rendered valuable services.

The Serbian element in Turkey suffered considerable diminution by the emigrations which the Austro-Turkish wars necessitated. This loss was felt most sensibly in the regions of what is called Old Serbia, north of the Shar Mountain. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these territories fell for a time under Austrian rule, but eventually had to be retroceded to Turkey. Fearing the vengeance of the Turks on their reoccupation of the territory many thousands of Serbians preferred to emigrate to Austria, where they were certain of better treatment by a Christian government. The country thus vacated by the Serbians was occupied by Albanians, who, favored by the



Turkish government, have pushed forward their settlements south of the Shar Mountain into Macedonia. The policy of having these Albanian settlements planted among the Christians of Macedonia has been to overawe and keep in subjection the Christians. These Albanians, who were practically unmolested by the provincial authorities in their treatment of the Christians, have been one of the principal causes of all the unrest and discontent in Macedonia. As these regions are now in the possession of Yugoslavia, Albanian licence will be curbed, and if Albania gets an independent government of her own, these Albanians may prefer to join their fellow-countrymen to remain-ing under the domination of Yugoslavia. The possibility of future disagreements and even conflicts between Albania and Yugoslavia in regard to these territories that are inhabited by Albanians is not at all excluded.

Another people of the Balkan peninsula which deserves notice because of its intermixture with the Bulgarians and Serbians are the so-called Aromani of Thessaly and Macedonia. The name Aromani is the one they like to give to themselves. The name by which they are called by their neighbors is *Vlakh*, *Koutso-Vlakh* or *Tsintsar*.<sup>1</sup> The accepted theory about their origin is that they are the Latinized descendants of the Thracians. Their language is akin to the Roumanian, with a great many words borrowed

<sup>1</sup> Vlakh is supposed to have the meaning of a *stranger, foreigner*, like the word Welsh. In Polish and Czech the word means Roman and Italian. Koutso Vlakh means a *lame* Vlakh, while Tsintsar is derived from the word *tsintsi* (five) which these people use instead of *tchintchi* in Roumanian.

from the Greek. The Vlakhs have been very susceptible to the process of hellenization, and in the opinion of those who are well acquainted with Macedonia and its nationalities, most of the people whom Greek statistics give out as Greek are really hellenized Aromani. According to Dr. Weigand, the best authority on the Balkan Vlakhs, they number about 160,000, half of them inhabiting Thessaly around Mount Pindus and the other half Macedonia. The Aromani form nowhere a compact mass; they are mostly scattered among the other nationalities of the province. The interest that the kingdom of Roumania has taken in them has been dictated by political expediency rather than by any consideration of Roumanian vital interests. In order to justify to a certain extent her claim to have a part in the solution of the Macedonian question, the Roumanian government has openly carried on a propaganda among the Aromani by subsidizing their churches and schools. The propaganda has been a failure, for the Aromani by themselves and separated from the Greeks are not numerically or otherwise strong enough to act as a factor in the questions affecting the Balkan Peninsula.

In looking back upon the history of the Balkan Slavs one notices with regret the want of union among them. The history of the Balkan Peninsula might have been different if Serbia and Bulgaria, while existing as independent States, had acted in unison, instead of engaging, as they did, in mutual jealousies and strifes. Disunion and mutual envy, of which foreign intrigues have often availed themselves to work woe among them, are the characteristic weaknesses of the Slavic

peoples. Unfriendly relations existed in the past not only between Serbians and Bulgarians, but between Serbians on the one hand and Croats and Bosnians on the other. Had all the Slavs in the Peninsula acted as one man at the time of the Turkish invasion, the day of Kossovo Polje, instead of marking the defeat of the Cross by the Crescent, might have marked a victory which would have secured the prolonged free development of all the people of the Balkan Peninsula.

## LECTURE II.

### CHURCH ORGANIZATION AND LITERATURE.

As church questions have always played in the Near East a large part in national questions, I have chosen for the subject of the lecture this morning "The Beginnings of Church Organization and the Beginnings of Literature among the Slavs of the Near East."

The second half of the ninth century marks an important epoch in the history of the Slavs. The official introduction of Christianity among the Bulgarians in 864, and the composition of a Slavic alphabet a short time before, opened to the Slavs the path of progress and culture. These two events affected not the Bulgarians alone; they exerted a powerful influence more or less upon the whole Slavic world. That Christianity had found its way even before the second half of the ninth century among the Slavs, especially among those who had settled as early as the seventh century in the Balkan Peninsula, is certain.

In the sixth century, during the reign of Emperor Justinian, we find Slavs serving in the imperial army as soldiers and high officers. You know the opinion has been advanced that Emperor Justinian himself was a Slav by origin; but I think anyone, after reading what Viscount Bryce has written on the subject, must come to the conclusion that it is a baseless story. As

heathens had ceased by that time to be accepted in the army and the government of the empire, the probability is that these Slavs were Christians.

Among the clergy and the monks there were also many Slavs, who, in the absence of a written Slavic language and Slavic church books, used the Greek language and liturgy in the church services. One of these Slavs occupied under the name of Niketas the Patriarchal throne of Constantinople from 766 to 780. Their knowledge of Greek must have been rather limited, if we may judge from what is related of the Patriarch Niketas, who was wont to pronounce the Greek diphthongs *ai*, *oi* as two syllables and not as the modern Greeks pronounce them as one syllable. One of his deacons ventured once to correct him, whereupon the Patriarch retorted angrily: "My soul abhors diphthongs and triphthongs."

In the Balkan Peninsula Christianity was spread more easily and more widely among the Slavs of Macedonia, who were for a long time under the direct rule and influence of Byzantium. In becoming Christians they came under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, they attended church services in the Greek language and made use of the Greek alphabet in writing their own language. It was from among the Macedonian Slavs, that the two men, Cyril and Methodius, came, to whom the Slavs, especially those who belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church, owe the construction of an alphabet, the translation of the Church books and the Bible, and the wider and firmer establishment of the Christian religion among them.

There is no name of any Slav so well known even to the little children in the primary schools of Bulgaria or even Russia as the names of Saints Cyril and Methodius. I use the name "Eastern Orthodox Church" for the Greek Church. It is unfortunate that in English a great deal of confusion is produced by using different names for this Church. The Greek Church is not exactly the title which ought to be given to it, because it is not exclusively Greek. There are Russians, Bulgarians, Roumanians and Serbians who belong to that church. To call it the Greek Catholic Church, as sometimes people here do, produces in the mind especially of a man from the Near East, a wrong impression, because to him Catholic means Roman Catholic, so that Greek Catholic Church would be understood to mean a Greek Church of the Roman rite. The official and the usual title by which the church itself likes to be called is the Eastern Orthodox Church. By "orthodox" it means the church which teaches the right doctrines.

These two Slavic Apostles, as they are usually called, were natives of Saloniki and sons of a distinguished Byzantine army officer. Whether they were Greeks or Slavs is a disputed question and will never be settled. The younger brother, Constantine (that was his name as a layman, which afterwards he changed to Cyril when he became a monk, and by the name of Cyril he is best known), born in 827, spent his youth in Constantinople, where he was educated under the tutorship of the well-known Patriarch Photius. By his learning, both in languages, philosophy and theology, he rose to be the librarian of the Patriarchate

and a professor of philosophy at the court school in the emperor's palace. In 862, he was sent, together with his elder brother Methodius, to Moravia, in consequence of a mission from two Moravian princes, who asked the Byzantine emperor to send them men, versed in the Slavic language and capable of instructing their subjects, already converted to Christianity, in their vernacular. Before their departure for Moravia, in 855, as a writer of the first quarter of the tenth century informs us, Cyril had already composed an alphabet for the Slavs and had translated parts of the New Testament, probably the gospels, and the liturgy.

I use the words "composed an alphabet" and not "invented an alphabet," which is very often used, because, as we shall see, the present Slavic alphabet is not an invention, but it is the Greek alphabet with some additional letters.

The work of the two brothers in Moravia, which was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Pope of Rome, their preaching and translation of the Bible went on unhindered up to the death of Cyril at Rome in 869.

For any future visitor to remember, it might be interesting to know that recently, or within the last few years, frescos have been discovered with pictures in the Church of St. Clement in Rome, where Cyril is supposed to be buried, and one of these frescos which I saw when I was in Rome some years ago is supposed to represent Cyril baptizing a Moravian or a Slavic prince. After the death of Cyril his brother Methodius was appointed by the Pope Bishop of Pannonia (a

part of modern Hungary) and Moravia, and continued his evangelistic work till his death in 885. The German clergy, during his life time, had begun to feel hostile to the use of the Slavic language instead of the Latin in the church services; but Methodius had succeeded with the help of the Pope in maintaining his position and fighting his opponents. The opposition, however, grew much stronger after his death, and his disciples and co-workers were forced to flee from Moravia to Bulgaria, where they found a hearty welcome. The fruit of the great work of the two brothers of Saloniki is enjoyed to this day by about 112 million Slavs, who hear God's word to-day from the translation which was made by them more than a thousand years ago.

The conversion of the Bulgarian King Boris in 864 and the official introduction of Christianity into Bulgaria gave a greater impetus to its spread among the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula. It was from Byzantium that Boris received Christianity, and the first teachers and preachers of the new faith among the converted Bulgarians must have been either Greeks or hellenized Slavs. In the absence of an established church organization in the early days of the conversion, Bulgaria became the field of various preachers of other professions or faiths, who flocked into the country. This we learn from the questions which King Boris sent with a delegation to Pope Nicolas I in 866, two years after his conversion, asking his opinion on various points of Christian law and doctrine. Three or four of these questions refer to Mohammedan books current in the country, to a Jew who had baptized



many people, to a Greek who falsely representing himself as a priest had baptized many, and to many preachers who had come from various lands, as Greece, Armenia and other places, into the country, and were teaching various discordant doctrines. But one of the most important questions and which probably suggested the dispatch of the delegation to Rome is: "Can we not have a Patriarch appointed for us, and who should appoint him?"

It is evident from this question that the Constantinople Patriarch had refused to sanction the establishment of an autonomous national Church in Bulgaria. King Boris must have considered it beneath his dignity as an independent ruler to have his kingdom in Church matters dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople. Hence he determined to enter into relations with the Pope of Rome and obtain from him, as the Eastern and Western Churches had not at that time separated, the consecration of a Patriarch for the Bulgarian Church. The negotiations, however, failed, because the Pope refused to consecrate even for an archbishop, the man whom the Bulgarian King had chosen.

In 869 a church council was convoked in Constantinople by the Emperor, at which Papal delegates were also present, in order to settle the rival claims of Ignatius and Photius to the patriarchal throne. The Council had almost reached an amicable settlement and was about to disperse, when a delegation from the Bulgarian King appeared at its sitting of March 3, 870. Speaking in the name of their King, the delegates said: "Up to now we were heathen and only a

short time ago we came to know the true God, Christ Jesus. But not to remain in error, we wish to learn from you, representatives of the great patriarchs, to what church do we belong?"

The question fell like a bombshell amidst the Council. The papal delegates unanimously declared that there could be no question whatever that Bulgaria belonged to the Roman Church, as it had already asked and obtained from the Pope spiritual teachers and preachers. The Greek members of the Council, however, took a different view of the matter, and put the following question to the Bulgarian delegates: "When you conquered that country (i. e., Bulgaria) to whom did it belong and what priests did you find in it, Greek or Latin?" To their reply that they had conquered the country from the Greeks and had found in it Greek and not Latin priests, the overwhelming majority of the Council said: "This being so, it is plain that your country was and ought to be subject to the Constantinople Patriarch." The papal delegates left the Council highly displeased and angered, and the question of the Bulgarian church, having been decided in favor of the Constantinople Patriarch, tended to widen the breach between Rome and Byzantium, which in 1054 culminated in the well-known great schism of the Church.

The Greek Patriarch recognized the internal autonomy of the Bulgarian church at the head of which was placed an archbishop or metropolitan, whose residence was in the capital of the Kingdom. Ten bishoprics were created, and the Bulgarian archbishop on public occasions, at which he happened to be present in Con-

stantinople, occupied the first place after the Patriarch. In the reign of Boris' son and successor, King Simeon, who during his reign from 893 to 927, assumed the title of Tsar of Bulgarians and Greeks, owing to his extended rule over the Balkan Peninsula, the archbishop of Bulgaria was honored with the title of Patriarch. It is uncertain whether this title was given to him with the consent of the Patriarch of Constantinople or the Pope of Rome, or whether King Simeon of his own will conferred the title upon him. The title was, however, officially recognized by the Patriarch and his Synod not many years after Simeon's death, and the Bulgarian Church was declared self-governed (autocephalous).

The Eastern Orthodox Church recognizes only four canonical Patriarchs: those of Constantinople, of Alexandria, of Antioch, and of Jerusalem. Nobody else is allowed to be called a Patriarch if possible, on the ground, as common tradition has it, that as there were only four evangelists, there cannot be more than four Patriarchs.

The Patriarch of Constantinople is not like the Pope of Rome. On the contrary, he is first among equals, and the other three Patriarchs claim the same honors and the same dignity that he does, but they recognize his superiority as being the Patriarch resident in the capital of the Empire. As you know, he claims the title of Œcumenical Patriarch, that is, if you translate it, as it is now, you would say the Patriarch of the whole universe, but at the time that he assumed this title by the name of Œcumene, the Greeks understood the inhabited part of the Empire, because they

considered that everything outside of the Empire was nothing but a desert.

Owing to internal dissensions that brought about a division in the kingdom of Bulgaria in the second half of the tenth century, the eastern part of the country between the river Danube and the Balkan mountains lost its independence to Byzantium and ecclesiastically became subject to the Greek Patriarch. In the western part, namely in Macedonia, under the leadership of a new King, the struggle against Byzantium for national independence was continued for over forty years, until in 1018 the Emperor Basil II (976-1025) conquered the whole country, annexed it to the empire, and put an end to the existence of the Bulgarian Kingdom. In depriving the Bulgarians of their political independence, Basil II did not deprive them of their ecclesiastical organization. After the fall of the eastern part of Bulgaria under Byzantine rule and during the forty years' war in Macedonia, the seat of the head of the Bulgarian Church was moved to the town of Ohrida in Macedonia, which had become the capital of the western kingdom. The Byzantine Emperor maintained the autonomy of the Bulgarian church of Ohrida and by imperial charters confirmed its rights and extended its jurisdiction over the whole of Bulgaria, but deprived it of the title of Patriarchate. Up to the time of its abolition in the 18th century it was known as the Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ohrida. Both the archbishop and his suffragan bishops were appointed by the Emperor and were almost always Greeks; but they stoutly defended their rights

and privileges against any encroachment of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

For 168 years Bulgaria remained a province of Byzantium and under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Ohrida. When in 1186 Bulgaria regained her political independence a new archbishop was proclaimed in Tirnovo, the capital, without the preliminary sanction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. In order to obtain such a sanction, application was made to the Pope in the beginning of the thirteenth century, both for the granting of a royal crown to the King and the elevation of the archbishop to the rank of a Patriarch. The request was granted and the King and the Patriarch gave a declaration of submission to the Holy See, which, however, was never fully carried out. This pretended submission of the Bulgarian Church to the Pope was only a political stroke, a declaration of a simple union with the Roman church and not an acceptance of Catholicism or renunciation of the dogmas and doctrines of the Eastern Orthodox Church. As at that time Constantinople was conquered by the Latins, the Bulgarian King, in order to secure himself against their attacks, sought to gain the Pope's protection. This is fully confirmed by the fact that about a quarter of a century later Bulgaria was at war with the Latins and concluded an alliance against them with the Greek emperor of Nicæa, who had replaced the one of Byzantium. At the same time the Archbishop of Tirnovo was formally recognized as Patriarch by the Greek Patriarch with the consent and approval of those of Jerusalem, Anti-

och and Alexandria. This Patriarchate subsisted till 1393, when Bulgaria was conquered by the Turks and in church relations placed under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Archbishopric of Ohrida, which was always known by the name of Bulgarian, maintained itself till 1767, when at the suggestion of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, it was abolished and all its dioceses annexed to the Patriarchate.

The early history of the introduction of Christianity among the Serbo-Croats is not quite clear. According to the testimony of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, emperor and writer of the tenth century, Christianity was introduced among the Serbo-Croats at two different periods. The first was during the reign of the Byzantine emperor Heraklios in the seventh century, who, it is said, asked the Pope of Rome to send priests to convert and baptize them. The second conversion took place in the second half of the ninth century through priests sent from Byzantium. Nothing is known about the church organization in the lands occupied by the Serbians in the earlier middle ages. Mention is made of a bishop of Belgrade and another of Morava in the second half of the ninth century, and the probability is that they were under the jurisdiction of the head of the Bulgarian Church, as their dioceses were politically dependent on the Bulgarian Kingdom. In later years, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Serbian bishoprics were under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Ohrida. Of these bishoprics, that of Rasa, modern Novi-Bazar, assumed greater importance and became the foundation for the erection

of a self-governed (autocephalous) Serbian national church in the thirteenth century. This took place in 1219, two years after the Serbian Great Zhupan or ruler Stephen Nyemanya received a royal crown from the Pope, whereby he assumed the title of King, and is known in Serbian history as Stephen the First-Crowned.

The establishment of a national Serbian church is closely connected with the name of the younger brother of King Stephen, widely known under the name of Sava, as one of the prominent saints of the Serbian Church. Led by his ascetic tendencies and pious bent to religious studies, he forsook in his youth all that royal parentage could offer him, fled from home to Mount Athos and there assumed the garb of a monk. His father, equally a pious man, eventually followed his son's example, abdicated the throne and became a member of the monastic brotherhood of Athos. You know Mount Athos is the sacred mountain of the Eastern Orthodox Church. It is full of monasteries and one of the rules is that no woman or anything female is ever allowed to put foot on its shores. In 1219 King Stephen sent his brother Sava to Nicæa, where the Greek Emperor and the Greek Patriarch then resided, to ask for the appointment of an archbishop of Serbia. The request was readily granted, and Sava was consecrated as the first Serbian Archbishop. This action of the Patriarch drew a strong protest from the then Archbishop of Ohrida, who maintained that Serbia was subject to his spiritual jurisdiction. He contested the legality of Sava's consecration, declared that by it his rights were infringed, and threatened

the newly-created archbishop with excommunication. The protests of the Archbishop of Ohrida, however, changed nothing in what had been done in Nicæa. Whether from a desire to placate the offended Archbishop, or unwilling to have the Serbian Church dependent on the Greek Patriarch, we find the successor of King Stephen turn to the Archbishop of Ohrida and not to the Patriarch for the elucidation of certain church questions that interested him. This greatly displeased Archbishop Sava, who resigned his office and left the country on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. On his return homeward he stopped over in Tirnovo, the capital of Bulgaria, to pay a visit to the King, and there died in 1236.

Sava is just as widely known and respected among the Serbians as Cyril and Methodius are among the Bulgarians. He is, in fact, called the *Illuminator* of the Serbian people.

In the fourteenth century Serbia, under the able rule of Stephen Dushan, became the most powerful State in the Balkan Peninsula, and the King assumed the title of "Tsar of the Serbians and Greeks." With the consent of the Bulgarian Patriarch of Tirnovo and the Archbishop of Ohrida the Serbian Archbishop of Ipek was raised in 1346 to the rank of a Patriarch, without the sanction of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

One of the most interesting facts about this Serbian Patriarchate is that, having for a long time ceased to exist, it was renewed about the sixteenth century by order of the famous Turkish Grand Vizier, Mehemet Sokolli, who was really a Serbian from Bosnia. To



show you how intricate and complex these questions were in those days, while this man Mehemet was Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire and a Mohammedan, his younger brother was a Christian Serbian bishop. So, for the sake of his brother the Grand Vizier ordered that the Patriarchate should be revived and that his brother be appointed Patriarch. Thus we find the two brothers, one governing the Church of Serbia as a Christian, the other governing the Turkish Empire as a Mohammedan.

The creation of a Serbian Patriarchate did not, however, abolish the Archbishopric of Ohrida, although the extent of its jurisdiction was reduced by having some of its dioceses annexed to the newly-created Patriarchate of Ipek. This Patriarchate subsisted till the year 1766, when it was abolished by a decree of the Sultan and its dioceses were placed under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople.

We know very little of the internal organization of the Bulgarian and Serbian national churches during their existence as self-governed or autocephalous institutions. The presumption is that they in no way differed in their hierarchical constitution from the other churches belonging to the Eastern Orthodox confession. As in Byzantium, so among the Bulgarians and Serbians, the Tsar or ruler was considered the defender and propagator of the faith. The Church was the handmaid of the State, Patriarchs or Archbishops were deposed or elevated to the throne by the ruler's order. By his command also ecclesiastical councils were convoked, over which either he in person presided or delegated this office to the Patriarch or Archbishop.

The decisions of these councils were promulgated as laws by a royal decree, and the secular authorities were charged with their execution. The tendency of the Bulgarian and Serbian Kings, as soon as they felt themselves strong enough to assert their political independence or by their conquests to gain supremacy over the Peninsula, was to declare also the ecclesiastical independence of their kingdoms. As the recognition of a national church by the Greek Patriarch could as a rule be obtained only under stress of circumstances or by compulsion, ecclesiastical self-government was secured by an order of the sovereign, or by having recourse to the Pope of Rome, whose sanction, though that of a schismatic prelate, was deemed sufficient and valid. That is one of the strangest things in the history of these Balkan peoples. Although the churches had already separated and they were all the time at daggers drawn with each other, these kings, if they could not get what they wanted from Constantinople, from the Patriarchate, would send a delegation to Rome and ask the Pope for it. Although the Pope in the eyes of the Eastern Orthodox Church and its adherents was a rank heretic, he would be asked to grant these patriarchal privileges.

Both King and church expressed a desire for union with this Roman church and repeatedly promised to recognise Papal supremacy, but these promises were never fulfilled. They were mere subterfuges to gain recognition of the royal dignity for the secular head of the State, and the Patriarchal or Archbishop's rank for the head of the church. These kings of Serbia

and Bulgaria were up to European diplomacy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, making promises and never keeping them. It thus came to pass that in spite of the various attempts made by the Popes to draw the Bulgarians and Serbians into a union with the Roman Church, they have remained members of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Roman Catholicism succeeded in penetrating and maintaining itself chiefly among the Croats and in Dalmatia. The few Catholics among the Bulgarians of to-day—about 30,000 in all—owe their conversion to a much later period, namely, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The majority of them belonged not to the Eastern Orthodox Church, but to a heretical sect, known under the name of Bogomils, which had a great affinity with the sect of the Paulicians, and even now, though Catholics, are called in Bulgaria Paulicians.

It is very strange that they have retained the name of this old sect, which was really an Armenian sect, starting first in Armenia and then coming over to the Balkan Peninsula.

The abolition of the Serbian Patriarchate of Ipek in 1766 and of the Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ohrida the following year placed both Serbians and Bulgarians under the direct spiritual jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. All dioceses in Church affairs were administered by Greek bishops and it was a rare exception that a Bulgarian or a Serbian was appointed a bishop. As the Patriarch and the bishops acted as the official representatives of the Christians before the central government in Constantinople

and the provincial authorities, the Bulgarians and the Serbians in the Turkish Empire had no representatives of their own race, but were represented by Greeks.

The Patriarch, by charter granted to him by Sultan Mehemet, the conqueror of Constantinople, in 1453, has the rank of the highest Pasha or a Vizier in the Ottoman Empire, and bishops also have civil ranks corresponding to the administrative hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire. So that really they are considered as officials of the government and in many receptions at the palace or on state occasions the Patriarch has the precedence over several Turkish officials.

All writers on the subject, some of them Greeks, agree in describing as most pitiable the condition of the Greek Church under Turkish rule. All offices from the highest to the lowest were sold to the highest bidder; and on account of that the patriarchal throne was sometimes occupied by men who were a disgrace not only to religion but to morality. One of the few non-Greeks who occupied it was a Serbian; but he was such a confirmed drunkard that it is said that even when he officiated in the church he had to be supported by two deacons, because he was so drunk he could hardly stand on his feet.

The bishops were as a rule men of low character, greedy and avaricious, bent upon extorting money from the lower clergy and their Christian flock under various forms and pretexts. Besides, especially since the beginning of the last century, a regular system of hellenization among the non-Greek populations was begun and zealously pursued. This process of hellenization and denationalization was greater in Bulgaria

than in Serbia. The latter country by its geographical position was not in immediate contact with Greeks. Across the river Save on Hungarian territory there was a large Serbian population, living under the spiritual jurisdiction of a Patriarch and enjoying church and school privileges.

That is another thing which is a puzzle for outsiders who do not know the history of these churches. Serbia before the war was an independent kingdom, but the chief of the Serbian Church was never called a Patriarch. The Serbian Church was ruled by a Synod, over which the Metropolitan or Archbishop of Belgrade, as living in the capital of the kingdom, presided, and he had the place of honor in regard to the other bishops. But across the River Save, on Hungarian territory, in the little town of Carloftsi, there lived the chief of the Serbian Orthodox Christians, and this man was called a Patriarch. He had a higher rank than the man who was at the head of the Church in Serbia. The explanation is: About the end of the seventeenth century a large part of Serbia and also of what is called Old Serbia was occupied by Austrian troops, and they held it for several years. Afterwards they were obliged to retrocede this country to the Turks, and they persuaded the Patriarch of Ipek or Petch, of whom I have spoken, to emigrate with as many Christians as wanted to emigrate and come over to Austria, promising him that he should retain his title. They gave him all the privileges and prerogatives of a Patriarch. It is said that about thirty thousand families emigrated at one time, going over to Hungary and settling there, and he had the

title of Patriarch, which he bears to this day. What will happen under Yugo-Slavia, of course, I do not know; whether he will be allowed to retain his title or whether the Metropolitan of Belgrade will be raised to the rank of a Patriarch. But it is really very curious that the Serbians under Hungarian rule should have had for the chief of their Church a man called by the title of Patriarch, while independent Serbia did not have a Patriarch.

Communications and relations with this population across the Rive Save were never entirely broken off by the Serbians in Serbia proper. When by the treaty of Adrianople of 1829 between Turkey and Russia, Serbia was recognized as an autonomous province under the suzerainty of the Sultan, an agreement was made with the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, by the terms of which the Prince and the people of Serbia were allowed to choose their own bishops without any interference on the part of the Patriarch. The archbishop of Belgrade, with the title of Metropolitan of all Serbia, was, as *primus inter pares*, appointed head of the church, taking precedence of the other bishops. The chosen Metropolitan was not to be obliged to go to Constantinople and receive consecration from the Patriarch. The latter was merely informed of the choice and expected to send his approval in writing. For the election of the other bishops the Patriarch's consent was not necessary. Serbia paid to the Patriarch a certain fixed sum of money as compensation or remuneration. This arrangement lasted till 1879, when the Patriarch was induced to recognize

the complete independence of the Serbian Church, and ceased to have any concern with its administration.

In Bulgaria, which up to 1878 remained a simple Turkish province without any political rights, the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch and bishops was maintained intact and absolute. The various excessive tolls levied upon the people by the Greek bishops were the least objectionable part of their rule, although, taken in connection with the heavy taxes and extortions of the Turkish Government and officials, they must have weighed pretty heavily on the people.

The bishops raised these tolls for all sorts of things. If you wanted a prayer said for your dead father or mother, you had to pay so much. If a man wanted to be ordained a priest he had to pay the regular price. A couple could not be married unless they paid so much for a license and the performance of the marriage ceremony. The reason was that the bishops had to buy their bishoprics by paying the Patriarch; the Patriarch had to buy his place by paying the Turkish officials, and as the Turkish officials increased their price the Patriarchs had to increase theirs, and the bishops naturally had to impose heavier burdens upon the clergy and the people. So the whole thing was based upon graft.

What was infinitely more obnoxious and menacing was the proscription of the Bulgarian language in the schools and of the Slavic liturgy in the churches. The Bulgarians were called and treated as blockheads, their language was considered as barbarous, and everything Bulgarian was despised. In the towns of Bulgaria

Greek schools only were tolerated, and every more or less educated Bulgarian, imbued with the spirit of Greek learning, was ashamed to call himself a Bulgarian, but prided himself on being a Greek.

In conjunction with the Turkish authorities, which were under their influence, the Greek bishops offered a strong opposition to the opening of Bulgarian schools. They even went further in their anti-Bulgarian propaganda, and sought to destroy every vestige of Bulgarian literature. There are well-authenticated cases of the burning or otherwise destroying of old Bulgarian manuscripts and books. The Russian historian and philologist, Grigorovitch, who traveled in 1844-45 in the Balkan Peninsula for the purpose of scientific research, reports that at Mount Athos eyewitnesses told him how piles of old Bulgarian codices and books were thrown into the sea, while others were being used as fuel for the stoves. The same writer relates that in his travels he rarely met with a person who could read Bulgarian or Church-Slavic, and almost no one could express himself in writing in his vernacular except in the Greek script.

I myself had an uncle who was educated in these schools and who to the time of his death could never write a letter in Bulgarian characters, but always used to write Bulgarian with Greek characters.

The reaction against this process of hellenization among the Bulgarians came from a monk in Mount Athos, a native of Macedonia, who, as he himself says, inspired by an ardent love for his people and his country, composed and circulated in manuscript a short history of the Bulgarian people. "I have written



it," he says, "for you, who love your people, your country and your language, that it might profit you and stimulate your national dignity." Then in sharp rebuke he apostrophizes those who learn to read and speak Greek, and says: "O fools! why are you ashamed to call yourselves Bulgarians, and why do you not read and speak your own language?" In reminding his fellow-countrymen of the former history of the Bulgarians, in presenting in a rather exaggerated form the prominent positions their ancestors in days of yore had occupied among the other Slavs, the book prepared the way for the Bulgarian national rebirth. This movement of necessity assumed a literary and church character, for it was directed towards the emancipation of the national language and consciousness from Greek influence, which was exerted chiefly through the school and the church. It is very significant that the people of Macedonia, the Bulgarian character of which has in recent years been called in question, were the first pioneers in this movement. It is really from there, where Greek influence was supposed to be the strongest, that the so-called Greco-Bulgarian church question was started. Some have asserted that it was a wrangle between Greeks and Bulgarians about priests and bishops. *That* is a very superficial view of the question, for it was more than that: it was a struggle by which a people, sunk in deep ignorance and oblivion, sought to vindicate its rights to existence and self-determination as a nation.

The original demands of the Bulgarians addressed to the Greek Patriarch were that bishops appointed to Bulgarian dioceses should be Bulgarians or persons

conversant with the language of the people; that church services should be conducted in the Church-Slavic language, and that the opening of schools with Bulgarian as the language of instruction should not be prohibited. The obstinate refusal of the Greek Patriarchate to listen to these modest demands, increased the popular agitation and indignation, and as the dispute dragged its weary length, the demands of the Bulgarians culminated in asking for a separate national church administration. After almost forty years of struggle, the Turkish Sultan, to whom the Bulgarians had appealed for a settlement of the question, granted in 1870 a charter for the constitution of a Bulgarian church administration, under the name of Bulgarian Exarchate. The chief of the newly constituted Bulgarian church was to bear the name of Exarch, who with a Synod of bishops and a mixed Council of clericals and laymen was to administer the church. The statutes elaborated by representatives of the people for the government of the church were based upon democratic principles, allowing popular elections for all ecclesiastical offices—a privilege, which Bulgarians had never enjoyed under the rule of the Patriarch. In all matters of religion, church dogmas or doctrines, the exarch is subject to the Patriarch, so that, strictly speaking, the Bulgarian church was not entirely independent of the Patriarchate.

The democratic principles which the authors of these statutes of the first Bulgarian church tried to push through were so liberal that they wanted even to have the Exarch chosen every four years, which is contrary to the ecclesiastical rules of the church. A man once

appointed a Patriarch, a Bishop or an Archbishop must remain and die in that office, unless he does something to deserve excommunication. I remember very well when the statutes were presented to the Turkish Grand Vizier and he read this article providing that the Exarch was to be chosen every four years, he smiled and said, "Are you choosing an Exarch, or are you choosing a President of the United States?"

The Patriarch, however, refused to recognize the Sultan's charter and the reason for his refusal was the tenth article of the charter. After enumerating the dioceses, mostly in North Bulgaria, which the Exarchate was to include, and to the inclusion of which the Patriarch had already consented, this article provided that in other dioceses a census would be taken, and wherever the total Christian population or two-thirds of it expressed a desire to join the Exarchate, they would be allowed to do so. This article had in view dioceses in Thrace and Macedonia, which, according to the contention of the Greek Patriarch, were not inhabited by Bulgarians, and it proved a stumbling-block to his accepting the Sultan's decision. After trying in vain for two years to have the charter revoked or its objectionable tenth article eliminated, the Patriarch convoked in 1872 a local church council in Constantinople, composed exclusively of Greek prelates, and declared the Bulgarian church schismatic. The Council did not invite or permit the Bulgarians to appear and state their case. The sentence of excommunication ran thus: "We blame, condemn and declare contrary to the teaching of the Gospel and to the sacred canons of the blessed Fathers *ethnophylet-*

*ism*, to wit, racial distinctions and national discussions in the bosom of the Church of Christ." The Bulgarians were declared schismatics, then, not because they had changed any dogma or doctrine of the Eastern orthodox church, but simply because they had asked to have a clergy of their own nationality and language, capable of preaching and expounding to them the Gospel and the teachings of the Fathers of the Church in a language intelligible to them. In their original demands they showed themselves ready to accept even Greeks as bishops, provided they were acquainted with the Bulgarian language. The Patriarch, on the other hand, in refusing to accede to this legitimate demand, exposed himself to the charge of upholding "racial distinctions," by insisting upon Greeks only having the right and privilege of being bishops. Besides, in Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania and Greece, there were national churches administering themselves, and yet not guilty of any schism. That the proclamation of the Bulgarian schism was justified neither by the teaching of the Gospel nor by the sacred canons of the church Fathers, but was only a subterfuge is best shown by the invitation which the Greek Patriarchate has recently sent to the Bulgarian church, asking it to send delegates to a church Council to be convoked by the Patriarch.

The introduction of Christianity among the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula and the construction of an alphabet had for a natural consequence the beginning and development of a Slavic literature. A Bulgarian writer of the first quarter of the tenth century informs us that the heathen Slavs had no books, but made use

of lines and notches in writing. What these lines and notches were is unknown, as no documents of such characters have been found. Those Slavs who became Christians before the second half of the ninth century were wont to write for many years their language with Greek and Latin characters; but as the Greek and Latin alphabets are wanting in letters expressing sounds peculiar to the Slavic tongue (as, e. g., *ch* in *chin*, *sh* in *shop*, *z* in *azure*, etc.), the method of such writing was unsatisfactory and full of irregularities. "Then," to use the words of the pious monk, "God, in his mercy and kind providence, raised up Constantine the philosopher, called also Cyril, who made for the Slavs an alphabet of thirty-eight letters, and together with his elder brother, Methodius, translated into Slavic the Holy Scriptures and church books." Of all European alphabets that I know of, the Slavic is the richest in separate characters for expressing various sounds, and that is perhaps why Slavs are such good linguists—they can learn languages so easily.

There are two Slavic alphabets, the Glagolitic and the Cyrillic (which bears the name of its author), in which manuscripts have come down to us. Both of them are formed on the pattern of the Greek alphabet, with the addition of some letters to designate sounds peculiar to the Slavs. The letters of the glagolitic alphabet, which was long ago superseded by the cyrillic, have a peculiar formation, resembling the Coptic or the Armenian alphabet; those of the cyrillic, which to this day is in use among all the Slavs who belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church (that is, the Russian, Serbian, Bulgarian and Montenegrin), are the exact

copy of the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet plus fourteen letters to represent particular Slavic sounds.

The language in which the translation of the Holy Scriptures and Church books was made in the ninth century is generally spoken of in ancient writings as "Slovenish" (*Slovenisk*), and sometimes as Bulgarian. The generally accepted opinion now is that it was the language of the Slavs in Macedonia, which did not much differ from that spoken by the Slavs or Bulgarians north of the Balkans. As this language served primarily for church purposes, which it does even now, it is often called by modern writers church Slavic, while other writers speak of it as old-slovenish or old-Bulgarian. The latter term is due to the fact that it was among the Bulgarians that this language became first a literary language.

The Bulgarian literature, the first among the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula, was developed soon after the introduction of Christianity, namely in the tenth century. The writers were exclusively churchmen, and their productions bore the character of religious works, intended to confirm the people in Christian faith, piety and morality. These productions were translations from Greek originals, which they servilely follow, and owing to the translators' defective knowledge of Greek are not infrequently rather obscure in meaning. From a philological or linguistic point of view they are no doubt very interesting; but from the standpoint of national literature they are of little value. They throw no light upon the life, the history or the character of the people, and that is why we possess hardly any in-

formation from native sources about the internal conditions of Bulgaria in the tenth and subsequent centuries. But such as it was, this Bulgarian literature served as the source and model for the Serbian and Russian literatures, which appeared much later. As the differences between the Bulgarian, Serbian and Russian languages were not so great then as they are now, the Bulgarian manuscripts were freely copied, with very slight modifications in orthography, by Serbian and Russian writers. Sometimes the copies did not change even the orthography, because every church book was considered sacred, and therefore it had to be copied exactly as its prototype is.

Christianity was officially introduced into Russia in 988, 125 years after its introduction into Bulgaria, and there can be no doubt that the Slavic liturgy and other church books, together with some clericals, found their way into Russia from Bulgaria. In fact, all that we know of the productions of the old Bulgarian literature from the tenth to the fifteenth century, when Bulgaria lost its political independence to the Turks, we know from the copies that were made in Russia and have been preserved in the Russian libraries. These copies bear unmistakable signs in orthography of their Bulgarian origin. In speaking of the literary and church relations between Russians and Bulgarians up to the fifteenth century, the late Professor Lamansky of the St. Petersburg University says: "During all that time Russia constantly received from Bulgaria not only Slavic manuscripts, but also spiritual fathers, writers, artists, church cantors, because Bulgaria up to its downfall in respect to its spiritual enlightenment and

State development stood incomparably higher than Russia at that time."

Beside the literature approved by the State and church for its orthodoxy, there arose in Bulgaria in the tenth century an unorthodox literature, which spread into Russia, Serbia and other neighboring countries. It also was derived from Greek sources, from the so-called apocryphal books. Many of the superstitions and popular beliefs that still survive among the Bulgarians, Russians and Serbians are due to this literature, and there is a strong presumption in favor of the influence it has exerted upon some of the Russian sects. The zealous propagators of this literature were the Bogomils, a sect that first appeared in Bulgaria in the tenth century, and from there spread to other countries, even to Italy and France, where they were known by the name of Cathari, Ppublicani, Christiani, etc. The modern Waldenses are supposed to be the descendants of the Albigenses or the Cathari, who were the representatives of Bogomilism in France and Italy.

The Bogomils had great affinity with the sect of the Paulicians and like them were a dualistic sect, believing in two principles: God the creator of the invisible and Satan of the visible world. They rejected the Old Testament, except the Psalms, as a production of the Evil One, and of the New Testament they honored the Gospel of St. John the most. They rejected the worship of images, the incarnation of Christ, the church hierarchy, the feasts and fasts of the Church, the erection of churches or altars as places of worship, and it is said that they used to pray anywhere, wherever they



happened to be. If we may believe the reports of some of their enemies the Bogomils were anarchists in their social and political tendencies. "They teach," says one of their opponents, "their adherents not to obey the rulers, to speak evil of the rich, to hate fathers, to revile elders, to rail at the nobles; they think that all who serve the King are an abomination to God, and they tell every servant not to work for his master."

Serbian literature did not begin till late in the twelfth century and the oldest church Slavic manuscript of Serbian recension is a Gospel, written in the cyrillic alphabet for a Serbian prince, towards the end of that century. The establishment of a Serbian archbishopric in the thirteenth century helped the development of a literature, the language of which, however, was the church Slavic. Like the Bulgarian literature which it copied, the Serbian literature had an ecclesiastical or religious character. The books which were used in the church services were the same, and the literary relations between the two countries were so close that some writers, Bulgarians by birth, have produced works that by right belong to the Serbian literature. The Serbians have been more fortunate in having had writers who strove after the creation of a literature with national tendencies. In this literature we meet with chronicles, which in a very succinct form tell of national events; biographical sketches of Serbian Kings and saints, which have considerable value in the reconstruction of Serbian history. Such productions are lacking in the Bulgarian literature, or, if they ever existed, they have been irretrievably lost.

With the establishment of Turkish rule in Bulgaria

towards the beginning of the fifteenth century, all literary activity ceased. Learned men fled from the country or found an untimely death in banishment and imprisonment. The utter intellectual degradation of the country and the absence of any literature is best shown by the fact that during the sixteenth century only two small books—a Psalter and a prayer-book—are mentioned as having been printed in Venice. In the following century only one little prayer-book, intended for the use of Bulgarian Catholics and composed in a mongrel Croato-Bulgarian language, appeared printed in Rome. In the first half of the seventeenth century, a prince of Wallachia (a part of Eastern Roumania) requested the Catholic mission in Bulgaria to send him a Bulgarian to supervise the printing of some works in the Bulgarian language. The mission sent him a Croat, because they could not find anyone in Bulgaria who was fit for the work. Bulgaria, which had formerly supplied Russia with church books, began now to receive such books from Russia, because in Bulgaria there was not a single printing press. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these books, written originally in the Slavobulgarian language, underwent in Russia a modification in orthography in order to assimilate them more to the Russian language and pronunciation. These books, so corrected, are in use in the churches of all Eastern Orthodox Slavs to-day and their language is known as church Slavic.

Literature among the Serbians in Serbia proper, which was under the direct rule of the Turks, was not much better, especially before the eighteenth century.

It is really from the beginning of that century that a movement for the promotion of Serbian enlightenment and literature is noticeable. The center of that movement, however, was not in Serbia, but among the Serbians of Austria, who, as I have already remarked, enjoyed church privileges under a Patriarch of their own. Sustained relations between this Patriarch and Russia existed and young Serbians were sent to Russia to be educated and prepared for entering the teaching or the clerical profession. Russia supplied not only the church books, but also Russian text-books for the schools. For the college or gymnasium at Carloftsi, where the Patriarch resided, Russian teachers were procured, and under their influence and that of the Russian literature a so-called Slavo-Serbian language was formed which became also the literary language of the Serbian writers of those days. This language was more Russian or church Slavic in its elements than Serbian, and quite foreign to the language spoken by the people. The literature was accessible only to a few learned men, while it was unintelligible to the mass of the people. It was towards the beginning of the nineteenth century that Serbian literature began a struggle for national self-assertion in the popular vernacular. The credit for this movement is due to two men, remarkable as men of practical good-sense, of whom the Serbians are justly proud. One of them, Obradovitch, was a monk of an open and inquisitive mind, broad and liberal views, seldom to be found in men of his class. He declared himself opposed to the literature produced by the Slavo-Serbian school, and maintained that for a literature to be helpful to a

nation it must be written in the language of the people. His successor and pupil, Karadjitch, a layman and a self-made man of genius, took up the fight where his predecessor had left it, and in spite of a most violent opposition on the part of the Slavo-Serbian party, carried the struggle to a successful issue. He simplified the orthography of the Serbian language, which formerly was unnecessarily cumbersome and difficult, and made its spelling the most phonetic among the Slavic languages. By the adoption of the popular language as that of the literature and by the reformation of its orthography, Serbian literature freed itself from the shackles which hindered its advancement and has steadily progressed. It has produced writers of no mean repute in almost all branches of literary pursuits.

In Bulgaria there was no occasion for such a hard struggle on the part of the popular language for predominance in literature. While it is true that the few writers who appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century used in their writings a mixture of church Slavic and Bulgarian, the difference between the written and spoken language was not as great as it was among the Serbians. In the formation of a Bulgarian literary language, the Russian language and literature have had considerable part. Most of the writers who have been responsible for its formation were men who had been educated in Russia; but in their imitation of the Russian they never went so far as the Serbian writers of the Slavo-Serbian school did. This is especially true of the writers who began their literary activity in the second half of the last century. Since

then the tendency has been to divest the literary language from any Russicisms and place it upon a more national basis. Very little change has been made in the orthography of the language, so that between the Serbian and Bulgarian, in their relation to the Russian literary language, the Bulgarian comes the nearest. A Russian can more easily read and understand a Bulgarian than a Serbian book or newspaper. In regard to literary productions, the Bulgarian people may well be proud of what they have accomplished, seeing that a forward and intensive literary activity among them began only after their political emancipation in 1878. In none of its productions does the Bulgarian literature lag behind that of Serbia.

Within the limited time assigned to this paper I have tried to cover a great deal of ground. The sketch that I have attempted to give of the Church organization and the literature of the Serbians and Bulgarians had of necessity to be concise, touching upon the most important and, what seemed to me, the most interesting points of the subject. Before I conclude, I would like to say a few words upon the position the Church occupies in the Near East, which may correct some misapprehension on the subject.

It is repeatedly asserted that in the Near East religion is politics and that nationality and religion are one and the same thing.

From 1453, when with the capture of Constantinople Turkish rule was definitely established in the Near East, the church has been under the official control of a ruler, alien to it in race, religion, language and sentiment. In the eyes of the Turkish govern-

ment and every Turk the people of the Empire were divided into two classes: the faithful or Mussulmans and the infidels or *ghiaours*. The government took no cognizance of nationalities, for Islam recognizes no national distinctions; it knows only of believers, who accept its doctrines, and unbelievers, who reject them. Every Christian was an unbeliever, and if he was allowed to live under a church organization of his own, that was an act of mercy, due to the generosity of the Sultan. Europeans, living in the empire but not Turkish subjects, had their respective States to protect them. This protection in the course of time assumed large proportions. The poor Christians who were Turkish subjects had no such protection from outside. The only protection, frail and unavailing as a rule, vouchsafed to them was by the Church, whose hierarchy enjoyed a certain official standing with the Turkish government and the foreign Powers. The Church, then, had to occupy itself with politics, for every appeal or protest it made against Turkish misrule, whether made to the Turkish Sultan or to foreign Powers, was interwoven with politics. The very interrelation between Turks and Christians, between masters and subjects, gave to every action of the Church in behalf of the latter, a political as well as a religious character. Once this interrelation is removed, the Church has no reason to play politics, as we see it in all the Balkan States that have been freed from Turkish rule.

As the Turk had nothing in common with the Christian, the latter looked upon him with deep aversion not only as his oppressor, but also as an enemy of his

faith. Any Christian, who became a convert to Mohammedanism, was considered a renegade, and as religion was the only distinction between a Turk and a Christian, a traitor to his nationality. Such a newly-converted Mohammedan became *ipso facto* a Turk, and, as it happens very often with renegades, a worse enemy of the Christian. This view was transferred, by popular logic, to other conversions, as for example to a man becoming a Catholic or a Protestant, who was also looked upon as untrue to his religion and nation. It is right to say, however, that as people in the Near East advance in education and gain a better understanding of the difference between religion and nationality, this view is on the wane, and among some of them has entirely disappeared. In Bulgaria, for example, no Bulgarian is treated nowadays as an alien to his nationality, because he has left the national church. Nor are a man's religious convictions or beliefs a barrier to his being accepted in the government employ, in the army or elected as deputy in the national parliament. If the truth were to be told, it is among the Greeks that the opinion of religion and nationality is still prevalent. In their opinion, every one who is under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch or bishop, attends services in a Greek church and has recourse to the spiritual ministrations of a Greek priest, is a Greek. The second article of the first Greek constitution of 1822 is said to have run as follows: "All the inhabitants of Greece who believe in Jesus Christ are Hellenes." This strange conception owes its origin, no doubt, to the time when all the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula, no matter to what

race they belonged, were subject to the Greek Patriarch and passed before the Turkish government and the outside world as Christians, hence Greeks. The two terms were interchangeable. Even as late as the first quarter of the last century, Russia, which posed as the protector of the orthodox Christians of Turkey, made and knew of no national distinctions among them. In all official documents, especially those prior to the nineteenth century, they are spoken of either as Christians or Greeks. I am glad to say that this mixing of religion with nationality has never found favor with the Bulgarians. There were a number of Vlach and Albanian communities in Macedonia which recognized the authority of the Bulgarian Exarch, but no one ever has claimed them as Bulgarians. On the contrary, full liberty was granted to them to have their own churches with their own priests, and to use in their churches and schools their national language.



### LECTURE III.

## EDUCATION IN THE NEAR EAST SINCE THE CAPTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1453.

In the last lecture I spoke about the church relations existing between the various nations of the Balkan Peninsula. In this evening's paper I wish to give you an idea of the educational relations which have existed among the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula.

It is generally supposed that the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 and the fall of the Byzantine Empire affected unfavorably popular school education among the Christians in the Near East. We know that one of the consequences of the fall of Constantinople was the dispersion of Byzantine learned men, who fled from the city to other parts of Europe, carrying with them Greek classical learning. But while the establishment of Turkish rule in Byzantium and the Balkan Peninsula had a blighting effect upon intellectual development and literary activity, we do not know to what extent it affected popular education. In order to be able to judge of the effect that Turkish domination had upon the public schools and the popular education of the Christians of the Empire, one ought to know what the public school system and the degree of popular education in the Byzantine Empire were. Unfortunately, the data upon which such a

judgment and comparison could be based are practically wanting.

Byzantine historians have given us considerable information about the higher institutions of learning in the Empire. As early as the first quarter of the fifth century, Emperor Theodosius founded a university in Constantinople, which in the time of Emperor Justinian is said to have had twenty-eight professors of Greek and Latin literature, one of philosophy, two of law and some others of theology. Besides this university there were similar institutions in Athens, Beirut, Antioch, Alexandria and other places, which gradually sank into insignificance as Constantinople became the center of all literary and educational movement.

A special system of education was provided for the Emperor's daughters and sons, especially the heir to the throne. Rich families, which could afford to pay for private teachers, had their sons educated at home, or they sent them to some famous educator, whose house became the school for a limited number of pupils, or to one of the many monasteries in the city, where some learned monk took charge of their education. Learning was principally concentrated in the monasteries, and most of the learned men of Byzantium were monks or priests. Several of them attained to a high rank in the civil administration or at the imperial court. There were not a few laymen who were renowned for their erudition, as, for example, the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the Patriarch Photius, who was suddenly raised from a layman to the highest rank in the Greek church, Constantine,

better known by the name of Cyril, the Slavic Apostle, and the author of the Slavic alphabet, which is in use to this day among the Slavs of the Eastern Orthodox profession.

The silence of the Byzantine historians about public schools or popular education warrants the conclusion that they either did not exist or, if they did exist, they were of such a low standard as not to deserve any special notice. While it may be true, as a modern historian remarks, that "illiteracy was considered a reproach among respectable people," we may take it for granted that education among the mass of the people was negligible. Some monk in his cell in a monastery, or some priest in some room attached to a church, may have collected a few children to give them a rudimentary instruction. Such children were destined to enter the clerical profession, to take part in the chanting of church hymns and the reading of the Psalter, Scripture lessons or some prayers used in the church service. The education that these pupils received must have been purely ecclesiastical of the most elementary kind, namely, to enable them to read the church books and rarely to write. If this view of Byzantine popular education be correct, we may safely assert that the Turkish conquest, as we shall see, made no difference in the school system of the Christians of the Near East.

Whether impelled by a spirit of tolerance or actuated by motives of policy, Sultan Mehemed the Conqueror (or as he is called also, Mahomet, but never by the Turks, who always call him Mehemed, who captured Constantinople, did not abolish the office of the Greek Patriarch. Soon after he took possession of the

city he ordered that a Patriarch should be appointed to the vacant Patriarchal throne, and as such he designated a certain learned Greek by the name of George Scholarios. He was duly consecrated with the usual rites and ceremonies and on receiving him in an audience the Sultan was very gracious to him and assured him of his favor and good-will. Presenting him with a pastoral staff, he ordered him to go back to his official residence and take up his duties and functions as the Head of the Church. By a charter granted to him, the Patriarch's rights and privileges as well as those of his bishops and clergy were recognized and confirmed.

It was very fortunate for the Christians in the Near East that, in falling under the political sway of the Turks, they were not deprived of their church organization by the abolition of the Patriarchate. In his capacity as the official representative of the Christians, the Patriarch became their advocate and defender before the Sultan and his government. Among his other duties, that of caring for the schools and the education of the people became one of his prerogatives. In this he was unhampered by the government, for while the Turks seized many churches and converted them into mosques, they were indifferent to the schools, owing to the little value they attached to them. The right of the Patriarch and his bishops, granted to them by the Sultan's charter, to supervise and control the Christian schools, has subsisted to our own days. Many and serious reproaches have been levelled at the abuses that crept into the administration of the Greek Patriarchate under the Turkish rule. Some of these

abuses were due to the unworthy and perverse character of some of the occupants of the Patriarchal throne, while others are to be attributed to the political and social environments in which the Patriarchal office was exercised under a government totally alien to it in religion, race and language. But in one respect great credit is due to the Patriarchate, namely, that in remaining the mainstay and defence of the Christian religion, it was also the patron and leader of education among the Christians of the Near East.

The catastrophe that befell the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula in the fifteenth century was so overwhelming that they could not explain it otherwise than as a direct punishment of God for their sins. It is not surprising that people who saw the Crescent victorious and the Cross vanquished, the followers of Christ oppressed by those of Mohammed, should have grown disheartened and apathetic to every other concern except that of preserving their lives and property, both of which were at the mercy of their rulers. Even the profession of their faith and religion was precarious and exercised under uncertain circumstances, for it was only as an act of mercy on the part of the victors that Christian churches existed. No Christian community could be sure of its place of worship not being seized and converted into a mosque. Schools and education were the last thing that the people thought of or cared for. Book learning was considered appropriate only for the clergy, and even among them it was of the most rudimentary kind. Modern conceptions of education have undergone a great change among the people of the Near East, but it was

not so very long ago that the saying current among the people: "I do not intend to make a priest of him," was considered a sufficient excuse for parents not to send their boys to school.

Very scanty is the information that we possess on popular education in the Near East from the fall of Constantinople to the seventeenth century. One of the oldest schools of a higher grade is that which the Greek Patriarch Gennadios, soon after the capture of the capital by the Turks, established or restored—for it may have existed before—as an adjunct to the Greek Patriarchate. This school still exists in Constantinople under the special supervision and control of the Patriarch and bears the name of "The Great National School." Mention is made of similar schools in the island of Chio and in the Peloponnesus, the principal object of which was to prepare men for the clerical profession, especially of the higher rank. But the attendance at these schools was insignificant, as we may judge from the fact that in 1550 there were only ten students in the patriarchal school in Constantinople, ten in Peloponnesus and four in Chio.

How learning stood and how neglected it was in those days is evidenced by a letter, written in 1550 by the then director or principal of the school in Constantinople to a friend of his in Germany. In this letter the writer bitterly complains of the extinction of all sciences, arts and learning in the East and of their having taken refuge in the West. Twenty-five years later, Stefan Gerlach, who accompanied in his quality as chaplain the Ambassador of the German Emperor to Constantinople and spent several years in

the city, relates that one day he asked a high Greek ecclesiastic if one could get any Greek books in the city. The ecclesiastic told him that he knew of none. To Gerlach's question if there were any learned men among the Greek bishops and monks, the reply was: "None, for we have neither schools nor teachers." In his endeavor to ascertain the extent of learning and the number of learned Greeks in Constantinople and elsewhere in Turkey, Gerlach succeeded in compiling a list of sixty-four persons only!

In order to give an impulse to education the Patriarch and his Holy Synod issued in 1593 an ordinance by which they enjoined "upon the bishop of every diocese to watch over public instruction and to make the necessary expenses to the end that the sacred and divine letters should not cease to be taught." The bishops were also ordered to "come to the help of those who wish to teach and of those who desire to learn, but have not the means." How many bishops conformed to this order of the Patriarchate, we do not know; but as many of them, we may presume, were not highly educated and cultured men nor great lovers of secular education, very few of them probably gave effect to the order. With the object of promoting education, the Patriarchate established in the seventeenth century the first printing press in Constantinople.

These so-called high schools, which have just been mentioned, were not, strictly speaking, colleges, but a sort of mixed schools, in which side by side with higher studies, as philosophy, theology, rhetoric and Greek literature, there were also elementary and preparatory classes. Of one of the directors of the Patriarchal

School in Constantinople, a man of erudition and talents, who had studied in the University of Padua in Italy, we are told that besides teaching the higher branches of science he taught the boys the rudiments of the Greek language.

The higher education given in the few superior institutions of learning was accessible to a very limited number of students. The teachers and the students in these schools belonged to the clerical class or those who were preparing themselves to enter it. Text-books were scarce and the teachers were obliged to prepare in writing their courses and have the students copy them, or distribute one copy among many students. The difficulties attending this method of instruction are obvious, and the progress of the students must have been greatly retarded thereby.

When we come to examine the primary education we find conditions more deplorable. In the absence of specially prepared teachers, the task of educating the young generation devolved upon the priests and monks, and in very rare cases upon laymen, who had succeeded in obtaining a smattering of education. No special buildings for schools existed. In the monasteries boys who had entered them as novices with the intention of devoting themselves to monastic life were taught in one of the cells. In the towns or larger villages where there was a church the priest would gather a few boys in one of the rooms attached to the church and give them such instruction as it was in his power to impart. These schools were known by the name of cloister or *cell* schools. School appliances were wanting and the only text-books that were ready at hand were church



books. Hence, the instruction given was limited to enabling the pupils to read the prayer book, the Psalter, the "Apostle," by which is meant the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles—the church hymns and perhaps the lives of some saints. The pupils were also required to commit to memory some of the church prayers and psalms, and to this requirement is due the name "Learn-by-heart-book" that even to-day the *Horologion* or Prayerbook in Bulgaria bears.

Very few of the pupils acquired the art of writing, while of secular learning some were taught the most rudimentary elements of arithmetic, not venturing most probably beyond addition and subtraction. History, geography, not to mention any higher studies, were ignored to such a degree that even high ecclesiastics had a poor knowledge of them. In his *A Journey through Albania*, published in the beginning of the last century, J. C. Hobhouse tells us that a bishop in Greece asked him if Spain, with which England was at war at that time, was situated in the Baltic Sea!

The limitations or the absence of secular learning is to be attributed not only to the inappreciation of it, but also to the incapacity of the teachers to impart such knowledge. The pupils who attended these cloisters or cell schools were destined to enter the priestly ranks, or, if they were to remain laymen, their highest ambition was to become cantors or leaders in the church singing. When a boy was advanced enough to read at the public church service with all the proper intonation and variation of voice some portion of the Acts of the Apostles or the Epistles, or to take part in the chanting of the hymns in that drawling, nasal intona-

tion so peculiar to the Greek Church music, then he was considered to have reached the acme of his school education. His parents' hearts swelled with pride and joy at the distinction their son had attained, and all their friends and acquaintances congratulated them on their good fortune to have begotten such a prodigy of learning. In celebration of the auspicious occasion that their son had finished his education and had been admitted to be a reader in the church services, the parents gave a banquet to the teacher, attended by all the relatives of the boy. The young graduate was put in a chair and processionally carried into the room of the banquet. At the door of the room he was raised in his chair three times and his head bumped against the lintel of the door, each bump being accompanied with the shout, in Greek, of *axios* or "Worthy!" This custom was called the enthronement of the young savorant and may be considered as the conferring of the *summa cum laude* degree upon him. In recognition of his services the teacher was presented with various presents, as a handkerchief, a towel, a pair of socks or a shirt by the boy's parents and relatives.

In the primary as well as in the superior schools there was no uniform program of studies or method of instruction. Each teacher was free to follow his own method and make his own program. Neither was there any time limit set to the course of study, as it was left to the discretion of the teacher to determine the fitness of the pupil to graduate. In the higher schools the time period was determined by how much of philosophy, theology, logic, rhetoric, grammar, etc., the professor was willing or ready to give. In the

primary or cloister schools the teacher, whose knowledge was generally limited to the simple ability to read, graduated a pupil when the latter had acquired all that his master was capable of teaching him. The object that the instruction had in view was not the mental development of the pupil, the awakening and strengthening of his reasoning faculties. To be able to read—and the faster he could read the better pleased the teacher felt—to commit to memory and recite parrot-like the lesson without missing a word, although not understanding what he recited, was all that was expected of the pupil. If he happened to miss a word or omit a sentence or phrase from his recitation, he was condemned as having failed and had to repeat the same lesson. Not unfrequently, such a failure brought upon the poor pupil condign punishment at the hands of the pedagogue, who considered severity as one of the chief requirements of pedagogy.

The elementary schools, if we may call them by that name, like those of a higher grade, were not very numerous. In some of the principal towns such schools most probably did exist, but the children of many a village were deprived even of such a rudimentary instruction. As there were no special buildings assigned to these schools, the few pupils who attended them were crowded into one room. In some places they sat on benches with the teacher sitting in a corner of the room on a stool or a chair. Most of the schools, however, did not possess the luxury of benches. Both the teacher and the pupils sat on the floor on pieces of carpets or skins, which they brought from home. If the teacher happened to be a craftsman of a sedentary

occupation, such as a tailor, a furrier or a cobbler, he plied his profession and at the same time watched over his pupils, while they were studying their lessons. By his side in a prominent place was a long switch, which served as an incentive to the sluggard and a salutary warning to the mischievous and which came into play on the slightest provocation.

In order to make sure that the pupils were studying and not wasting their time in idle thoughts they were required to read all aloud. There were no fixed hours for recreation; that depended upon the good-will and kind-heartedness of the teacher. Many teachers probably looked upon such recreation as obnoxious to study and damaging to the boy's character. Steady and continued application was regarded as the best way of keeping the young from falling into mischief. Instead of giving the boys recess and allowing them to go out and play, it was not unusual with many teachers to make the children lie down perfectly still and go to sleep or pretend that they are asleep. This gave the teacher an opportunity of having a breathing spell and enjoying his siesta, for the school hours lasted almost the whole day.

A French traveller who visited a preparatory school in Athens in 1673 has left us a description of the method of teaching which he witnessed. There were about thirty boys in the school. Each boy held in his hands a similar book and they were all required to read thirty words of a continued paragraph, the first boy reading only the first word, the second the second and so on in order till all the thirty words were read. If each pupil read correctly his word, the teacher made them read

other thirty words; but if any one of them made a mistake in reading his word, the boy next to him took up the missed word. In this way the attention of the pupils was held upon what was being read, and an emulation among them was developed, as each one considered it a point of honor to correct his neighbor's mistake, and the task of each individual pupil became a common lesson. In order to prevent a pupil from preparing himself only on the particular word that was to come to him in his turn, the order in which the pupils sat was not permanently fixed, but was frequently changed, so that a boy who at one lesson had been placed first would be put at another lesson in a different place. This method was also very practical in providing only one lesson for a whole class, no matter how large it may have been. It was very convenient for the teacher also, because instead of obliging each one of the pupils to come in his turn to read the lesson to him, it constituted each pupil a kind of teacher to his classmate in correcting his mistakes.

As books were scarce, even primers being unobtainable, the pupils had to start their education on tablets made of bark, commonly called by the Greek word *pinakidia*, on which the alphabet and the first reading lessons were written. Such *pinakidia* were in use as late as the first quarter of the last century. That learning was considered a serious and arduous work is exemplified by the fact that at the head of the alphabet or the primer and the other reading lessons a cross was placed and the pupil was required to make the sign of the cross ere he began to read, repeating at the same time the words: "Cross of God, help me!" Con-

sidering the painful way in which, owing to the lack of a rational method of instruction, the pupil was able to acquire the elements of learning, very often taking him days to learn the alphabet, and in view of the punishment that was in store for him if he failed in his recitation, the pupil was wise in imploring divine assistance in the performance of his task.

The school discipline was maintained by inspiring awe in the hearts of the pupils. The severer a teacher was the better educator he was considered to be. The punishments that were administered were harsh and even barbarous, and the instruments of these punishments were ever present before the eyes of the pupils. The long switch placed by the seat of the teacher was the most common, and in order to make the punishment visible to the whole school, the culprit was made to get on the back of one of the bigger and stronger pupils and then was castigated. Other punishments were to make the boy stand before the whole school, sometimes on one leg, with a placard hung around his neck and inscribed with his misdemeanor, or make him sit in a kneeling posture. If the teacher wished to make the pupil feel more forcibly that the way of the transgressor was hard, he would have pebbles or small stones put under his knees. Sometimes, whether standing or kneeling, the boy would be given a more or less heavy weight to hold up in his hand. For very serious offences the culprit had his face blackened with soot or charcoal and his schoolmates were made to pass by him and spit on him; or his bare feet were placed in a kind of stocks, called *phalanga*, made of two pieces of wood tightly tied at

the ends, and as many blows applied as his misconduct in the opinion of the teacher deserved.

The moral principles that were inculcated upon the minds of the pupils in these inferior schools were equally rudimentary. The reading of the Psalter, the prayer-book and other church books was supposed to be conducive to the formation of a good, pious character, in addition to the morality which the teacher's punishments were intended to impress. What confused ideas this school instruction had upon this part of education is well shown in the following song, which the pupils used to sing after their daily task was ended and before they left the school to go home. After an invocation to the Virgin Mary, the song went on to say:

"My father I revere, my mother I venerate, and my first brother and my sister. For all commandment have love. Fear God, honor the King, venerate the priests. An illiterate man is a fruitless tree; hence, that which has learning is more honorable than gold and silver. And you, our good master, have a good night, and for him who does not come early, if small, twelve strokes of the switch, to the bigger twenty-four, and to the monitor forty-eight, and two to boot for a blessing, fifty. Amen! Amen! Amen!"

No improvement was made in these elementary schools during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as we can gather from descriptions of these schools and the method of instruction given to us by European travellers who visited them about the beginning of the last century. In the first quarter of that century a turn for the better took place by the

introduction of the Lancasterian or monitorial or mutual method of instruction. This method was certainly a great improvement upon the cloister or cell system, although it also had the defect of not being very expeditious in the imparting of knowledge. It was quite in vogue in those days in England and other parts of Europe, and through the Greek schools, which adopted it first, it was introduced into the schools of other nations in the Near East. Through monitors or more advanced pupils, who acted as his assistants, one teacher was able to take charge of a whole school by simply supervising and directing the instruction given by the monitors. In view of the scarcity of teachers, the Lancasterian method was very advantageous in making it possible to have a larger number of pupils gathered in a school and taught by one man. I began my education by that system, and I remember very well that the first thing that they made the newcomers do was to begin to write with their fingers on sand. Paper or slate were not in use, but we little ones used to write on sand.

Beginning with the second half of the seventeenth century the instruction given in the higher institutions of learning received a greater impulse. This was due, first, to the introduction of the printing press, whereby books became more general, and, second, to the interest which Greek merchant communities, established in other parts of Europe, more especially in Italy, began to take in the dissemination of learning among their fellow-countrymen. With the funds supplied by them some good schools were founded in Janina, in Epirus, Athens, the island of Scio and other



places. Many young Greeks studied in the Italian universities of Padua and Bologna, and on their return home became teachers or zealous promoters of education. Through the exertions of the Patriarch and some Greek notables, who had succeeded in attaining to official positions in the Turkish government, Sultan Selim III, towards the end of the eighteenth century, granted official recognition to the Greek schools and appointed a Greek to be their general superintendent.

Among the Greeks who had a prominent part in the promotion of learning, Alexander Mavrocordato deserves special mention. He was a native of the island of Scio and had received his medical education in the University of Padua. On his return to Constantinople he was appointed physician to the Court of the Sultan, and successively rose to the position of Chief Dragoman or Interpreter and Privy Councillor of the government. He founded several schools, distributed among them textbooks composed by him, as well as reprints of classics made at his expense.

Mavrocordato was in favor of the ancient Greek language and literature and like many other learned Greeks of those days he considered the spoken language uncouth and barbarous. He occupied for seven years the post of director or principal of the Patriarchal School in Constantinople, where he taught without any remuneration Greek literature, rhetoric, philosophy and sciences. One of his pupils, whom the Greek church proclaimed as the most illustrious of philosophers, in writing of Mavrocordato's services to Greek learning, says: "Mavrocordato found the Chris-

tians of the city not only deprived of all philosophic notions, but ignorant of Greek learning. He at once organized an association of intelligent men. First of all he bettered their manners conformably to the principles of moral philosophy. Then, like a good and diligent paterfamilias he taught the Greek language and philosophy. He also rendered immense services to the Greek nation by imparting in a very short time to his numerous hearers good and serious knowledge."

Another famous teacher of the eighteenth century who deserves to be mentioned was Eugene Boulgaris. As the founder of an academy in one of the monasteries of Mount Athos and as the director of the Patriarchal School at Constantinople and that of Janina, he educated many young men and prepared them to enter the ranks of the clergy or to become teachers. His fame was so great that pupils, both Greeks and of other nationalities, from far and near, came to attend his classes. Logic, grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, mathematics, theology, physics and the Greek classics were taught by him, and in some of these sciences he has left works composed or translated by him.

This program of studies carried by Boulgaris is a good sample of the wide field of instruction that a professor in those days had to cover, without any assistants in his arduous task. The work of the professor was made harder not only because he lacked assistants, but also because proper textbooks were wanting. The education received by the pupils, among whom not unfrequently there were men of maturer age than the college graduates of to-day, was scholastic

and there can be no doubt that many of the teachers were pedants. A great deal of time was devoted to grammar, the ancient Greek writers and the works of the holy Fathers of the Church. The object in view was to produce men who could imitate these ancient writers in their style. The learning of words and the ability to give various turnings to a sentence by employing various synonyms, more or less appropriate to the word that was to be explained, were the usual grammatical and rhetorical exercises.

A writer, himself a professor but evidently of more advanced ideas, in a work on pedagogy published in 1779 strongly attacks this system of teaching the language and grammar. He calls it "verbiage" and a pure waste of time. "Why, oh man of letters!" he says, "do you torment the student with subtleties and futilities, by making him spend time which he could devote to some other exercise of more use to him? Why do you burden him with fifteen synonyms, every one of which may have a proper meaning, since you do not explain to him its meaning, and do not show him the differences among them? Why do you teach him to say the same thing under various forms?"

Another writer, a Roumanian bishop, speaking of the Greek schools which, towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, were the only institutions of learning in his country, says: "Up to the present only words and rules are taught in our schools, and the pupils' memory is overburdened by forcing them to learn them by heart, like parrots, without troubling themselves to understand them. It is thus that one sees students spend from

ten to twelve years and grow old in the study of grammar."

It is no wonder, then, that education was hard to get, that learned men were the rare exception and that schools were not numerous. In the first quarter of the eighteenth century two Europeans who visited Athens found only three learned men there, namely, the archbishop, the abbot of a monastery and a physician. In the second half of the same century, there were about thirty-two higher Greek scholars in Turkey, while up to 1813 there was not a single grammar, parish or elementary school in Greece. While we are told that Mavrocordato and other pioneers of education aimed at spreading philosophy among the people, a thing which the people could very well have dispensed with, popular education was at a low ebb.

I have dwelt so far upon the education supplied by the Greek schools, because up to the first quarter of the last century the Greeks were the only people in the Near East that were able to have schools. This was due to the fact that the Greek Patriarchate was in their hands and the Patriarchs almost without any exception were Greeks. The same is true of the bishops and archbishops who had charge of the various dioceses in the Turkish empire. The other Christians, as the Bulgarians and the Serbians, had no ecclesiastical heads of their own and no official representatives, except the Greek patriarchs and bishops, before the central government in Constantinople or the provincial authorities.

Another advantage that the Greeks had over the other Christians was, that they possessed a rich an-

cient literature, which could serve them as the basis of education. Greek was also the language of the church, and in it were composed the theological works of the great fathers of the Church, its preachers and divines. The Bulgarians and Serbians had no such ancient literature of famous poets, historians, philosophers, orators and others. In the elaboration of a school system of education, the Greeks, in view of the degeneracy of the spoken language which was considered uncouth and barbarous, fell back upon the revival of ancient Greek as a literary language and as the medium of instruction. The Bulgarians and the Serbians had no such language represented by such productions of high literary character. Aside from their spoken language, in which no literature existed, they had the church Slavic language, which was quite different from the popular or vernacular, and in which the only available books were those that were used in the church services. Hence, the Greek schools became the patterns after which similar institutions among the other Christians of the Eastern Orthodox confession in Turkey were established.

But as the spoken language of the people was considered unfit for literary purposes, and as even the church Slavic was proscribed by the Greek Patriarch and bishops in the churches, the non-Greek populations were obliged to have recourse to the Greek language and the Greek literary productions in their schools. The teachers were graduates of the Greek schools, imbued with the spirit of Hellenism and with devotion to Greek learning. One of the most prominent Bulgarian teachers, in whose school in the first

half of the last century several Bulgarians had been educated, was such a fervent devotee to Greek learning that in one of his writings he recommends to the Bulgarians to leave aside instruction in Bulgarian and devote themselves to the study of the Greek language and literature.

In Bulgaria the instruction in the cloister or cell schools was maintained in some of the monasteries, and in very few other places where some monk or priest, versed in the reading of the church Slavic language, gathered around him a very small number of pupils and taught them. These schools, however, were so rare that their number in 1750 was not greater than twenty-eight, and fifty years later it did not amount to more than forty-eight. How many schools there were in Bulgaria in which the instruction was given in Greek cannot be determined, but it is safe to affirm that wherever there were such schools, the Bulgarian language was excluded from them.

In the first half of the last century, Bulgarians who had been educated in Greek schools began here and there to open the so-called Greco-Slavic schools, in which, while still retaining Greek instruction as the most important, a small part was allotted to the study of the church Slavic language.

It was only in 1835 that the first really Bulgarian school of a high grade, conducted on the Lancasterian method of instruction, was founded. It owed its foundation to a Bulgarian merchant settled in Odessa, Russia, and its first principal was a Bulgarian monk. In this school Bulgarian textbooks, either printed or in manuscript prepared by the principal, were used. One

of these textbooks was a grammar of the Bulgarian language, the first of its kind. The opening of this school led to the opening of similar schools in other parts of the country, and its graduates or even students who had taken a partial course, easily found places as teachers in the newly opened schools. The curriculum was naturally not very extensive or comprehensive; still it was not limited only to ecclesiastical training or the tedious study of old classical Greek authors. More attention was paid to secular studies, such as mathematics, geography and history, and in the latter was included that of Bulgaria, utterly neglected in the schools before.

Some of the graduates of these schools went to Russia to complete their education in the Russian gymnasiums or universities. Thanks to the benevolence of the Russian government and Russian societies for the encouragement of education among the Slavs, scholarships were founded by which many young Bulgarians benefited. Coming back from Russia these educated men entered the teaching profession, at that time the only profession open to them, in which they could be of the greatest service to their country. By their much better qualifications as teachers, they were able to give the Bulgarian schools a better organization, far more consonant with the needs of the times and the advance made in school instruction in Europe. They also imprinted upon them a distinctly national character, and saved them from remaining asylums of scholasticism.

In the Danubian principalities, as they were then called, of Wallachia and Moldavia (now known as

Roumania), Greek schools and learning took a firmer hold than in Bulgaria. For about two centuries (1633-1821) Greek influence was predominant in the country, and in polite society the Greek language was preferred to the popular vernacular. In Bulgaria and more so in Roumania, people who laid claim to being educated were ashamed to acknowledge their nationality and kinship with the popular mass, but felt proud to call themselves Greeks. This Grecomania took possession even of the women in Roumania, who considered it a point of gentility and good breeding to speak Greek. In Bulgaria, on the contrary, woman's education was practically unknown and Greek influence never reached the female sex.

The reason of the extension of Greek schools, Greek learning and manners among the Roumanians was that both Wallachia and Moldovia were under the spiritual dominion of the Greek Patriarchate and Greek bishops, and also under the political rule of Greek princes. As autonomous or privileged provinces they were governed not by Turkish pashas, but by Christian governors appointed by the Sultan and chosen from among the prominent Greeks in Constantinople. Each such prince was accompanied by a number of his relatives and friends, to whom various offices were assigned, and a great influx of other Greeks, merchants or speculators, and of Greek monks took place. Naturally all these conditions were favorable to Hellenism, which found its greatest supporters among the aristocracy or big landed proprietors of the country. Education was limited to this small class; sons of the peasants, who were really serfs of the nobles, were excluded



from the schools, and the opposition to the education of the popular mass was so great that attempts at the opening of primary rural schools in 1838 proved vain. The method of instruction in these schools of Roumania was the same as in the other Greek schools which we have already described, and, according to the testimony of the Roumanian bishop, which was cited above, their defects were the same.

Serbia, unlike Bulgaria and Roumania, did not fall, owing to its geographical position, so directly under Greek influence. Ecclesiastically it also was under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople and Greek bishops; but there were hardly any Greeks living in it or adjoining it. The influence which was exerted upon Serbia came mostly from the large Serbian population which inhabited Hungary and which was under the jurisdiction of a native Patriarch and clergy. The privileges granted by the Austrian Emperor to this population authorized it to have its own schools. In 1782 a full gymnasium or lyceum existed in the town of Karloftsi, the seat of the Patriarch, the teachers of which were Russians. In Serbia proper, which was under Turkish rule, there was not, up to the year 1804, one school in a hundred villages, and whatever school instruction there was had to be supplied by the usual cloister or cell schools. During the summer, the pupils in the monasteries as well as those under the tutorship of the priests in the towns and villages, were occupied with work in the fields. They tended the sheep, goats and pigs, or were busy with harvesting and haymaking. During the winter they were taught principally to read church Slavic books. The teaching, however, was so

haphazard and unmethodical that many of the pupils forgot during the summer what they had learned during the winter, so that some of them did not acquire the practice of simple mechanical reading in four or five years.

With the political emancipation of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria from Turkish rule, popular education in these countries has made rapid advances, compared with what it was before. Serbia and Greece regained their independence or self-government in 1829 and 1830 respectively; Roumania, even when it was considered part of the Turkish empire, had home rule under Christian governors, while Bulgaria was constituted in 1878 into a semi-independent principality practically self-governed.

The school systems in all these countries have been organized after those obtaining in other countries of Europe, particularly Austria, Germany or France. The schools are under State supervision and management and the State provides for their maintenance. In the capital of each of these States there is a State University.

One of the most interesting things in connection with the progress that has been made in popular education in the Balkan States is the attention that is paid to the education of girls. No such education existed under the old system, as it was considered unnecessary for girls to know anything beyond their household duties. In Bulgaria especially co-education has been introduced into the University, the primary and high schools and into some gymnasia or colleges.

In December, 1920, the Minister of National Edu-

cation of Bulgaria introduced into the National Assembly a new project of law by which greater impulse is to be given to popular education. In the speech which he pronounced on the occasion, he brought out, basing himself upon official statistics, some facts which show the progress the country has made in the matter of education within the last forty years. Judged by the literacy of the army recruits in 1910, Bulgaria occupied the first place among the Balkan States and the tenth place among the European States, standing before Hungary, Italy and Russia. Three years later, i.e., in 1913, only 5% of the recruits were illiterate, while in Greece and Roumania the percentage of illiteracy was 30% and 41% respectively. In Bulgaria there are 121 pupils per one thousand inhabitants, in Greece 117, in Roumania 88, and in Serbia 51. Bulgaria has one school to every 788 inhabitants, Greece to every 691, Roumania to 1291, Serbia to 2065.

Even when they were under Turkish rule the Bulgarians were noted for their great zeal for education. Two years before Bulgaria was politically emancipated, i.e., in 1876, she had 1479 schools as against 582 in Serbia, though the latter had enjoyed self-government for almost half a century. The fact assumes a much greater significance because under Turkish rule no state aid was given to any Christian school. The people, in addition to their other taxes and government exactions, had to tax themselves voluntarily for the support of their schools.

While popular education among the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula has thus progressed rapidly and been more and more assimilated to that of other

European nations, it has been very slow among the ruling race—the Turks. Christian schools have outstripped the Turkish in every respect. Up to the year 1846 whatever education there was among the Turks was concentrated in the hands of the *ulemas* and *imans* or, in other words, the priesthood. Elementary instruction was given in some room attached to a mosque devoid of all the appurtenances proper to a school, under the guidance of the incumbent of the mosque. Reading, rarely writing, and reciting the Koran or parts of it were the principal subjects taught. Besides these elementary schools, there were the *medressehs* where theology and the religious law, with the Arabic and Persian languages, were taught. Both these kinds of schools still exist, but by a law of 1846 secular education was introduced and three grades of schools were established: primary, middle or secondary and higher. Education is obligatory in the primary schools, but the law is not strictly enforced, as is the case likewise with the schools of other Balkan nations. An Imperial Lyceum, after the pattern of the French lyceums and open to all nationalities was established in 1868, under the management of French professors and with French as the official language. It was the first institution of learning created by the State in which young men of all nationalities of the Empire could get a liberal education. During the reign of Sultan Hamid many schools were opened and some attention paid to the education of the girls, for in spite of all the defects that characterized him as a ruler, he prided himself on being a promoter of education. In Constantinople there is a University with branches for

law, medicine, a military and naval academy, normal school, engineering school, while in the principal towns there are high schools and the usual schools for popular education. But education among the Turks, in comparison with that of the Christians, is very backward and the people in general are not so eager for it. A few years ago a Turkish deputy in the Parliament at Constantinople drew attention to the popular prejudice against education, and in evidence of it said that primers sent to schools in Asia Minor had been returned, because they contained illustrations of some domestic animals.

A survey of education in the Balkan Peninsula would not be complete if one were to omit from it the work done by American schools. Of these the best known are Robert College and the American College for Girls in Constantinople, which are non-sectarian and have no connection with any missionary board. The College for Girls, originally started as the American Home School in 1871, is now in its fiftieth year of existence, while Robert College has been in existence since 1863. Aside from these two colleges there are in the Balkan Peninsula other schools for boys and girls due to missionary enterprise, all of which are found in Bulgaria or among Bulgarians. In none of the other Balkan States—Greece, Roumania and Serbia—have such institutions been encouraged or allowed. The American Collegiate and Theological Institute of Samokov, established in 1860, and the school for girls in the same town, started in 1863, have not only been allowed to exist, but have been granted privileges equal to those enjoyed by the State schools.

Their diplomas are recognized and accepted on equal footing with those of the national schools. Their beneficent work in the education of the youth of the country has been welcomed and unstintedly praised and welcomed by the Government, and recently the National Assembly voted almost unanimously to grant to these two schools land free near Sofia for the erection of buildings where they are to move.

American educational influence has been greatest in Bulgaria, and sixty years ago, when Bulgarian schools were, one might say, in their infancy, American missionaries helped in the preparation of Bulgarian textbooks. As in America, so in the Near East American education aims at imparting to those who come under its influence a love for honest work, perseverance, self-reliance, manliness, broader views of life and a spirit of toleration. So far as instruction goes, it cannot be denied that with the present equipments which they possess and with a corps of instructors a great many of whom have university education, the native institutions of learning do not fall below the American. In certain cases they may even surpass them; but it is universally recognized and deplored that the spiritual and moral influence of the native schools leave much to be desired, and it is in this particular that the American schools stand on a much higher level.

From the historical sketch which I have attempted to draw of school education among the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula since the capture of Constantinople, it is apparent that Turkish rule did not affect unfavorably popular education. It was most probably

no better under Byzantine rule, and while the Turkish domination did nothing to further it, it did not oppose or hinder it. The church up to the last century was the sole depository of learning among the Christians in Turkey and although that learning was neither great nor widely diffused among the clergy itself, popular education was saved by the church from extinction.

For reasons to which I have already alluded, the Greeks occupied a prominent place in the maintenance of school education, but their schools were accessible to men of other nationalities, who wished to benefit by them. It is true that beginning with the last century especially, these Greek schools were employed as means of Hellenic propaganda and promoters of Hellenization. It is also true that the Greek hierarchy, which was spiritually ruling over the non-Greek Christians, discouraged, nay, positively forbade the opening of national schools and the giving of instruction in the national tongue of these Christians. But their efforts to stifle national sentiment or consciousness proved vain. In the revival of the Bulgarian nationality during the second half of the last century and even before, the most prominent champions were men who had been educated in the Greek schools. That several Bulgarians did yield to the process of Hellenization is not to be denied; but the very fact that the Greek professors in their teaching extolled the glory of ancient Greece and bewailed the servitude, misery and hopelessness of the modern Greeks, awakened in the minds and hearts of their non-Greek hearers pity for

their own fellow-countrymen, and a desire to devote themselves to the regeneration of their own people. The opposition which they met on the part of the Greek Patriarch and bishops, made them more determined in their perseverance, for they knew that they were fighting for a righteous national cause.



#### LECTURE IV.

### CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BALKAN STATES.

I am going to speak to you to-day on the constitutional and political development of the Balkan States and peoples since their political emancipation.

One of the principal arguments urged by those who were opposed to granting political emancipation to the Christians of Turkey by according to them autonomy or home rule and thus detaching them from direct Turkish rule, has been that they were not ripe for liberty and self-government. Whatever the defects or demerits of the Turkish government may be, it had, in the eyes of the Turkophiles, this merit, that it had existed for a long time with some sort of an organized administration. The Turkish régime may not have been all that could be desired; but this at least could be said in its favor, that it maintained order and peace among the various nationalities in the Balkan Peninsula. The Turk stood as the policeman of the Peninsula, who prevented national and religious divergencies and animosities from degenerating into open strife and civil war. Ignorant and debased, without any political leaders or political experience, the Christians of the Near East were incapable, so it was said, to organize themselves into orderly governments

and develop qualities which would assure success and stability. It was better, in the opinion of the propounders of this argument, to put up with things as they were than to try experiments the success of which was problematic.

The weakness of the argument is apparent. You cannot expect people to develop political capacities by denying to them every opportunity of exercising political power or by keeping them in bondage. There was nothing in the Turkish régime that could be called politically educational for their Christian subjects. To keep them under such a régime was certainly the most hopeless way to prepare them for self-government.

If we look back at the constitution of the mediæval Bulgarian and Serbian States we find that political authority was concentrated in the hands of the ruler and the class of nobles or magnates. The greatest pride of a Bulgarian or Serbian King was to adorn himself with a title of Tsar, corresponding to the Greek Basileus and that of "Autocrat," borne by the Byzantine Emperors. If the ruler happened to be a man of strong will and iron hand, he could keep the magnates in subjection and make them obey him: if not, they did not hesitate in braving his authority and asserting their independence. The people had no rights; they were practically serfs. Notices have been left to us of assemblies convoked by the Kings on some special occasions; but in these assemblies, composed of the magnates and the higher clergy, the mass of the people were unrepresented. The model which the Bulgarian and Serbian Kings imitated and from which they copied their own administration was Byzantium, where autocratic rule

obtained. When dissatisfaction with oppressive laws, taxes or government exactions became too strong, it found vent in riots and revolutions, of which we find more instances in the history of Byzantium than in that of Bulgaria or Serbia.

The reason assigned by the Serbian historian Stanoevitch for the downfall of the Serbian kingdom under the domination of the Turks may be applied equally well to the same fate which befell the Bulgarian kingdom. "The State," says this historian, "took away everything from the peasantry without giving them in return any security whatever of life or property. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that in many places the people preferred to fall under the Turkish dominion, believing that it might grant them some advantages which the Serbian State could not, and that a change of masters might, at any rate, bring some improvement in their life. The people reasoned that they were not obliged to work and fight for their masters, who squeezed everything out of them without being able to defend them at least from the incursions of their enemies."

The Turkish conquest did not produce any great change in the condition of the mass of the people. It was only an exchange of masters, with the difference that the new master was alien to his subjects in race, language and religion. Provided the Christians were submissive, paid their taxes and endured without any murmur the demands or exactions made by the government upon their resources, their domestic and social form of organization was not disturbed. Of political rights there could be no question, for such rights were

not enjoyed, under the existing despotic government, even by the Turkish population itself.

The social and religious differences between the conquerors and the vanquished tended to keep them apart, though they lived under the same government. Had the conquering race been akin to the Christians in faith, there might have been, perhaps, some cohesion between the two, and some sort of assimilation might have been the outcome. As it was, a differentiation was imposed upon the Turkish Sultans, and this was clearly perceived by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, when he replaced the Byzantine Emperor in Constantinople. He might, of course, have offered to his Christian subjects the Koran or the sword, conversion to Mohammedanism or extermination. Aside from the possibility that such a plan might have proved too difficult to carry out and have raised complications by driving the Christians to desperation, while the Turks were still hoping or planning to extend their conquests to other Christian lands, it is doubtful if the plan would have worked for the advantage of the Turkish power. A policy of toleration was much more profitable, for the Turks could not have dispensed altogether with the services of the Christians. The latter supplied them not only with the best troops, but also with the resources for the prosecution of their wars of conquest. By the taxes they paid, by the tillage of the soil as farmers and producers and by the various requisitions that were imposed upon them in the matter of transportation, provisioning of the army, *corvée* or forced labor, etc., the Christians were of greater service than they would have been if they had been made by con-

version equal to their masters. Of course, if they had become Mohammedan like the Turks, some of these things could not have been imposed upon them.

We may safely assume that it was not due to generosity or magnanimity, of which Turkish Sultans have always liked to boast, or to a spirit of toleration merely, that the Christians were allowed to exist or preserve their faith and nationality. Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror chose the part of wisdom, when, instead of taking extreme measures towards the Christians, he tried to win their allegiance by conceding to them certain immunities and privileges.

The most important of these immunities and privileges were those granted to the Christian Church and its Head, the Patriarch of Constantinople. Aside from the personal prerogatives which he enjoys, as an official of the highest rank, the Patriarch, as I said in my last lecture has the absolute control over the churches, schools, hospitals and other beneficent Christian institutions. He is treated not only as the religious chief of the Christians, but also as the intermediary between them and the government. The position of the Patriarch under Turkish rule was in many respects stronger and more independent, so far as his ecclesiastical or spiritual power was concerned, than it had been under the Byzantine emperors. As a Mussulman ruler, the Sultan could not interfere in the purely ecclesiastical questions, which were of the competency of the Patriarchate. In the Byzantine Empire, as we know, the Emperor really was the master and the Patriarch was his servant.

In matters relating to marriage, divorce and in-

heritance as concerning Christians the Mohammedan sacred law could not be applied. They were referred to the ecclesiastical tribunals, which were allowed to function under the authority of the Patriarch and the bishops, whom he appointed to the various dioceses of the Empire. In the management of their churches and schools, the Christians had their boards of trustees under the general supervision and control of the bishops. The church was, therefore, not limited to religious affairs only: it exercised civil rights also, and, as a Greek writer says, "with its prelates and dignitaries, who represented it in every community, was virtually the Christians' supreme ruler in matters of national affairs as well."

Another institution which the Turks tolerated for a long time and in which the Christians had some share of self-government was the communal organization. This affected especially the rural population, which was allowed to manage its own local affairs. The mayor of the village, with a council of elders, assessed and collected the taxes, which he paid over to the government, acted as the representative of the people before the authorities, and in case of litigation used his good offices between the litigants, so as to prevent them from going to the Turkish courts and save them from expense and exploitation. In the towns also there were similar communal organizations, composed mostly of the prominent citizens, called *tchorbajis* or notables, and the representatives of the guilds or trade-unions. This word "tchorbaji" is a very interesting word, because it denoted among the Janizars the man who had charge of the mess or kitchen. It is de-

rived from the Turkish word "tchorba," which means "soup," so that "tchorbaji" means "soup-man." Afterwards, however, it was transferred to these notables in various towns and villages, and it is never given to a Turk, but only to a Christian. I have never heard of a Turk being called "tchorbaji." The notables were men who either for some service rendered to the government as army contractors, or on account of their wealth, had acquired a prominent position among their fellow-countrymen. As late as the last century such men were found in every town, and by the rank or some distinction conferred upon them by the Turkish government, they became very influential with the provincial authorities. Some of these notables, it is true, used not unfrequently their influence for selfish ends and the promotion of their own interests, but not a few of them, at the risk of their interests and even lives, defended their fellow-countrymen against the abuses and oppression of the local authorities. I know of Bulgarian notables who were more powerful with the central government than the Turkish governor of the province himself, and the Turkish governor stood in awe of such Bulgarian notables.

Another social agency where the Christians could exercise freedom of organization and control of their affairs was the guilds. Every trade was authorized to have its guild, which the government officially recognized as a corporate body, possessing its own by-laws for its administration. As the various kinds of crafts or trades were generally in the hands of Christians, these formed the majority or even the exclusive membership of the guild; but there were some guilds where

Christians and Turks worked harmoniously together. The guild held its regular meetings, discussed its affairs, passed resolutions embodied in protocols or registers, distributed fairly the profits among its members, imposed penalties by fine or temporary suspension upon those who had violated its statutes, without any interference on the part of the government authorities. Its decisions were without appeal, even if a Turk were condemned to pay a fine by supplying candles to a mosque or wax to a church.

The strangest privilege granted by the Sultans of yore to their Christian subjects, was the constitution of certain villages and towns, mostly situated in mountainous districts, into a kind of semi-autonomous communities. These privileged localities existed in Bulgaria in the early part of the nineteenth century, and were designated even by the Turkish government by the Bulgarian word *voynik* (soldier) villages. They were exempt from certain taxes, the official who represented the government authority bore the title of *voyvoda*, a Bulgarian word meaning a leader or chief. No Turks were allowed to dwell in these villages, no exception being made even for the family of the government representative, and, according to some reports, no Turk could pass through the place on horseback or with his horse shod. He was obliged, before he entered the village or town, to unshoe his horse and lead him, and not mount him until he went out of the village at the other end. In return for these privileges the inhabitants of these localities were required to supply the government with the facilities of transportation or act as convoy in the commissariat or the



army. Another charge which they had to perform in time of peace was to take care of the Sultan's numerous horses, groom and pasture them. It was one of the great sights in Constantinople years ago to see these beautiful Arab horses being led out to pasture in the month of May, all led by these Bulgarian peasants, accompanied by music and the horses beautifully decorated with flowers. They used to go through a large part of the city. Most of the grooms in the imperial palace at this time were Bulgarians, and I know that the chief coachman of the Sultan and the lackey who sat with the coachman for many years were Bulgarians from these villages. From these localities also were supplied the tailors, who in the absence of any factories and sewing machines in those days, had to prepare by hand the uniforms of the Turkish army. These tailors, under foremen and managers of their own, formed an organization on a military model and were amenable to special regulations. The privileged villages were entrusted also with guarding the mountain passes and keeping the country clear of brigands. In Greece and Thessaly they were known by the name of *Armatoloi* (armed men) and were placed under the control of the village mayors.

In alluding to these few privileges enjoyed by some of the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula, it is well to state that they were granted by the Sultans as exceptional favors, either as a matter of policy or necessity. These favors, as I said, were bestowed mostly upon such localities which by their geographical position or for some other reason, it was better to conciliate than to try to bring under complete subjec-

tion. Besides, their population was obliged to perform duties which may have been regarded as too humble or humiliating for Mohammedans to perform, or for the performance of which they were incapable. It would be attaching too high a value upon these privileges to say that they partook of self-government, or that they initiated those upon whom they were bestowed in political or civil liberty. When the Turkish government began to think of reforms, which were to convert Turkey into a European State, these privileges were abrogated, under the pretext that they were inconsistent with the proclaimed equality of all the subjects of the Sultan. Repeated attempts have been made to annul the immunities vouchsafed to the church; but the strenuous opposition of the Greek Patriarch and the foreign influence exerted in his behalf have frustrated them.

The political emancipation of the Balkan States dates from the last century. Serbia's autonomy was secured by the Adrianople treaty between Turkey and Russia in 1829. By the same treaty the Sultan was forced to recognize the independence of Greece, which was officially proclaimed in 1832. The youngest Balkan State was Bulgaria, and it owes its political emancipation to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 and the treaty of San Stefano of the following year. By this treaty Russia sought to create a Big Bulgaria, comprising the territory between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains, a large part of Thrace and almost the whole of Macedonia, where the majority of the Christian population was recognized to be Bulgarian.

Guided by the principle that territorial and political

changes in Turkey are a matter of European concern and fearing lest a Big Bulgaria might prove an advanced post of Russia in her future designs on Constantinople, the European Powers, led by England and Austria, revised the San Stefano treaty at the Congress of Berlin of 1878. By this revision Macedonia and Thrace were left under Turkish rule with the promise of a privileged administration; Bulgaria, south of the Balkans, was constituted into an autonomous province, called Eastern Roumelia, under the sovereignty of the Sultan, while Bulgaria between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains was erected into a semi-independent principality under the Sultan's suzerainty. An International Commission, composed of delegates of the Great European Powers, was charged with the elaboration of the Organic Statute by which Eastern Roumelia was to be administered. The Principality of Bulgaria was placed under the rule of a Prince, chosen by the people and approved by the European Powers, and its administration was to be regulated by a constitution enacted by the people through their representatives in a Constituent Assembly.

There are several points of resemblance between the Balkan States in the beginning of their political life and constitutional government. The conditions under which they had lived while under Turkish rule were the same, and the preparation of the people for self-government did not differ much. A constitutional régime was an altogether new experiment they were called upon to try, and doubts about the success of the trial were not unjustified. Constitutional government in the Balkan States did not develop by evolu-

tion, nor was it determined by political traditions, which did not exist. A political servitude of well-nigh five hundred years would have obliterated them, even if they had existed. Everything had to be constructed and organized on new principles, different from those on which the Turkish régime had rested, and in accordance with the development these principles had reached in other European countries.

In comparison with Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria, which began its political life half a century later, had the advantage of working out its constitutional form of government under more favorable circumstances. While popular education was still very low, it certainly stood much higher than that of Serbia, for example, when the Serbians began their war for independence in the early part of the nineteenth century. There were more Bulgarians who had received a home or foreign education or had come into contact with European culture than there were Serbians, when Serbia won her autonomous government. The two leaders of the two Serbian revolutions of 1804 and 1815 were uneducated and illiterate men, and most of those with whom they had to work in the administration of the country labored under the same disadvantage. They were brave and courageous men, who had distinguished themselves as good fighting leaders in the war against the Turks; but they lacked both the knowledge and the experience of organizing a State. As chiefs of the various districts, they claimed equality with the prince, who had been raised to that rank from their midst, and were not willing to submit to him as their sovereign.

By the charter of 1830 the Sultan granted autonomy to Serbia and recognized Milosh Obrenovitch, the leader of the Serbian revolution of 1815, as hereditary prince, who, in conjunction with a Council of State, composed of the prominent men of the country, was to carry on its government. But the ideas of government of Milosh were those of a Turkish pasha, not of a constitutional ruler. The Council of State was not a body representative of the people, and the prince, guided by his arbitrary instincts and ambition for power, ignored it. A constitution, voted by a National Skupshtina or Assembly in 1835, which provided for the formation of a Ministry or Cabinet of six members, the distribution of the legislative and executive power between the Council of State and the Prince, and the institution of a National Assembly of one hundred popularly elected deputies, was suspended by the Prince about two months after it was voted. Dissensions among the national leaders, antagonism between them and the Prince, which involved a change of dynasty, interference on the part of the Sultan, as Suzerain of Serbia, and of some foreign Powers that were interested for their own political ends in the form of administration of the country, delayed for a long time the establishment of a stable government, based on a truly popular representation.

Up to 1888, the various Constitutions that were drafted had for their principal aim to strengthen the authority of the Prince and to leave loopholes whereby their prescriptions could be set aside or violated. Under the reigns of Milan\* and his son Alexander,†

\* Third ruler of the Obrenovitch dynasty; Prince 1868-1882; King 1882-1889.

† Fourth ruler of the Obrenovitch dynasty; King 1889-1903.

constitutional government in Serbia was a mockery. The constitution was suspended or restored according to the whims of the ruler and as it best suited his individual policy. By cleverly manipulating the discords among the politicians of the country, both Milan and Alexander found supporters of their encroachments upon the constitutional régime. The Radical Party, composed of men sincerely desirous of introducing a real constitutional government into Serbia and representing the great majority of the Serbian people, fought strenuously for the vindication of popular rights and popular government. The struggle did not end till 1903, when by a military *coup d'état* the last scion of the Obrenovitch dynasty was deposed and murdered, and the Karageorgievitch family, in the person of King Peter,\* was recalled upon the throne of Serbia. With his accession to the throne constitutional government in Serbia with popular representation and on democratic principles was firmly established. The new King has faithfully kept his promise to observe strictly the constitution and under his rule Serbia has enjoyed a peaceful parliamentary government which has proved beneficial to the country. With the formation of Jugoslavia, or the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, in which Serbia will, or wishes to, play a prominent rôle, a new constitution for the united kingdom will be elaborated by a Constituent Assembly, the delegates to which have been already elected.†

\* King Peter died August 16, 1921, a few days after the delivery of this lecture.

† A constitution was voted on the 15th of last June, but I am sorry to say I have no details of the constitution, so I cannot tell you anything about it.

Greece also had to pass through several years of unrest and political experiments ere it succeeded in establishing a constitutional government. Starting its political existence as an independent kingdom, it was free from the disadvantages and inconveniences of the interference of a suzerain power in its internal affairs; but the conflicting interests in the kingdom of France, England and Russia, which had secured the independence of Greece, exposed it to greater trials and difficulties. A young and inexperienced Bavarian prince, aged seventeen, selected by the three Powers, was sent to rule over the newly established State. A Regency of three members, all of whom were Bavarians, unacquainted with the country and its people, were entrusted with the powers of government. Instead of ordering their administration on communal or municipal principles, they formed it on those of centralization and bureaucracy. For ten years popular discontent, which found vent in brigandage and piracy, kept the country in turmoil and disorder. King Otho was finally forced to convoke a National Assembly to elaborate a constitution, dismiss his Bavarian Counsellors and appoint a ministry of Greeks.

The new constitution did not improve much the administration of the country or the condition of the people, for it was based upon concentration of power in the central government and allowed very few rights to the people. The blundering interference of the Powers added still more to the confusion, for each Power tried to create a party of its own adherents, which were known as English, French or Russian, according to the cause they espoused, and by serving

which they hoped to attain to power. With political parties so constituted, the interests of the Greek people were neglected, and Greece financially and economically was brought to the verge of ruin.

A military revolution for the overthrow of King Otho, who during his reign of almost thirty years had failed to gain any popularity, forced him to leave the country in 1862. In the space of thirty-two years (1832-1864) of its political existence as an independent kingdom, six constitutions were successively applied in Greece. With the accession to the throne of the late King George, who succeeded Otho in 1863, the Greeks asserted their rights to a liberal constitution, framed by a Constituent Assembly in 1864, which secured to the country a national government, and recognized the principle that "all power had its source in the nation."

The constitutions of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria bear a great resemblance to each other both on account of the sources from which they were derived and the social conditions under which they were framed. They contain those rights and attributes which parliamentary government grants to popular representation, and they are particularly careful to emphasize the democratic principles upon which they are based. Neither in Serbia, nor in Greece, nor in Bulgaria is there any aristocracy, and in order to guard against the creation of a nobility or the institution of privileged classes, some constitutions, as for example, that of Bulgaria, expressly forbid any class distinctions. A brief review of how the Bulgarian constitution originated and of its principal provisions, that are common to the constitutions of Greece and Serbia, may be of



interest in giving an idea of the way former Turkish subjects have managed to organize orderly and decent government.

When in 1878 Bulgaria was constituted into a semi-independent Principality, a commission composed of Russian officials was appointed by order of the Russian Tsar to frame a constitution for the country. In 1879 a Bulgarian Constituent Assembly, consisting of popularly elected and *ex officio* delegates, met in the old capitol of Bulgaria, Tirnovo, to discuss and adopt the constitution. Among the members of the Assembly there was hardly one Bulgarian who had formerly sat in a parliament, or was familiar with parliamentary usage and procedure. Exception should be made for the few delegates, alumni of the American Robert College, who as students had studied Parliamentary Law and practiced it in their literary and debating societies at school. To them also fell the larger share in drawing up the parliamentary rules and regulations in accordance with which the business of the Constituent Assembly was to be conducted.

The draft constitution was in many points very conservative, as it left in the hands of the ruler or Prince considerable power. If its framers had expected that it would be passed without submitting it to searching discussions and criticisms, they were soon undeceived. From the very beginning strongly liberal and democratic tendencies became evident, the aim of which was to make the government of the country truly popular. It must have been a startling revelation to the Russian officials, who attended the meetings of the Assembly, to hear and see men, so recently emanci-

pated from political serfdom, discuss and propound so freely political and constitutional ideas and theories.

The proposition that a Senate conjointly with a House of Representatives should exercise the power of legislation was rejected, on the ground that Senators would be a "bunch" of idlers and loungers, and that the name senator savored of aristocracy. The institution of a Council of State, partly by election and partly by appointment, met with the same fate, for it was feared that its members might eventually develop into a privileged class. Whether these fears were justified or not, and whether the Constituent Assembly acted wisely in instituting a one chamber legislature, are open questions. I have cited these cases only to show how strong the democratic sentiment of the Assembly was and how suspicious its members were of any institution that might be construed into or give rise to class distinctions. The aversion to Turkish pashas and State Councillors, with whose character and proceedings the people of Bulgaria were well acquainted, induced no doubt the delegates to look with distrust upon the institution of a Senate or a Council of State.

In order to guard against any future attempts to introduce class distinctions, the Constitution expressly forbids the conferring of titles of nobility or any other distinctions. Among the latter were included uniforms, except for the military and police, and decorations, of which one only for military bravery on the battlefield was allowed. By a later amendment to the Constitution decorations have been sanctioned, and men employed in the diplomatic service of the country are permitted to wear uniforms, a regulation which

now, however, is not considered obligatory. Other officials of the government, not excluding even the cabinet ministers, are forbidden to wear any uniforms.

The Christian Orthodox religion of the Eastern rite is declared to be the State religion, but all other religions that are not contrary to public morals are tolerated and no interference with their free exercise is allowed. Equality before the law for all, inviolability of the right of property, of personal liberty, of correspondence and domicile are guaranteed. Primary instruction is free and obligatory. There is complete freedom of the press, with no censorship of the requirement of caution money from either editor or publisher. The rights of association, meeting and petition, individual or collective, are guaranteed.

Legislation is vested in the National Assembly, and initiation of laws is shared between it and the ministers. While the ruler has the right of appointing and dismissing ministers, the latter are responsible to the National Assembly and every act or decree of the King must be countersigned by the respective minister who assumes the responsibility for the King's act.

The control of the State budget and the voting of supplies is entirely in the hands of the National Assembly, which also has the power to impose and determine taxes. The convocation and prorogation of the assembly is a prerogative of the King, but the time and the manner are expressly stipulated in the Constitution. He may, on the proposition of the Cabinet, dissolve the Assembly, but within a certain specified period of time new elections must take place and the new Assembly be called together.

Such are the most important provisions of the Constitution of Bulgaria. At the time that it was adopted, forty-two years ago, many thought that it was too liberal for a newly emancipated people and serious doubts were entertained about its successful working. These doubts have been disproved, as they have been disproved also in the case of the Constitution of Serbia and Greece. The political inexperience of the people and their leaders, the absence of a strong and healthy public opinion and the difficulties inherent in the application and working of a constitutional government among people devoid of parliamentary traditions and precedents, have been the cause of serious blunders in the administration of the State affairs in all the three Balkan States. That was inevitable, and every impartial critic and observer will agree with the judgment of Mr. William Miller, the English author of the well-known work on *The Balkans*, who, in speaking of Bulgaria, says: "With all their faults and in spite of all their trials and temptations, the peasant statesmen have achieved great triumphs during the comparatively brief period of their country's existence as a practically independent State."

In the development of their political life the Balkan States have had to work under several disadvantages. Their smallness has not allowed them to have and practise an independent policy of their own. In foreign politics they have been obliged to move in the orbit of this or that great European Power, according to political exigencies. This fickleness in their foreign policy has reacted upon their internal affairs also, and has made undue foreign influence possible. I have

already alluded to the formation in Greece of parties called English, French and Russian, according to the support they received from England, France or Russia. In Serbia and Bulgaria Austrophilism and Austrophobism, Russophilism and Russophobism have played a great part in national politics. Perhaps no very great harm would have been done, if these tendencies had been limited to foreign politics; but a separation of foreign and internal politics was not easy to establish, and now the one, now the other tendency has been used by the politicians to advance their own ambitious ends and secure their ascendancy. To this cause is also due the existence in the Balkan States of more politicians than real practical statesmen with broad conceptions of a constructive policy.

No parliamentary government can do without political parties. In countries where such a government has been created by evolution and where the parties have developed from certain principles relating to external or internal State policies, they may be useful and justifiable in acting upon each other as a counterpoise in the government machinery. Such parties, based on principles, are not apt to degenerate wholly and easily into personalities or individual animosities.

The bane of the political and constitutional life of the Balkan peoples has been that the political parties are founded upon personalities and not upon principles. It was so in the beginning of their political existence, and although in later years some improvement is noticeable in the formation of parties with some definite platforms, Balkan States are not yet free of partisan politics. Perhaps that is not a

disease peculiar to the Balkan States only. In the Bulgarian Constituent Assembly of 1879, there were men who honestly thought that a too liberal Constitution might not be to the best advantage of the country, which was just starting on its political life. These men were not aristocrats or nobles, nor were they in favor of instituting class privileges or distinctions, which they knew perfectly well would be repugnant to the sentiment and temperament of the people. In defending the institution of a second Chamber or a Council of State, they wished to prevent the National Assembly from falling into the hands of demagogues and to put a restraint upon hasty and ill-considered legislation. Their opponents at once dubbed them as "conservatives," "retrogrades" and "reactionaries," epithets which were quite misplaced, for there was nothing in the past history of the country that was worth conserving or that these men wished to conserve. The personal element counted for a great deal in this political split, which as time went on widened and caused serious commotion and unrest in the country, and which at one time seemed likely to imperil the Constitution.

The political parties in the Balkan States without any really definite political programs have tended to become powerless to resist the assumption of more power by the reigning King. A clever, ambitious and scheming ruler can easily so manipulate the various leaders of the parties as to make them subservient to his desires and designs, and concentrate greater power in his hands than is his due by the prescriptions of

the Constitution. As the chief concern of the party leaders is to get into power and as the King has the right of appointing and dismissing the ministers, it frequently has happened that a new ministry has been constituted not because it has a majority in, or enjoys the confidence of the Parliament, but simply because the King, by a more docile cabinet, hopes to attain some purpose he may have in view. Parliament is then dissolved and new elections are ordered, which, being carried out under government pressure, may secure a parliamentary majority for the new ministry, unless public sentiment be so strong as to resist the pressure and assert itself.

One often meets with the statement that parliamentary elections in the Balkan States generally turn out in favor of the government that is in power and under whose control they are carried out. While the truth of the statement cannot be denied, for it is supported by many instances, it can be qualified by saying that as the political education of the people has advanced and they have become more conscious of their rights, fraudulent or made-to-order elections have become rarer and more difficult. The experiences through which some of the Balkan nations have gone during the last war will make them more chary of trusting their fate to their politicians or rulers and more jealous of the exercise of their constitutional privileges and rights.

The virulence of party animosities and bickerings has been considerably softened, as, for example, in Bulgaria and Serbia, by the introduction of the pro-

portional system of elections, by which minorities are able to obtain due representation in parliament and municipal government.

The great lesson which the Balkan peoples have to learn and which they are gradually learning is, that, no matter how good a Constitution may be on paper, it is beneficial only when it is loyally observed by those in authority and when the people, instead of being indifferent to the actions and conduct of their rulers, take an interest in the affairs of the State and make their influence felt through the ballot and the press.

It is usually said that the Greeks are great politicians and very fond of discussing political questions. The same is true of the other peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. In Sofia or Belgrade one will hear politics, internal or external, discussed in private or in public much more and oftener than in this country, as far as my experience goes; but in the Balkan countries people have not yet learned to dissociate personal grudges from public questions. Dissensions and cleavages in parties are produced not by any great differences or divergencies of opinion on political, social or economic questions, but by wrangles over leadership or distribution of ministerial posts. It would be difficult, for example, to draw a line of distinction between a Liberal, a Young Liberal and a National Liberal party, unless it be on the ground that each of these parties contains men who disagree on the various places they wish to occupy in the Cabinet. The press is run on party lines, and rare are the newspapers that in the discussion of public affairs will not be biassed more or less by partisan considerations. Independent journals



could help much in promoting the formation of independent public opinion, but it is doubtful, as a Bulgarian minister with whom I discussed the question told me, if such papers could enlist public support enough to assure their existence.

It may not be amiss to touch here upon a question which bears some relation to the political tendencies of the Balkan States. Since the Balkan wars a great deal has been written about political hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, and Bulgaria particularly has been accused of aiming at establishing her preponderance in the Peninsula and lording it over her neighbors. Those who make the charge carefully avoid bringing any facts in corroboration of it. They point, it is true, to the efficient army which Bulgaria has been able to organize; but omit to state that the other Balkan countries have not been backward with their military preparations. Both Serbia and Greece have devoted great attention to the efficient organization of their military forces and have spared no expense for the attainment of it. Greece has called the help of French officers for her army and that of British officers for her navy. The following statistics, taken from the "Peace Year Book" for 1914 of the British National Peace Council, show the respective war budgets of the three countries. Bulgaria with a population of 4,329,000 had a war budget of 39,642,000 francs, or 9.10 francs per capita; Serbia, population 2,927,000, war budget 27,009,000 francs, or 9.50 francs per capita; Greece, population 2,632,000, war budget 29,829,000 francs, or 11.30 francs per capita. These figures certainly do not prove that Bulgaria is the

greatest spendthrift in the upkeep of her army, or that she is more militaristic than her neighbors.

No hegemony could be established in the Balkan Peninsula except by conquest. National consciousness is so strongly developed among all the peoples that they will not yield ready obedience to any power unless they were coerced to do so. A Prussia in the Balkans can neither exist nor maintain itself, for all the national and social conditions that raised Prussia to a predominant position in Germany are lacking there. It is absurd to suppose that a small country like Bulgaria could ever subjugate the Greeks or the Serbians and hold them under her sway, or force them into a union in which she was to play the part of a "boss." In the next place, hegemony in the Balkans, or the creation of a powerful State that could group the other States around it, would not have been regarded with disinterestedness by the European Powers, especially Austria and Russia. In a secret Austro-Russian treaty of 1899 it is expressly stipulated that in all future distribution of Turkish territory no allotment should be made which might give the preponderance to one Balkan State over another. Under such political conditions the attempt of any one of the Balkan States to assert its predominance in the Peninsula would surely have brought it into conflict either with Austria or Russia or with both. When after the Balkan Wars Serbia, by the increase of its territorial possessions, political prestige and military strength, seemed or was supposed likely to play a greater political rôle in the Peninsula than before, Austria was

not slow in opposing her with the terrible consequences that we all know.

Constitutional government has been a new experiment in the political life of the Balkan States, for which they had no preliminary preparation. From the darkness of a servitude for centuries they were called suddenly into the light of freedom. No wonder that at first they were dazed, just as a man would be who comes out of a long confinement in a dark prison into the full glare of daylight. It took them considerable time ere they found their bearings and got accustomed to the new life they were beginning. Taught by past experience, they looked upon government as an institution for rapacity, extortion and oppression. The attitude they assumed towards it was opposition, and I have no doubt that the mass of the people inwardly transferred this suspicious, distrustful feeling even to their own government.

When in Bulgaria in the early years of its political life party spirit ran high, debates in the parliament were vicious, newspaper polemics virulent, there were some foolish people who did not hesitate in saying that it was better under the Turkish rule, because such license was not tolerated. They would have preferred a muzzled press, obedience to government orders without criticism, to the liberty of thought and speech, which, in their opinion, was so demoralizing for the public. The political dissensions which they witnessed inspired them with doubts about the future, whether a free constitutional government would prove beneficial to the country. Such political doubters were found

likewise among the Serbians and Greeks in the beginning of their political life; but time and experience have shown their apprehensions to have been misplaced. Constitutional government among the Balkan peoples has not been wrecked; on the contrary, it has been so firmly established that no personal or arbitrary régime can supplant it. A saner press, a more enlightened public opinion, with which rulers and governments have to reckon, a healthier atmosphere among political parties and sounder, more rational conceptions of popular rights and duties are observable in all the Balkan States. They have adapted themselves to European culture and civilization and in the development of their political and civil life have diligently striven to follow the examples set before them by more advanced nations.

In judging of their progress, it would be unfair to compare them with nations which, under totally different historical, political and social circumstances, have in the course of time evolved their constitutional institutions. The Balkan peoples have had to organize their government and administration in all its branches with the raw materials which they possessed and without much outside help. Men with very little knowledge and far less experience of government affairs were entrusted with the arduous task of establishing an orderly government in the place of what had existed before. Constitutionalism has not always run smoothly among the Balkan nations, regrettable incidents have happened and blunders have been committed that have retarded but not arrested their progress. Nevertheless, no one who is acquainted with their past his-

tory, with the difficulties, both external and internal, with which they have had to contend, will be inclined to judge them harshly or to assert that their self-government has been a failure.

## LECTURE V.

### EFFORTS AT REFORM IN TURKEY.

About seventy years ago a French political writer expressed the opinion that "the Ottoman Empire can, with the help of the Powers, maintain itself, become civilized and serve as a link for civilization between Europe and Asia." Similar opinions and hopes were expressed by writers of other countries. There was at that time a widespread belief among the friends of Turkey, engendered by some attempts at reformation, that the Turks had realized the urgent necessity of turning over a new leaf in their history. The failure of the old institutions of the Empire to give it strength and stability was patent to those Turks who could think on the subject. These institutions had contributed to the glory and expansion of the State under circumstances that had greatly changed. European States which formerly had stood in awe of the Ottoman military power had grown stronger and were able not only to resist Turkey with success, but also to impose their will upon her.

As early as the eighteenth century the disadvantage in which Turkey stood towards the other countries of Europe was recognized by one of the Sultans, who wished to introduce order into the empire and work for its welfare; but he complained that there was nobody to help him in his good intentions. All his pashas

had become corrupt and degenerate, and thought of nothing but palaces, high living and women.

The example of Russia, which under the reformatory reign of Peter the Great had in a short time risen into prominence among the European Powers, served no doubt as an incentive to the Sultans of Turkey to enter upon the path of reform and progress. By the adoption of European manners and customs, military and civil organization, Russia had all of a sudden emerged from a state of semi-barbarism; why could not Turkey do the same? If instead of remaining stationary, as Turkey had done, the European nations had outstripped her in military organization and civil administration, Turkey, by following similar methods and using the same means, could improve her condition and strengthen her position among them. Reforms were necessary for the regeneration as well as the preservation of the country, and they were to be modeled on the institutions obtaining in the European countries. The grand admiral of the Turkish fleet, Halil Pasha, one of the few men favorable to reforms, on his return from Russia in 1830, said: "I come back more convinced than ever that if we do not hurry to imitate Europe, we should resign ourselves to go back to Asia."

The chief concern of those who favored reforms was to organize the military forces of the Empire on a new basis, conformably to the organizations of the European armies. By reorganizing the army, it was hoped to make Turkey strong for defensive and, if need be, for offensive purposes. The first serious effort in this direction was made by Sultan Selim III about the be-

ginning of the nineteenth century. With the help of some European officers he organized a small body of infantry, cavalry and artillery, armed and drilled in the European fashion. These bodies of troops were to serve as the nucleus of the "new army," which the Sultan intended to create. The innovations proved repugnant to the Janissaries and the *Ulemas* or religious leaders. A revolt took place; Sultan Selim was deposed and soon after murdered. The reform, which had cost him his throne and life, needed a firmer hand and a stronger will for its execution, and both these were found in his successor and nephew, Sultan Mahmoud II.

For eighteen years the new Sultan had to put up with the insolence of the Janissary Corps and mature his plan for their destruction. Although he had enemies who would have liked to do away with him, he managed by an adroit policy to maintain himself on the throne and keep in check the turbulence of his lawless army. He saw clearly enough that so long as the Janissaries existed, who had it in their power to raise and depose Sultans and dictate the policy of the government, the Turkish empire would be exposed to constant disorders and revolutions.

Recruited in the beginning of their history almost exclusively from Christian children, who were torn away from their families, the Janissaries had shown their military prowess on numerous battlefields, and had brought by their victories glory to the Ottoman arms. They had carried the Turkish flag to the very walls of Vienna and were the mainstay of the power



of the Sultans. Their recruitment from Christians had long ago ceased, and their ranks were composed of many undesirable elements, lawless and unruly. The Greek war of independence, which was then going on, and several former wars, in which the Janissaries had given tokens of military degeneracy, showed that they had lost their former warlike spirit and prestige.

For vindicating and strengthening the supreme authority of the Sultan as well as for paving the way for any reformation of the government, the destruction of the Janissaries was of imperative necessity. The problem Sultan Mahmoud had to solve was the same which more than a century before, Peter the Great of Russia had to face, when by the destruction of the *streltsi*, the praetorians or Janissaries of Russia, he prepared the way for the reformation of the country. On June 15, 1826, taking advantage of a riot on the part of the Janissaries against an edict of his ordering the formation of a body of troops partly by quota from the Janissary corps to be regularly drilled, the Sultan ordered and accomplished what his predecessor and uncle had failed to do. The Janissaries, whose arrogance and disorderly behavior had made them odious in the eyes of the people, were entirely exterminated. Their destruction will always remain as the chief reformatory act of Sultan Mahmoud's reign.

The military reorganization of the empire, which was made possible after the disappearance of the Janissaries, does not concern the study we have in view. If, as some one has remarked, Mahmoud thought "that reform consisted in putting his soldiers into tight trou-

sers and epaulettes," he was greatly mistaken, as later events have amply proved. That he did not proceed any farther in his reformatory designs may be partly attributed to the internal troubles and external difficulties with which he had to cope. His intentions for doing good to his country we have no reason to doubt. "I wish to do good to my country," he is credited with saying, "and reconstruct on the basis of religion and according to the principles of the law, the edifice which should assure happiness and peace to my subjects." If by *religion* he meant Mohammedanism and by *the law* the *Sheriat* or sacred law of the Koran and the traditions, he, wittingly or unwittingly, pointed out the two chief obstacles to the carrying out of his good intentions and those of his successors.

In his determination to get directly acquainted with the needs of his subjects and let them see that, as he said, "the throne was not to be a terror, but a support to them," he did something which for centuries past no Sultan had done. He undertook at two different times a trip through the provinces of the empire "in order to put," to use the florid language of a Turkish historian, "under the protection of his eternal shadow the peoples and *rayas* of these countries, by making shine before their eyes the light of equity and compassion."

European usages and customs found their way into the capital. The Sultan set the example of European dress, gave in his palace dinners, concerts and balls as any European ruler would have done. These innovations produced great discontent among the conservative and reactionary majority of the Turkish popula-

tion; but Mahmoud, who had now concentrated all the power in his hands, was stern and ruthless towards all who dared to oppose him.

It was reserved for his son, Sultan Medjid, to take the most momentous measure for carrying out the reforms of which his father had laid down the principle. Four months after his accession to the throne he promulgated in 1839 the famous *Hatt-i-Sherif* or sacred edict which was to serve as the guide for the future reformation of the Empire, and in which the principles along which the reforms were to be effected were stated. It is an interesting and curious document both by what it avows and by what it concedes. In its preamble reference is made to the former grandeur and might of the Empire and the well-being and prosperity of its subjects, which are attributed to the precepts of the glorious Koran and the laws of the Empire having been always respected. But since a century and a half, the internal strength and prosperity of the Empire have turned into weakness and impoverishment, because conformity to the sacred code of laws and the regulations deriving therefrom had ceased. In view of this, the Sultan deems it proper "to seek, through new institutions, to procure to the provinces which compose the Ottoman Empire, the benefit of a good administration." These institutions should have for their principal object the following three points:

1. Guarantees which will assure to his subjects perfect security of life, honor and property.
2. A regular method of assessing and collecting the taxes.

3. A regular method of recruiting soldiers and fixing the term of their service.

The perfect security of life, honor and property was to be assured to all the subjects of the Sultan, of whatever religion or sect they might be. They were to enjoy this security without any exception.

Of the three points named in the imperial edict at which the new institutions were to aim, this was the most important and valuable in the eyes of the Christians. Up till then neither the life nor the honor nor the property of a Christian was considered safe from attack or violence on the part of a Turk or the government. It was most rarely that a Christian could obtain justice in the existing courts. Granting now such a security to the Christians and assuring them of equal justice before the courts was tantamount to putting them before the government and the sovereign on an equality with the Turks.

This measure was in direct opposition to the notions which the Turks had had till then about their relations to the Christians. These ideas of their superiority over the latter were based not only on the fact that they had made the Christians their tributaries by the might of the sword, but also on what the precepts of the Mohammedan religion taught them. When the Sultan, in trying to justify before the eyes of his co-religionists the concessions he was making to his Christian subjects, said in his edict that these concessions were demanded "by the sacred text of our law," every Turk knew and felt that he was talking impiety and was ranging himself on the side of the *ghiaours* (infidels).

To the Turks the Sultan's edict must have been an offence and an execration, although there were a few influential men who favored the ideas which it expressed. Among the Christians it raised high hopes of an improvement in their political and civil status. They thought that the Sultan, having publicly recognized and solemnly proclaimed the growing decline of the empire and the necessity of a thorough reformation of its administration, could not refuse them the rights and privileges to which they were entitled. As time went on, they came to look upon these rights and privileges not as a boon conferred upon them by the ruler's clemency or generosity, but as prerogatives due to them by one who officially and repeatedly boasted of regarding all his subjects, be they Mohammedans, Christians or Jews, with equal favor and as the children of a common Father.

The edict of 1839 was hailed in Europe by the various governments as a sure sign that Turkey had at last undertaken seriously to reform and reorganize her administration. As the Sultan showed a marked predilection for French manners and models of reform, French opinion was most favorable to him. In the initiatory measures for giving effect to the projects of his reforms he tried to copy French political and civil institutions.

Amidst the general approbation of the Sultan's act and the slowness of putting into practice his projects, a discordant voice was heard from Austria, from a man who at that time occupied a preëminent position in the politics of Europe. In a long dispatch to the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople, Prince Met-

ternich, Minister of Foreign Affairs, passed judgment on the efforts at reformation in Turkey in terms that must have been heartening to the Turkish conservatives and reactionaries and discouraging to the progressive party at the head of which stood the Sultan. In Metternich's opinion the Ottoman Empire is a body in decadence, and of all the causes of this decadence the one that has completed the source of its evils "is the spirit of reform *à l'européenne*" which has taken possession of the Sultans. The advice that he gives the Turks is not to borrow from the civilization of Europe institutions which do not tally with theirs, nor follow models that have nothing in common with the conditions of their Empire, nor imitate States the fundamental legislation of which is in opposition to the customs of the East. He urges them to establish their government upon the respect for their religious institutions, which form the fundamental basis of their existence as a power. As the foundation of the Western institutions is the Christian law, so let the Mohammedan law serve as the basis of the institutions of Turkey. "Remain Turks," he says, "but then consult the Mohammedan law. Make use of the facilities it gives you to be tolerant, and give to your Christian subjects the most complete protection." Whether Metternich was sincere in his advice, or whether he offered it as a counterstroke to French or English influence in Turkey, is quite immaterial. The advice as we shall see, is both impracticable and illogical. He evidently did not know much about the Turks and Turkey, or else he gave it with the object of preventing any reforms in Turkey. The casuistry of it is

evident, and I have only quoted his views here in order to show that even then, as subsequently, reforms in Turkey found no favor in the political spheres of Vienna.

The reforms promised by the Sultan in his edict were not realized, in spite of the measures that were taken from time to time to give them a concrete form. Various commissions were instituted to study their application, a Council of State to act as a legislative body was established, codes of laws adopted from those of France were promulgated, etc., but the essential point—equality among the Sultan's subjects—which would have given cohesion and unity to the various elements of which his Empire was composed, remained still a thing to be desired.

It would be, however, unfair to affirm that Sultan Medjid's edict of 1839 produced no change whatever in the administrative condition of the Empire. It did correct some of the most glaring abuses and brought some order and improvement in the formerly disordered and disorganized state of the provincial administration. The Sultan himself, nevertheless, had to acknowledge some years later that his good intentions had not been fully realized and that something more had to be done in order to increase the welfare, prosperity and happiness of his subjects, "who are," he said, "all equal in my eyes and equally dear to me."

In order to complete and amplify the guarantees of the promises he had made in his former edict to all his subjects, he issued a new edict dated February 18, 1856, which is more specific in the concessions and privileges which it grants to the Christians. The prin-

cipal articles of this most important document that are of special interest are those which affirm (1) security of life, honor and property for all Turkish subjects; (2) full liberty of conscience and worship for every religious confession; (3) nobody can be forced to change his religion; (4) admission of Christians into the civil and military service of the government; (5) equality of all before the law; (6) admission of Christian testimony before the courts.

It is generally asserted that this new edict was a spontaneous act of Sultan Medjid. In the treaty of Paris of 1856, which closed the Crimean war, it is characterized as "spontaneously emanating from his sovereign will." The fact is that it was imposed upon him by the European Powers which had fought the war in order to save Turkey from Russian aggression. In declaring war upon Turkey, Russia justified her action by the declaration that she was warring for the liberation of the Christians from Turkish misrule and oppression, and for securing for them the immunities and privileges so often promised but never carried out by the Sultan. It was impossible for France and England to ignore this plea of Russia, and leave the Sultan's Christian subjects in the lurch. They could not deny that the former edict of the Sultan, promulgated seventeen years before, had brought no improvement in the condition of the Christians. It would have been an outrage in the eyes of the Christians of Turkey as well as of the other nations of Europe, not to exact from the Sultan something more definite, more binding. Had they omitted doing this, they would have played the game of Russia, by alienating the



sympathies of the Christians in Turkey and by enhancing Russia's prestige among them as being the only Christian Power solicitous for their well-being. The question was even raised at the Conference of Paris, which drew up the treaty, whether, in order to give the edict of the Sultan a greater binding force, it should not be incorporated into the treaty as part of it, and thus placed under the guarantee of signatory Powers. The Turkish plenipotentiaries objected to such a course on the ground that "it would compromise the dignity of the Imperial Government by throwing doubt upon its frankness and good faith." The Powers accepted this plea as valid, and in acknowledging in the ninth article of the treaty that the edict, a spontaneous emanation of the Sultan's will, had been communicated to them, they added the following clause:

"The Powers acknowledge the high value of this communication. It is well understood that it could in no case give a right to the aforesaid Powers to interfere, whether collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration of the Empire."

This has been really the standing condition on which all Turkish promises have been accepted by the European Powers. They gladly accept the promise, but decline to interfere to put it into practice. This is exactly what the Turks want: to accept their promises, but not to press them to stick to them.

This clause was most unfortunate in more than one respect. It bound the Powers to an engagement or undertaking which they were soon to violate and have repeatedly violated. The military intervention of

France in 1860—only four years later—in the affairs of the Lebanon, and the subsequent interventions of the Powers whenever a Turkish crisis has arisen, showed how little value they attached to the clause. It augured ill for the execution of the promised reforms, because it was left entirely in the hands and to the discretion of the Sultan. The clause deprived the Christian subjects of Turkey from the right of appeal to the Powers in case the Sultan chose not to keep his promises, and lastly, it supplied the Turkish government with a weapon to defend itself against foreign intervention. "We are willing," said a grand vizier to an ambassador once, and the remark has been frequently repeated since, "we are willing to listen to your counsels, but we cannot accept your intervention in our internal affairs."

It is not strange that under such conditions the new edict of the Sultan was doomed to non-execution. When he died and was succeeded by his brother, a much less capable and liberal-minded man, Turkey had the good fortune to be governed by two very able men, perhaps the most able diplomats she has produced. If individual ability and resourcefulness could have reformed the Empire, Ali and Fuad Pashas should have been able to perform the feat; but they failed. The government kept puttering, for that is the proper expression, with reforms, but never set itself resolutely to combat the evils which beset it. The financial embarrassments grew daily worse, the imposition and distribution of taxes more burdensome and unjust, graft and general corruption in the judicial

and other branches of the administration more shameless.

Writing eleven years after the promulgation of the *hatt-i-humayoun* or imperial edict, the British consuls in their reports testify that none of the promised reforms have been faithfully carried out. Christians are not admitted into the service of the government, except in rare cases and inferior positions. In the administrative councils charged with the duty of assisting the provincial governors, the Christians are always in marked minority and even the few who have seats in these councils are nominees and lackeys of the governors. Christian testimony is not accepted by the courts, or is treated as of no value, and a Mohammedan, were he a murderer, has every chance of being acquitted, if there are only Christians to testify against him. A Christian, unlike a Mohammedan, can be arrested and imprisoned, without a warrant from a magistrate, on the most trifling accusation or on mere suspicion.

In trying to find the cause of the failure of the reforms to secure a better government for the country, some enlightened Turks fixed upon the absolute and autocratic power of the Sultan as the primary cause. So long as the ruler exercised an unlimited authority and every reform was considered as emanating from his sovereign will, no permanent improvement, in the opinion of these liberals, could be effected. The sovereign must have the assistance of the people in any attempt he makes to benefit them, and ministerial responsibility or the existence of some control cannot

be inconsistent with the good wishes he may cherish. In quoting the aphorism of the French historian and statesman, Louis Adolphe Thiers, that "the government of a single man is always dangerous, whatever the superiority of the ruler may be," they maintained that a constitutional régime with national representation and ministerial responsibility was not contrary to the Mohammedan religion.

The enunciators of these ideas, so at variance with the current opinion among the governing class and the Mussulman population of the Turkish Empire, were the pioneers of the "Young Turkey" party. It was a bold step indeed to assert by implication, if not directly, that the Sultan, "God's shadow upon the earth," as temporal ruler and as Caliph or Mahomet's successor, was subject like anybody else to the weaknesses of human nature, and needed in the exercise of the power delegated to him by God, the advice and coöperation of those who in his eyes were his humble and obedient slaves. Hitherto reformation of the country had been looked for from the throne; now it was to be undertaken and carried on by the people through a Constitution with national representation.

On December 23, 1876, amid a great deal of pomp and parade and cannon-firing, the first Turkish Constitution was promulgated. By it individual, political and civil liberty was granted to all the subjects of the Sultan, equality before the law was assured and all public offices were open to all, irrespective of their nationality or religion. In order to effect a fusion of all the nationalities of the Empire, the distinctive national names were abolished and they all were to be

known henceforth as "Ottomans." A Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, to which the ministers were responsible, were instituted to control the actions of the government. The Mohammedan religion was declared to be the religion of the State and the *Sheriat* was maintained as the sacred law of the Empire.

In a circular dispatch to the representatives of Turkey abroad, by which he informed them of the promulgation of the Constitution, the Minister of Foreign Affairs described it as "a great event which will inscribe into the annals of the Ottoman Empire an ineffaceable date." He spoke of the new institutions as "founding in the Ottoman Empire the reign of liberty, justice and equality, that is, the triumph of civilization." Feeling evidently uneasy about the confidence people in Europe, taught by past experience, might be willing to place in this new Turkish promise of reformation, the minister solemnly declared: "The Constitution is not a promise; it is a real and formal act that has become the property of all the Ottomans and the development of which can neither be arrested nor retarded except by the will of the nation itself joined to that of the sovereign." There is no diplomat more capable of writing a diplomatic note or dispatch than a Turkish minister.

There were few people either in Turkey or abroad, outside of the rabid Turkophiles, who believed in the seriousness of the constitutional régime or in the ability of its advocates to carry it out. Everybody knew that it was proclaimed with the sole object of taking away from the European Powers all pretext for interfering and demanding the execution of the reforms promised

in years gone by or formulating new demands. On the very day that the Constitution was promulgated, an International Conference of the Ambassadors and other special delegates from the Great Powers met in Constantinople to provide for an autonomous administration of Bulgaria, where a few months before terrible massacres had taken place. To parry the proposition of the Powers, the Turkish government offered them a Constitution for the whole Empire, which made it unnecessary to demand special privileges for any separate province.

Some of the provisions of the Constitution were so framed as to be capable of various interpretations, as, for example, the declaration that the press is free, "*within the limits of the law.*" I remember very well that a comic Turkish newspaper, after the Constitution was promulgated, had a cartoon representing a man tied hand and foot with ropes, and a friend is asking him: "How is it that I see you in such a plight?" The man replies: "This is liberty within the limits of the law." The consequence was that the next day the paper was suppressed and the editor was sent to prison.

The system of election was such as to give the Turks the majority both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. In fact, the first Christian members of these two bodies were appointed by the government. That the Constitution provided no guarantees for the safety of anyone against arbitrariness was found out by its very author, Mithad Pasha. Three months after its promulgation, he was arrested and sent by order of the Sultan into exile out of Turkey. The Parliament

was dissolved, never to be called together again, and its members were ordered to leave the capital and go home. Mithad Pasha, who was inveigled into returning from Europe, and some of the most prominent members of his party who had not succeeded in fleeing from Turkey, were later on banished into various parts of the country and perished, as it is generally believed, by the hands of hired assassins.

The Constitution was buried and for more than thirty years the notorious Sultan Hamid reigned supreme. Sly, dissembling, a religious fanatic imbued with an inveterate hatred of the Christians, harsh and cruel towards all who opposed his power, autocratic by nature, he inspired terror into the hearts of Christians as well as Turks. Surrounded by despicable men, whose only recommendation to his favors was their baseness and servility, he instituted a system of espionage that had its ramifications throughout the Empire. A most rigorous censorship weighed heavily upon the press and all literary activity. The ministers, whom the Sultan appointed and dismissed according to his good pleasure, became simple registering clerks of his orders. The army and navy were entirely under the control of the Sultan, and by intrigue and favoritism he destroyed every *esprit de corps* among the officers and tolerated only those who were blindly devoted to him. All government was concentrated in the palace, and from there corruption and arbitrariness spread among all the branches of the administration. It was dangerous to pronounce the word "reforms" or "Constitution," for it meant arrest, imprisonment or exile.

It was under these adverse conditions that the Young Turkey Party started its revolution of 1908 and made a renewed effort to regenerate Turkey and save it from destruction. The ease with which the revolution was accomplished, without almost any bloodshed, surprised every one, most of all its authors. The discontent with the Hamidian régime was so widespread that its collapse produced joy and relief among all classes and nationalities. The popular enthusiasm was unbounded. Turks and Christians fraternized together, and embraced each other as the children of a common fatherland. The former Constitution was re-established. "Liberty, equality and justice" were inscribed on the banner of the new revolution, and even on handkerchiefs which people bought and displayed by the thousand. A free press exultingly dilated upon the new era which had this time really begun for all the peoples of Turkey and the prospects that it opened for the future regeneration and grandeur of the Empire. The new régime was to be conducted and controlled by the best intellectual forces of Turkey, the men who by their learning and contact with European civilization entertained broad views and liberal ideas about the reformation of the country. If they also should fail in this attempt, what hope was there of any reformation or regeneration of Turkey?

Unfortunately for the execution of any reforms in a state so complex in its constitution and so much in need of radical changes, theoretical knowledge is not the only prerequisite. Experience and practical sense and a true realization of what is pressing and important to be done, and what is subsidiary, is essential.



It was, no doubt, a huge task that the Young Turkey Party was undertaking, and it was not to be performed by grandiloquent speeches or bombastic leading articles in the newspapers. Very few of the Young Turks had had any experience as statesmen or administrators; hence, in the beginning of their new régime they had to fall back upon the older officials of the government, all of whom had occupied positions under the rule of Sultan Hamid. Their sympathy with the principles of the Young Turks and their sincerity in co-operating with them to put them into practice, was questionable. It is quite probable that the counter-revolution which took place less than a year after the triumph of the Young Turkey Party and aimed at the reëstablishment of the Sultan's power and the abolition of the Constitution, had the sympathy of these men, or of most of them.

By the deposition of Sultan Hamid and the accession to the throne of his brother, a kind-hearted weakling, the Young Turks assumed the power of government in their hands. No serious opposition to their plans was to be anticipated from the new Sultan, who seemed to be satisfied with reigning but not governing. Divergences of opinion among the members of the party as to the methods of improving the condition of the country and carrying out of the reforms could not be avoided. The great majority of them were in favor of a centralized administration, others proposed decentralization as the best remedy. By centralization, it was hoped, a greater cohesion and unity, almost a fusion of the various nationalities, might be attained.

The question of abolishing some privileges and im-

munities, granted to the Christian church by the Conqueror of Constantinople and confirmed by later Sultans, was very unwisely and prematurely raised. It was claimed that these privileges and immunities were incompatible with the Constitution or made superfluous by its promulgation. The Christians naturally viewed with suspicion and distrust this attack upon their church prerogatives, and assumed that the promulgation of the Constitution was a subterfuge to deprive them of what they already had. They had not forgotten the fate of the Constitution which was promulgated with so much *éclat* more than thirty years before, while the new one had yet to prove its viability and durability.

The first steps taken to initiate the institutions were certainly not very encouraging. The elections for the Parliament were a farce. The number of the Christian deputies in it was determined by bargaining, and the candidates agreed upon came out of the ballot boxes, as by magic, the duly elected. It was very funny to see on the day of the elections the ballot boxes carried processionally through the streets of Constantinople, with flags flying and bands playing, as if it was some religious procession going through the streets, followed by great crowds shouting "Constitution! Brotherhood and Liberty!" and so on. A great deal of gerrymandering of the electoral districts in the provinces was done, so as to secure the election of Mohammedans.

Elated by their revolution and the crushing of the Sultan's absolute power, the Young Turkey Party became obsessed with megalomania. They indulged in

big talk about restoring the former glory of the Turkish Empire and recovering its lost provinces, a question which it would have been wiser not to have raised. They not only dreamed of such a restoration, but openly declared that Bosnia, Herzegovina, Eastern Roumelia, Crete and other territories, detached from Turkey or enjoying certain privileges, should revert to it and benefit by the Constitution by having their representatives in the Turkish Parliament.

The raising of this question showed short-sightedness and a want of comprehension of the political situation of the country. It precipitated events which otherwise might have been postponed without impairing the viewpoint of Turkey or causing any detriment to her real interests. To forestall any demand for the restoration of these provinces, which would have created an awkward and difficult problem for the interested parties, Austria hastened to proclaim the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria its independence as a Kingdom, and Crete its union with Greece. Turkey was powerless to assert its rights, and lost territories to which she might, with some justification, have laid claim at some future date. Whether her claims would have been better respected is an open question. The Young Turkey Party at any rate would not have exposed itself, in the very beginning of its political career, in the eyes of its fellow-countrymen, to the reproach of having injured the Turkish cause by want of political foresight and tact.

In presenting this sketch of reformatory efforts in Turkey I have omitted to touch upon the various projects of reforms formulated by the European Pow-

ers, and which they vainly tried to recommend to or impose upon the Sultan. My purpose has been to lay before you what the Sultan or the political leaders of the country have, of their own free will, attempted to do for the reformation of the Turkish Empire. It did not escape the notice of these reformers that the Empire was losing in strength and stability, and that so long as the Christians living in it, who formed the larger and most productive element of the population, were kept in bondage, it could not regain either. The task of reconciling the Turkish and Christian points of view was not an easy one; but some way out of the difficulty had to be found, otherwise the country could not enjoy peace and tranquillity.

The bad administration affected not only the Christians, though they felt its harshness and injustice more, but the Turkish peasants also. A Turkish statesman in a memorial to the Sultan in 1867 was bold enough to tell him that his "subjects of every religious profession were divided into two classes: those who oppress without restraint, and those who are oppressed without pity," and that the Mohammedans, because no foreign Power takes an interest in them, suffer more than the Christians.

The introduction of reforms was to be a benefit to Christians and Mohammedans, and this, if nothing else, ought to have powerfully worked with the Sultan and his advisers for their execution. Unfortunately, neither imperial edicts nor constitutional and parliamentary institutions were able to produce the desired changes for the better. It is true that Turkey since Sultan Mahmoud was not such as it had been during

the time of the Janissaries and other legalized plunderers that preyed upon the population. A more regular administration had been established, administrative divisions copied from those of France had been introduced, various codes of laws had been compiled, regular courts had been instituted; but all these innovations have remained only formal.

The principal trouble has always been how to reconcile the Mohammedan sacred law with the reforms. One of the first requirements for a just and civilized government is that there should be equality before the law for all. This is just what the sacred law of the Mohammedans does not recognize. It cannot allow that a Christian is equal to a Mohammedan and can enjoy the same privileges. Writing in *The Fortnightly Review* of May, 1897, "A Turkish Patriot" says: "The inferior situation assigned to non-Mohammedans in the Mohammedan Muslim world is a question not of ethics, but of law." All projects of reforms that have been elaborated by Turkish reformers have maintained the sacred law as a principle of government and have pretended that it and the reforms are not contradictory. Their pretence has been proven false. If there can be no equality before the law, it naturally follows that the testimony of a Christian has no value as against that of a Mohammedan. In civil and commercial law Christian evidence is admitted; but in all cases that fall under the Sacred law, or where the question is between the testimony of a Christian and that of a Mohammedan, the latter has the preference. A Turkish judge of high standing was heard once to thank God that in all his career as judge he had never

condemned a Mohammedan on the strength of a Christian's testimony.

Along with the sense of superiority or "spiritual pride" which his religion gives him, the Turk is uncompromising towards the Christian, because he feels and acts as the conqueror. The Christians are the *raya* (which literally means a herd of cattle), and are to be treated as the vanquished, without any legal claims to rights or privileges, except those that the conqueror may vouchsafe them. Although Turks and Arabs profess the same religion, the latter have never felt friendly towards the former. The domineering spirit of the Turks, the oppression and exactions to which they have subjected them, have goaded the Arabs into periodical rebellions against the Sultan's authority.

When the imperial edicts and the Constitution speak of liberty of conscience and worship, of the freedom of changing one's religious beliefs, etc., they understand that these privileges are good for the Christians, but not for the Mohammedans. In his endeavors to have the law repealed which punished with death any Mohammedan apostate or any Christian who after having adopted Mohammedanism wished to return to his former faith, the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford de Redcliffe, received the following reply from a Turkish minister: "In politics we will always be full of deference to the counsels of Europe; but in the matter of religion we need to keep all our independence. Religion is the basis of our laws, the principle of our government. Neither the Sultan nor we could touch that."

In proof of the tolerant spirit of the Turkish government, one hears very often cited the fact that the Christians in Turkey have not been interfered with in their religion and that the Christian Church has even been granted certain immunities. A Young Turk is credited with the remark that had the Conqueror Sultan Mehmed ordered the head of every Christian above the age of 12 years cut off, there would have been no Eastern Question. It is more than doubtful if sparing the lives of the Christians or not forcibly converting them to Mohammedanism was merely a matter of clemency. There was expediency also in it, for the Turks certainly could not have accomplished their conquests or maintained themselves as a State, if they had not had the Christians to work and slave for them. Turkey would soon have become a desert and famine would have been its normal condition.

The limitations which a constitutional or reformed government puts to financial extravagance is not in accordance with Turkish notions or tastes. This is especially true of the governing class. The Turkish official from the highest to the lowest is, as a rule, a spendthrift. He likes show and pomp. In spite of the shrinkage of the territory of the Empire and the consequent diminution of its revenues, the Sultan and those in authority have not desisted from maintaining large establishments full of servants, supernumeraries and parasites. The money necessary for the upkeep of these establishments must be obtained by hook or crook, and any reforms that would really put a stop or limitation to its acquisition are not welcome. A strict system of taxation that would make for the fair

assessment and equal distribution of the taxes has never been enforced, for it would have diminished the incomes of those who had the charge of collecting them. The government has always been in financial straits, practically bankrupt. Salaries, small and insufficient as they are, have been most irregularly paid, sometimes only two months or three months, at the most, in the whole year, and the number of the officials has been kept disproportionately large.

Turkey is not without its intellectuals. There are not a few men who are well-read, who have gone through a college education, are acquainted with European languages and history. Some of them are full of ideas which they have picked up through their reading or through contact with Europeans. In their religious beliefs they are mostly free thinkers, not to say atheists. As theorists they are all one could wish. They will talk glibly and fluently about liberty, equality, fraternity, justice, about the bad conditions of the country, the necessity of reforming and doing away with the abuses, etc. For some reason or other, they prove impracticable and incompetent when they undertake to put their ideas and theories into practice. Nor are they able to throw off some of the prejudices, that seem to be inherent in a Turk, when he is faced with the problem of putting the Christian citizen on a footing of equality with the Mohammedan. They evidently feel that in a fair competition the Christian stands a better chance of success on account of his diligence, progressiveness and mental aptitude.

In the debates of the Turkish Parliament there were some enlightened Turks with advanced liberal ideas



who pleaded for perfect equality among all the subjects of the Empire. One of them even went so far as to say that everyone should be free to follow his own conscience and profess whatever religion he pleased. The argument met with a great uproar not only on the part of the forty or fifty clerical members, but even members of his party took exception to his statement. He was forced to retract his words by saying that when he spoke of complete liberty of conscience he had in mind the Christians and not the Mohammedans.

It is often said that it is impossible to dissociate the temporal power of the Sultan as a ruler from his spiritual attributes as a Caliph or successor of Mohammed. The Sultan is frequently compared to the Pope of Rome, when the Pope cumulated temporal and spiritual authority, and hence, it is claimed, no constitution or reforms can be properly instituted which, while limiting the temporal power of the Sultan, impair at the same time his spiritual prerogatives.

There is no greater mistake than to suppose that the Sultan is like the Pope of Rome, just as it was a mistake to represent the Tsar of Russia as the Pope of the Russian Church. The Sultan has practically no spiritual authority or power. He cannot do anything without referring the matter to the *Ulemas*, or the religious learned men who are the expounders of the law.

On the other hand, there are Turks, some of them belonging to the religious class, who maintain that a constitutional government is not contrary to the sacred law, that the Caliph is not a Mohammedan Pope and that originally he did not possess unlimited tem-

poral or spiritual power. In his circular dispatch to the representatives of Turkey abroad, informing them of the promulgation of the Constitution in 1876, the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressly stated that the new institutions were not contrary to the Mohammedan religion because they had been fully approved by the *Ulemas* or the religious teachers and leaders of the people. The functions of a Caliph are three: He commands the army in time of war, he dispenses justice to the people in time of peace, and he leads in the public prayers.

None of these attributes, it is asserted, can conflict with regulations or institutions the object of which is to secure good government and better justice. The Caliphate, if rightly interpreted, cannot be adduced as an obstacle to reforms.

The question of Turkish reforms is not one of actual interest. Turkey in Europe has ceased to exist outside of the capital and its environs. Whatever modifications may be made in the actually existing territorial arrangements of what was formerly called European Turkey, it is not to be presumed that Turkish authority will be reëstablished there. The subject of reforms is, however, interesting in showing what efforts have been made to save the Turkish Empire from decadence and how futile they have proved to be.

In Asia Minor there is still quite a large area of territory left to the Turks where their authority will be maintained. In this territory there will be a considerable number of Christians, who need to be protected against misrule and arbitrariness, and their civil and political interests safeguarded.

Will the Turks be able so to organize and conduct their government as to satisfy the Christians by assuring to them real privileges and equal treatment? The past experience with Turkish promises does not inspire great hopes for the future. If the Turks, taught by the catastrophe that has befallen their Empire, wish really to preserve within their power what is left of it, they should frankly and sincerely apply to Europe for help to reorganize it. They should pocket their national pride and allow foreigners to assist them in the work of reconstruction. For them to imagine that they will be able to work out a Turkish civilization or a Turkish reformation on Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turanian principles is a delusion.

## LECTURE VI.

### THE EUROPEAN POWERS AND THE NEAR EAST.

ON December 9, 1913, the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, in a speech before the German Reichstag, spoke of the attitude which Europe, after the Balkan Wars, meant to take towards the future development of Turkey. He declared that upon that point there was absolute unanimity among the great Powers. The Triple Alliance, i.e., Germany, Austria and Italy, have "a personal interest," he said, "in maintaining the integrity of Turkey." He assured his hearers that this attitude of the Triple Alliance in regard to Turkey was "in accord with that of England, or the three Powers of the Triple Entente." Pleased evidently with this absolute unanimity of the Powers, the German Chancellor, in predicting the future, said: "From this general self-restraint we can hope that a conflict for ascendancy among the Great Powers on the subject of Turkey will not arise for a long time to come."

Nine months had hardly elapsed after he pronounced his hopeful speech when a terrible war broke over Europe on the subject of the Near East, Turkey included. The absolute unanimity of the Great Powers proved to be a slender reed, which broke down before the whirl-

wind of their political passions and jealousies. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, which was the immediate cause of the war, did not aim merely at humiliating Serbia by placing her under the heel of Austria. It had for its object also the assertion of Austro-German predominance on the Balkan Peninsula, and the upholding of Austro-German political and economic influence in Turkey.

The integrity of Turkey, a phrase so often used and abused by European diplomats, has ceased to be the slogan of European diplomacy. The Turkish Empire, as it existed before the World War, is practically defunct, and whatever arrangements may be made for the future, it can never be resuscitated. It is recognized by all now that the terrible catastrophe which has befallen Europe and under the consequences of which it is still staggering, had its origin in the Near East. The political questions in Europe, which might have produced disagreements and frictions among the Great Powers, were not of a nature to bring about a great conflict among them, if the Near East question had been eliminated in time. More than a hundred years ago the French diplomat Talleyrand declared that the center of gravity of the world was neither on the river Elbe, nor on the river Adige, but down there at the frontiers of Europe, on the river Danube.

All European statesmen, diplomats, political writers and others have clearly recognized where the greatest danger and menace to the peace of Europe lay, and yet those who had the power and the means did very little to avert it. They never grappled with the question seriously, never sought in real earnest to find a

satisfactory and permanent solution of it. All their efforts to settle it have been characterized by a from-hand-to-mouth policy, by indecision and tergiversation and by proposing palliatives without attacking the real root of the evil. This conduct of the Great Powers of Europe cannot be attributed to the obscurity of the question or to their ignorance of its essential points. The question was clear enough, the sore point of it was plain, and their efforts for at least a hundred years past to find a remedy for the disease shows that they were cognizant of it. Their failure to find a peaceful issue out of the difficulty is a blot upon the history of Europe and a disgrace to European statesmanship.

One might say that with the rise of Mohammedanism a struggle between it and Christianity began. The Byzantine Empire had to wage bloody wars against the encroachments and the spirit of conquest of the new religion. The capture of the holy places of the Christians in Palestine roused the religious ardor of Western Europe. Crusades were undertaken to drive Mohammed's followers from Jerusalem and rescue the Christians who had fallen under their rule. These crusades in the course of time lost sight of the original object which called them into being, and degenerated into a lust for spoils, which did not spare the very Christians whom they were supposed to free from alien bondage.

The capture of Constantinople in the early part of the thirteenth century by the Crusaders widened the breach between the East and the West by embittering the already existing antagonism between the followers

of the Eastern and Western Churches, and weakened the Byzantine Empire for its later struggle with the Turks. When the latter crossed over into Europe and began their conquests in the Balkan Peninsula, which were to culminate in the capture of Constantinople, the Eastern and Western Christians, instead of joining forces to fight them, spent their time in discussing theological questions and wrangling over papal or patriarchal supremacy. The heroic attempts of leaders like John Hunyadi, Vladislav of Poland, Scanderbeg and some others to stem the Turkish advance with insufficient forces proved vain. The Turks had established themselves in Europe so firmly that it was impossible to drive them back into Asia. With Constantinople in their hands they were able to extend their conquests in all directions.

For more than two centuries success attended upon the Ottoman arms. Thanks to their better military organization and discipline, their implicit obedience to and confidence in their leaders, and to their religious fanaticism, the Sultan's troops swept all resistance before them. When in 1521 Belgrade, the modern capital of Serbia, fell into the hands of the Turks, the last rampart against their invasion of Hungary was removed, and the way for their advance into the heart of Europe lay open.

It is strange that just at the time that Turkish power had reached its highest point, the Sultan should have been willing to negotiate on equal footing with a Christian Power, France. It was in 1536 that a treaty of peace, friendship and commerce was concluded with the King of France, which is generally

known by the name of "capitulations." By this treaty French subjects were granted freedom of trade in the Ottoman territories, liberty of practicing their religion without any molestation, the right of consular jurisdiction over them, and exemption from being tried in Turkish courts except in the presence of the consul or one of his representatives. The treaty also stipulated that the other European nations, as the English, Genoese, etc., whose governments had no treaties of friendship with Turkey, might navigate the seas under the French flag and trade under the protection of France in all the countries under Ottoman domination.

These capitulations were several times renewed and amplified, French influence in Constantinople became paramount and the King of France was recognized as the sole protector of the Catholics in the East. The privileges of free trade, diminution of duties on imports, consular jurisdiction, etc., granted to France were later on extended to the other European Powers. They lasted up to 1914, when Turkey, on entering the late war, declared the abolition of the capitulations. While France by these conventions with the Ottoman Government secured the full protection of her subjects against abuses of the Turkish authorities, nothing was said in them about the Christian subjects of the Sultan. They were completely ignored.

From the moment that the Turks crossed over the river Save into Hungary and pushed their conquests towards Budapest, Austria had to bear the chief part in opposing them. The opposition was not strong enough to stop the advance of the enemy, but there were already certain signs of the weakening of the



military ardor of the Turks, and instead of being "ever victorious," as they had boasted before, they sustained considerable reverses at the hands of Austria.

In the year 1683, when the furious attack of the Turks on Vienna was beaten off by the Polish King John Sobieski, Turkey lost the reputation of being invincible. Sixteen years later, she was obliged to sign the treaty of Carloftsi with Austria, by which she ceded to the latter Hungary and Transylvania, and to Venice and Poland other territory. This treaty marks the decline of the Turkish Empire, and all the efforts to rehabilitate and raise its pristine glory have proved unsuccessful.

But neither in this treaty nor in those concluded later (Posharovatz, 1718, Belgrade, 1739) by Austria with Turkey were there any provisions made for the relief of the Christians in Turkey. Austria fought simply in her own defence and for her own interests. Perhaps it could not be expected of either France or Austria to interest themselves in the Christian subjects of the Ottoman government and insist upon the amelioration of their lot. This certainly could not have been done while the Turkish Sultans were elated with their military successes, and would not have brooked any outside interference with the treatment of their Christian subjects. They, no doubt, would have resented such an interference even when they saw their former power waning, for the Turkish Empire was far from being on the point of exhaustion, as subsequent events showed. Whatever excuse one may give, the fact remains that the reverses which the Turkish arms suffered did not change the condition of the Chris-

tians in the Balkan Peninsula. On the contrary, it was made worse, for the Turks, exasperated by these reverses, wreaked their vengeance upon the helpless *rayah*, whom they rightly suspected of being in sympathy with their enemies.

By the eighteenth century Turkey had ceased to be a menace to Europe, and the decline of its military power was followed by the corruption which reigned in its civil administration. Many of the provincial governors had declared themselves quite independent of the central government and were acting like petty tyrants in their respective provinces.

While the condition of the Ottoman Empire was growing precarious and critical, another State in the north was coming on the political stage of Europe and gaining in power and prestige. It was Russia, which was destined to cause a great deal of worry and consternation both to the Turks and the European Powers. Preoccupied with internal troubles and with wars against the Tartars and her immediate neighbors, Russia had shown up to the eighteenth century very little concern with Turkish affairs.

With the accession of Peter the Great on the throne Russia began to turn her attention to the south, towards the Black Sea, in order to gain access to it. To him is attributed the elaboration of a plan, known by the name of "Testament of Peter the Great," which was to guide the future policy of Russia in the extension of her territorial acquisitions in the east. The plan is generally acknowledged to be apocryphal; but even in the absence of such a plan, the geographical position of Russia and the requirements of her ex-

pansion as a great and progressive State plainly indicated the policy to be followed.

Preparatory to entering into a war against Turkey, Peter the Great in the early spring of 1711 issued a proclamation in which he called upon "all who profess the Orthodox faith, Greek or Roman, in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and especially the inhabitants of Montenegro, the Croats and other Christians who are found under the tyrannical yoke of the Sultan" to rise and join with the Russian armies in fighting for the expulsion of the Turks. The proclamation found no echo among those to whom it was addressed, and the war against Turkey would have proved a terrible calamity for Russia and her Tsar, had not the venality of the Turkish commander-in-chief made the conclusion of peace possible.

The idea of Peter the Great of expelling the Turks and freeing the Christians from Turkish rule became the guiding policy of Russia, especially with and since the Empress Catherine II. Wars between Turkey and Russia became frequent, one might almost say habitual, and of all the European Powers Russia deserves the credit of having done the most to weaken still more the power of Turkey. The Christians in the Balkan Peninsula, who are united to Russia by the ties of religion and most of them by that of race, began to look upon Russia as their future savior from political bondage. The repeated victories that the Russian armies won over the Turks gladdened their hearts and enhanced the prestige of the Russian Tsar in their eyes. They had not benefited by the advantages which the other European Powers had derived from their

victories over the Turks. Russia was the only power that had come out as the champion of their cause. Whether she did this out of a pure desire for their welfare or had some ulterior motives of her own, did not enter into their calculations. What chiefly concerned them was to get rid of the harsh rule of a Power, so alien to them in every respect.

The policy in regard to Turkey initiated by Peter the Great did not at first arouse the suspicions and fears of the other European Powers. Moreover, as we have just said, he failed in the first attempt he made to carry it out. Sixty years later Russian conquests were pushed into Roumania of to-day and Bessarabia, part of Bulgaria and the islands of the Archipelago. The Russian fleet, operating in the Archipelago, would most probably have entered the Dardanelles and Constantinople easily, had not the dilatoriness of the Russian admiral given time to the Turks to put the straits in a state of defence. Although her capital was saved from a Russian occupation, Turkey had to acknowledge her defeat and sue for peace. At a small village in Bulgaria, called Little Kainardja, Russian and Turkish plenipotentiaries met and signed on July 21, 1774, the famous treaty which in the future was to serve as the basis upon which Russia founded her claims to interference with Turkish affairs.

According to the terms of this treaty, Turkey bound itself to open to Russian merchant vessels the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and to treat the Russian merchants on the same footing as the French, who were then the most favored nation. Russia was to evacuate Bulgaria, Wallachia and Moldavia, the

two latter retaining their status as privileged provinces under the Sultan's suzerainty, with the understanding that the Sultan's government will take into consideration any representations made in their favor by the Russian Court or its ministers. Other articles of the treaty stipulated that Turkey will protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches; that it will not impede in any way the free exercise of it, will not put obstacles in the way of building new or repairing old churches, and that it will pay due regard to any representations made by Russia in favor of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

The treaty produced a great commotion among the European Powers which took an interest in the Eastern question. It was apparent to all that by its terms Russia secured for itself a paramount influence in Constantinople, and assumed for her Court and ambassadors in Turkey the right of interfering with the internal affairs of the country. The Austrian Ambassador to Turkey (Thugut) in a report to his government commenting upon the treaty declared that it makes of Turkey a Russian province. The Powers, however, took no steps to annul the treaty of Kainardja, because at that time Prussia and Austria needed the help of Russia in the iniquitous spoliation of Poland, the first partition of which had already been effected two years before. Austria even entered a few years later into a compact with Russia to dismember Turkey, and in case the Turks were expelled from Constantinople the old Greek empire was to be revived under the rule of Constantine, grandson of the Russian Empress Catherine II. Whether Austria joined with Russia in

this famous plan of putting an end to the Turkish empire with a sincere desire of helping to carry it out or with the desire of frustrating it is a matter of doubt. The plan failed, and both Austria and Russia concluded separate treaties with Turkey, which put an end to their war with it.

We may pass over the negotiations that Russia entered into with Napoleon I concerning the disposition to be made of the Turkish empire and the settlement of the Near East question. These negotiations led to no result, and Russia, being more occupied with the affairs in Central Europe, devoted her energies to the destruction of Napoleon's power. At the Congress of Vienna, convened in 1815 to rearrange the map of Europe which had been so disturbed by Napoleon's conquests, the Turkish question was relegated to the background. Although, at the time that the Congress was sitting, an insurrection was going on in Serbia, the plenipotentiaries refused to take any cognizance of it. They were occupied with much more important affairs and did not wish to trouble themselves with a Turkish province, where the Christians were heroically carrying on an uneven warfare with their masters for their liberty.

The Congress could not, however, altogether avoid expressing an opinion on the Near East question. There was no denying the fact that Turkey was declining and its internal situation growing worse and more chaotic. By her participation in the struggle against Napoleon Russia had gained great prestige in Central Europe as well as in the East. The Christian

subjects of the Sultan were greatly impressed by the Russian victories, and began to turn with more confidence their eyes towards the north, whence they expected their salvation. To deprive Russia of the vantage ground which she had gained by her former wars and treaties with Turkey, and to prevent her from sole interference with the affairs of Turkey, Austria, the next most interested power in the future of the Turkish Empire, proposed to the Congress that the European Powers should guarantee the territorial integrity of Turkey. Russia naturally refused to agree to the proposition; but as each one of the Powers was interested, for reasons easily understood, in the fate of the territories of the Sultan, the integrity of Turkey was declared to be necessary to the European balance of power and, therefore, a matter of general concern. Henceforth, the Near East question was to be a European question, and its solution was to be sought in European congresses and conferences, where, instead of one, there were to be half a dozen cooks, who were to prepare the broth.

The declaration that the question of Turkey was a European problem, which was to be solved by the Great Powers, had its advantages, if these Powers were mindful of the interests of the people who inhabited the country. Considering the geographical position of Turkey, especially of its capital, which Napoleon I, rightly or wrongly, pronounced to be "the key of the world," no one Power of Europe could be allowed to dispose of it. It might not have been to the advantage of the Christians of Turkey, either, if only one of

the great European Powers had the final say in their future. They might have fallen from Scylla into Charybdis.

Subsequent events have amply proved that the doctrine of the integrity of Turkey being a matter of European concern did not save Turkey from being drawn into wars, which have tended to exhaust her and to impair that very integrity which the doctrine was meant to insure. The action of the Congress of Vienna opened the way for every question that concerned Turkey to be made a European question and a menace to the peace of Europe. Over a dispute between Greek and Roman Catholic monks at Jerusalem about the Holy Sepulchre, which might have been easily arranged, had good-will presided at the discussions of the Powers, the Crimean War was started in 1853. England and France united their forces to defend Turkey from Russian aggression, and after almost three years of a bloody war, they imposed upon defeated Russia the treaty of Paris of 1856. Russia was deprived of all the advantages she had gained by her previous wars and treaties with Turkey. The independence and territorial integrity of Turkey were again solemnly proclaimed. Instead of Russian protection of the Christians of the Turkish empire, the treaty promised European protection, and forbade the intervention of any Power in the internal affairs of Turkey. To cripple Russia in any future designs upon Turkey, the Black Sea was declared neutral and neither Russia nor Turkey was allowed to keep a fleet in its waters.

It is questionable whether the Powers which signed



the treaty of Paris believed in its durability or in its having secured a satisfactory settlement of the Eastern Question. They would have been very naïve indeed if they expected a great Power like Russia to submit passively to the humiliating clauses of the treaty that drove her back from the Danube and hampered her naval development in the Black Sea. The Russian Chancellor, Prince Alexander Gortchakoff, gave the European Powers a broad hint when in one of his circulars after the treaty of Paris, in delineating Russian policy, he declared that "*La Russie ne boude pas; elle se recueille.*"

Taking advantage of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, in which France, one of the principal signatories of the treaty of Paris, was defeated, Russia obtained the abrogation of the article which placed a limitation to her maritime forces in the Black Sea. Seven years later she entered into a war with Turkey, and by the San Stefano treaty of 1878 tried to emancipate the Bulgarians from Turkish rule, secure the independence of Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro and reforms for the amelioration of the condition of the Armenians. The European Powers, guided by the principle of the Eastern question being of general European concern, replaced the San Stefano Treaty by that of Berlin, which modified and limited many of its provisions. Bulgaria was divided into two, the region between the river Danube and the Balkan Mountains being constituted into a Principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, while south of the Balkans, within a limited area from which Macedonia and Thrace were excluded, an autonomous province under the sovereignty of the

Sultan was created under the name of Eastern Roumelia. The reforms by which the inhabitants of Macedonia, Thrace and Armenia were to be guarded against Turkish misrule, and the necessity of which the European Powers fully acknowledged, were to be carried out under their supervision—we all know with what results. The poor Armenians and Macedonians never got the reforms which were promised to them.

Considering the complexity of the Near East problem and the variety of interests involved in its solution, no blame can attach to the European Powers for treating the question as of international importance. The claims of Russia to settle the question between herself and Turkey may have been exaggerated, and her demand to be recognized as the sole protector of her co-religionists in Turkey and to speak in their behalf may have led to her acquiring such an ascendancy in the Balkan Peninsula as to be inconsistent with the interests of the other powers. In claiming for herself the protection of the Orthodox Christians bound to her by the ties of race and religion Russia was following the example of France, which claimed to be the protector of the Roman Catholics in the Turkish Empire. Under the plausible excuse of striving after the amelioration of the lot of the Christians, Russia may have had only selfish motives, looking to her own aggrandizement and the extension of her conquests. Such designs have invariably been imputed to Russian policy in the Near East, although unselfish and disinterested philanthropy has rarely been one of the distinguishing characteristics of European diplomacy.

Count Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, probably

spoke the truth when he wrote a hundred years ago: "Russia could perhaps give the last blow to the Ottoman monarchy; but this monarchy, reduced not to exist any longer except under the protection of Russia, suited better the latter's political and commercial interests than all combinations which would have obliged it, either to spread itself too much by conquests, or to substitute for the Ottoman Empire states which would not have delayed in rivaling with Russia in power, civilization, industry and wealth."

A weak Turkey leaning upon a strong Russia was what would have suited best the political plans of Russian diplomacy. If the European Powers wished to frustrate these plans, it was necessary that their policy towards Turkey should have for its chief aim to make Turkey strong, and to create on the Balkan Peninsula such a state of things as to deprive Russia of a pretext for interference. They were morally bound to remove the causes which were working for the weakening and decline of their *protégé*, and in assuming the responsibility for the protection of the Christian subjects of the Sultan they assumed obligations towards them which they were in honor bound to fulfill. How they kept their promises, and how much improvement in the condition of the Christians was secured under the joint action of the Great Powers, will be made apparent by the following brief survey of European diplomatic action in Turkey.

In 1804 the Serbians, unable to endure any longer the rapacity and outrages to which they were exposed on the part of the Turkish marauders and Janissaries, rose in rebellion. The insurgents distinctly stated that

they did not rise against the Sultan or his government, but against those lawless bands of plunderers, who under the protection of influential pashas braved even the Sultan's authority and committed untold misdeeds upon the poor Christians. The sufferings of the people were resumed in these short, but fraught with meaning, sentences found in the address sent to the Sultan: "Our lives, our religion, our honor are menaced. Not a single husband who is sure to keep his wife; not a father his daughter, not a brother his sister. Monasteries, churches, monks, priests—nothing is safe from outrages."

In their fervent appeal to the Sultan to free them from the intolerable bondage in which they were pinning they acknowledge him as their ruler. "Art thou still our King?" they wrote; "then come and free us; or if thou wilt not save us, at least tell us so, that we may decide whether to flee to the mountains and forests, or to seek in the rivers a termination to our miserable existence."

Even the Sultan could not deny the oppression and outrages to which his Serbian subjects were exposed. He gave orders that these cruelties should be stopped, but the orders tended only to exasperate the Janisaries and the other desperadoes and to make the lot of the Serbians worse.

For ten years the latter fought bravely against the superior Turkish forces and not unfrequently inflicted severe defeats upon them. For the want of any help from outside the rebellion collapsed, but only for a short time. In 1815, the year of the meeting of the

Congress of Vienna, it broke out again. Hoping that the plenipotentiaries at the Congress would be induced to take an interest in Serbia and help her to some kind of a political emancipation, a Serbian delegation appeared in Vienna to plead the cause of their people. The delegation made it plain in their memorandum that Serbia did not wish to throw off the sovereignty of the Sultan, or to cease paying taxes to him. All that they asked was that the lawlessness of the Turkish marauders should be curbed and security for life and property should be procured for the people.

While the delegation was trying to lay before the Congress the grievances of the Serbians, Serbia was being devastated by the Turkish troops and horrible atrocities were being committed upon the people, irrespective of age or sex. One would have thought that the plenipotentiaries at the Congress would have been moved by what was taking place not very far from Vienna, and of which they could not have been ignorant. Not they. The delegation was refused admittance to the Congress or even to private interviews with the plenipotentiaries. Their most pathetic appeals in the name of God, Christianity and common humanity found no echo in the hearts of those who were claiming to be their protectors. They all excused themselves of being unable to do anything for Serbia, because they were on good terms with the Sultan. Russia was the only power that took some interest in the representations of the delegation, but was unable to urge them upon the consideration of the Congress. For five years the Serbians were

obliged to continue the struggle for independence, while the European Powers remained passive spectators and did nothing.

When the Serbian insurrection was drawing to its close, the Sultan having agreed to grant the Serbians some privileges, the Greek revolution broke out in 1821. The revolution was not unexpected, for several years before a Greek revolutionary association, with branches all over the Balkan Peninsula, was preparing a general rising among all the Christians. The Greek insurrection created a great stir in Europe, greater than the Serbian had done, owing to the philhellenic sentiments which the history and glory of the ancient Greeks had aroused among the educated classes. The European Powers, however, were not affected by this sentimentality, and they refused to interfere between the Sultan and his Greek subjects.

Exasperated by their failure to subdue the Serbians and by the rising of the Greeks, the Turks had recourse to their usual method of dealing with Christian revolts. On Easter Sunday, while the Greek Patriarch was officiating at high mass in the Patriarchal church at Constantinople, Janissaries and a large mob of infuriated Turks entered the church, dragged the Patriarch in his sacerdotal robes and hanged him at the door of the church. Three archbishops and eight bishops were butchered. For three days after the hanging of the Patriarch the Greeks were indiscriminately attacked and massacred almost before the eyes of the representatives of the European Powers. The massacres were extended to the provinces also. It is said that about one hundred Greek ecclesiastics of high standing

and thirty thousand Greeks were ruthlessly slaughtered, while women and children were sold as slaves. Greece itself, where the insurrection was going on, was being devastated and depopulated by a cruel war, in which massacres and outrages played the greater part.

To the appeals of the Greeks for protection, the European Powers, induced by Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, who looked upon the Greeks as rebels against their legitimate sovereign, turned a deaf ear. When informed of the terrible things that were happening to the Greeks in Turkey and Greece, Metternich is credited with the cynical remark: "I do not care much about the three or four hundred thousand men hanged, strangled or impaled beyond our eastern borders." The integrity of Turkey and the maintenance of the Sultan's sovereignty outweighed in his mind every other consideration, even that of humanity.

The march of events, however, proved too strong for European diplomacy, and the scandal of seeing a whole Christian country doomed to extermination, without any intervention from Christian Europe to stop it, was too ignominious to be tolerated. An Anglo-Russian agreement, supported also by France, in favor of an autonomous Greece, under the sovereignty of the Sultan, was presented to the latter and scornfully declined. This refusal was followed by another agreement of the above-mentioned three Powers to impose their mediation between the belligerents. The Sultan again refused to accept their offer, claiming that the Powers had no right to interfere in a matter that concerned his relations with his subjects.

The battle of Navarino in 1827, in which the Turkish fleet was practically annihilated, failed to impress the Sultan with the seriousness of the situation and he replied by ordering a holy war. The three Powers—England, France and Russia—whose fleets had fought that battle, could not draw back, although in the eyes of the British Government the disaster to the Turkish fleet was “an untoward event.” The landing of French troops in the Morea and the declaration of war by Russia against Turkey, promised a speedy and favorable termination of the Greek revolution.

By the treaty of Adrianople of 1829, Russia forced the Sultan to recognize the independence of Greece and the autonomy of Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia. It took about nine years for European diplomacy to settle the Greek question, a question, which, owing to the geographical position of Greece, could have been easily settled much sooner if the European Powers had sincerely desired its settlement. Greece would have been spared the misery and sufferings of those nine years and the integrity of the Sultan’s dominions and his sovereignty would have been much better preserved by the creation of an autonomous than an independent Greece.

Of all the Turkish provinces the island of Crete has been the one where constant unrest and commotion have more or less existed during the past century. The overwhelming majority of the population is Greek. The Mohammedans, who are really Greeks converted to Mohammedanism and whose vernacular is Greek form a small minority. The island has been periodically disturbed by revolts, accompanied by massacres.



That the complaints of the Christians from Turkish misrule were well-founded and just was generally acknowledged and not unknown to the European Powers. The reports of their consuls in the island made it plain that there could be no peace in it, so long as conditions remained what they were. All these reports agreed in representing the state of the island as deplorable, the tribunals and the administration openly and scandalously venal. The Christians were exposed to all sorts of outrages and exactions both on the part of the authorities and the Mohammedan population.

Driven to desperation, the Cretans revolted in 1866, and during two years sustained the fight with the help that they received from the Greek Kingdom. As a result of this insurrection and the friendly intervention of the Powers to put a stop to it, the island of Crete was granted by the Sultan certain privileges, among which may be mentioned a general Assembly chosen by the people to meet every year, and mixed tribunals to judge cases between Christians and Mohammedans.

These privileges might have helped to bring about the pacification of the island, had the Turkish government faithfully carried out its promises; but it did not. By degrees it curtailed these immunities or by its inaction it made them nugatory. The European Powers as usual refrained from interfering, although they must have known that, unless the Sultan was kept to his obligations, Crete would again be driven into insurrection.

At first Crete did not demand annexation to Greece;

what the people wanted was the establishment, under proper guarantees, of a decent government that would protect them from oppression and extortion. The demand of union with Greece came in 1885 when they saw that it was the only satisfactory way of ridding themselves of Turkish rule and of Turkish promises that were never kept. The poor island had to go through several years of unrest and suffering ere the four European Powers—England, France, Italy and Russia—determined to put an end to the troubles, and landed detachments of troops at some of the ports. In 1897 four admirals accomplished in a few days what all the diplomats of Europe had not been able to do in years, namely, they packed off by force from the island the Turkish troops and officials, and Crete was freed from Turkish rule. Its union with Greece was merely a question of time and it came sooner than the Cretans could have expected it.

The same causes which operated to cause discontent in Crete, were operating in other parts of the Turkish empire. It seemed to be a fatality that the central government at Constantinople, though occasionally it fell into the hands of capable men, was powerless to check the abuses of the administration. These abuses were nowhere more crying than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time that these two provinces came under the Turkish domination, the large class of nobles and landed proprietors, in order to save their lives and property, accepted Mohammedanism. Though related by race and language to the Christians, for by origin they are Serbians and speak Serbian, they were the most bigoted fanatics and the harshest

oppressors of their fellow-countrymen. The Christian peasants were their serfs and there was nothing they possessed that was not at the disposal of their masters. No governor could bridle their lawlessness, for they were so powerful with the various bands of retainers and henchmen whom they kept in their castles and on their estates that they defied the orders of the governor as well as of the central government. The European Powers were well aware from the reports of their consuls of the intolerable conditions existing in the two provinces, and of the imminent danger of troubles.

In 1875 the Christians of Herzegovina sent a petition to the Sublime Porte with the following moderate demands: (1) the reduction of the sheep tax and the tax for exoneration from military service; (2) a promise that no new taxes will be imposed; (3) the organization of a native police force. No attention was paid to the petition, whereupon an insurrection followed, which soon spread from Herzegovina into Bosnia.

It was evident to everyone that Montenegro and Serbia, owing to their proximity to the disturbed regions and their racial and religious affinity with the insurgents, would be drawn into the fray, unless the insurrection was stopped and the demands of the people were granted. The possibility or probability of similar outbreaks taking place in other parts of the Peninsula was not excluded, for the disaffection was not limited only to Bosnia and Herzegovina. A great deal of time was wasted in writing diplomatic notes and memoranda offering to the Turkish government suggestions about the settlement of the question; but

as the representations of the Powers had no force behind them to back them, the Sublime Porte refused to take them into consideration.

The following year (1876) a feeble attempt at an insurrection in Bulgaria took place, which the Turkish government could have easily put down with a few battalions of regular troops. Instead of doing this, bands of *bashi-bazouks* or irregulars, composed of the worst elements among the Turkish population, were let loose upon the revolted villages. With the connivance of the authorities, vengeance was wreaked upon guilty and innocent alike, and from twelve to twenty thousand people, among whom were many women and children, perished by massacre.

Thanks to the efforts and investigation of the late Eugene Schuyler, American Consul General at Constantinople, and MacGahan, an American newspaper correspondent, the hideousness of the massacres was made known to Europe, and evoked great indignation, especially in England, among the people. The late Mr. William Ewart Gladstone valiantly and nobly took up the defence of the Bulgarians and demanded that the Turkish administration, with all its officials, "bag and baggage," should be cleared out of the province they had so long oppressed and polluted with their misdeeds.

It was no longer possible for the European Powers to maintain a passive attitude towards affairs in the East and content themselves with mere diplomatic notes. An international Conference was called at Constantinople in December, 1876, of which the most prominent members were the Russian Ambassador and

the late Marquis of Salisbury. The object of the Conference was to draw up a plan for the future administration of the Turkish provinces in Europe, especially Bulgaria. According to this plan, in the elaboration of which Mr. Schuyler had no small share, autonomy was to be granted to Bulgaria (including also Macedonia), Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

The Turkish Government naturally refused to accept the propositions of the Powers, for it knew that their agreement and coöperation would not go to the extent of enforcing them. It is absolutely certain that had the Powers presented a united front, and made it unmistakably plain to the Sultan that they would, if need be, use force to carry out their plan, the Sultan would have yielded at the mere threat. Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have continued for many years to form part of the Turkish empire, and the integrity of the Sultan's territory would have been assured. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 would have been avoided, and the dismemberment of large regions from which even the Treaty of Berlin could not save Turkey, would have been prevented. It was a partition of Turkey, what that treaty really sanctioned, by depriving it of its vassal principalities and half of its European possessions, and yet the late Earl of Beaconsfield, ironically or in real earnest, called the work of the Berlin Congress "a consolidation of the Turkish empire."

The conclusion to be drawn from the above short sketch of the way the European Powers have dealt with the Near East Question is, that the force of cir-

cumstances was too strong for them to enable them to maintain absolutely the principle of the integrity of the Turkish empire and non-interference with the internal affairs of Turkey. The latter principle especially was the most reprehensible, for it left the Christians to the tender mercies of the Turks. The Christians could not defend themselves against oppression, because they were forbidden to possess or carry arms. European intervention was the only means of keeping under restraint the evil passions and the arrogant domineering spirit of the Turks.

Four years after the signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, moved by the massacres of the Catholic Maronites by the Druses in the Lebanon, in Syria, France sent, in spite of the Sultan's protest, a military expedition to restore order. That was the way France observed the principle of non-interference with Turkish affairs. This led to the autonomy of the Lebanon, and so long as the administration was kept clear of interference or intrigues from Constantinople the country enjoyed such a peace and prosperity as it had not known before.

Whatever political privileges have been secured for the Christian peoples of the Near East have been secured by the interference of one or more of the European Powers. No Christian nation in Turkey could have obtained single-handed its political emancipation. How much bloodshed, misery and suffering the Near East would have been spared had the European Powers acted more promptly and energetically in dealing with the various problems they had to solve! The integrity of Turkey was not inconsistent with the

granting of those elementary rights and privileges of security of life, property and honor which the Christians of Turkey demanded and which every decent government is bound to secure for its subjects.

Instead of looking facts in the face and acknowledging that the discontent of the Christian subjects of the Sultan was due to bad administration, the European Powers evoked the boggy of Russian *agents provocateurs* and Pan-slavist machinations. If there were really such underhand influences at work, it was because they found receptive minds ready to submit to them. People who are contented with their lot and happy under their conditions of life are not apt to abandon what they possess and plunge into the woes and uncertainties of revolution, no matter from where the instigation may come. The best way to paralyze any outside intrigues against the safety of the Turkish empire was to remove the causes upon which they were founded. Ample proof of this was afforded by those territories of Turkey where the people had been endowed with some kind of home-rule, and where, in the place of the former lawlessness, law and order prevailed. Turkey might still have existed as an Empire, if the European Powers had, by extending such self-government to the various provinces, secured their attachment and loyalty to the Sultan's person. To say that their selfishness, jealousies and hatreds did not allow them to do it, neither justifies nor excuses their conduct: it rather makes their sins of omission and commission blacker.

## LECTURE VII.

### THE BALKAN CONFEDERATION AND THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

When I was asked to give this course of lectures before the Institute of Politics I expected to deliver eight lectures, and the seventh lecture I meant to devote to the Balkan Wars and the World War as they affected the Balkan peoples. But as the number of lectures was curtailed I have had to include in my seventh and last lecture a kind of condensation of the two lectures which I had planned to give as the seventh and eighth.

My lecture tonight will be on the Balkan Confederation and the decisions of the Paris Conference bearing upon it.

The foundation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912 was laid on the twenty-ninth of February (or, new style, March thirteenth) of that year, when Bulgaria and Serbia signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. This Serbo-Bulgarian alliance was supplemented by a Greco-Bulgarian defensive alliance concluded on May 29, 1912, at Sofia. By Article II of a secret annex to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of alliance the distribution of territory that was to be taken from Turkey in case of a successful war was regulated. The general principle on which this distribution was to be made is stated in



the following clause: "Serbia recognizes the right of Bulgaria to the territory east of the Rhodope mountains and the river Struma; while Bulgaria recognizes a similar right of Serbia to the territory north and west of the Shar mountains." In regard to the territory comprised between the Rhodope and the Shar mountains, or, in other words, Macedonia, a detailed line of delimitation was fixed, beyond which Serbia undertook to ask for nothing. The larger part of Macedonia was thus adjudged by the treaty to Bulgaria, and only a portion of it, known by the name of the disputed or contested zone, was left to be arbitrated upon by the Emperor of Russia. The Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was signed on the part of Serbia by Dr. Milovanovitch, Minister of Foreign Affairs; but owing to his death a few months before the beginning of the Balkan War, the conduct of the Serbian foreign affairs and the execution of the treaty was left in the hands of Pashitch, the prime minister of Serbia.

On September 30, 1912, the Balkan States—Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—ordered a general mobilization of their armies, preparatory to an expected war with Turkey, which actually broke out less than three weeks later. Various attempts were made by the European Powers to prevent the war, but they proved unsuccessful. Among these attempts was one made by Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, who in the preceding month of August had proposed a plan of autonomous administration based upon decentralization along ethnic lines. In a circular letter dated September 28, that is, two days before the mobilization, Pashitch, the Serbian

prime minister, writing on Berchtold's proposition, urged upon the Serbian representatives and consuls abroad to work for the introduction of reforms in Old Serbia and the ethnic delimitation of this region. In this delimitation he included districts and towns which, five and a half months before, the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty had declared to be by right Bulgarian and upon which Serbia bound herself to lay no claim.

Contrary to the expectation of many military experts, the Balkan States proved more than a match for Turkey. Their armies in a very short time defeated and routed the Turkish forces, Macedonia was occupied by the Greek and Serbian troops, while the Bulgarians were still fighting the bulk of the Turkish army in Thrace. No sooner had the Serbians established themselves in Macedonia than they made a dash through Albania for the Adriatic Sea, and on November 28, 1912, occupied the seaport of Durazzo. Austria, however, opposed so determinedly their exit upon the sea, that on December 20 Serbia had to evacuate the town and withdraw from the seacoast.

It is a mystery what the motive of the Serbian Government was in sending its army to occupy a town inhabited by Albanians and situated in purely Albanian territory. Serbia was very anxious, it is true, to get an outlet on the sea, the lack of which was very injurious to her commercial expansion and interests. But her Government must have known that Austria, if not also Italy, would have strongly opposed Serbian domination on the Adriatic. The evacuation of Durazzo was also due to the fact that Russia refused to back up Serbia in her effort to gain access to the

Adriatic seacoast. In the opinion of the Russian minister of foreign affairs, as expressed in a telegram to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, "necessity obliges the Serbians not to seek any territorial acquisitions on the Adriatic coast," as "the Triple Alliance had definitely decided the question" . . . and "obstinacy on the part of Serbia might give rise to very serious complications."

The Serbians have accused the Bulgarians of not having supported them in their attempt or desire to gain an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. The Bulgarian Prime Minister has refuted the charge by declaring that the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty does not provide for the securing of a seaport for Serbia on the Adriatic or for extending Serbian domination over Albania. The provision that the treaty makes is that in case Austria should attack Serbia, Bulgaria is bound to send an army of at least 200,000 men to the help of Serbia to act offensively or defensively against Austria. Neither when the Serbian army started on its expedition to the Adriatic, nor when, in view of Austrian opposition, it withdrew from it, was Bulgaria informed of Serbia's plans. Had Serbia persisted in the occupation of Durazzo and been attacked by Austria, Bulgaria would have been obliged to go to her assistance in accordance with the terms of the treaty. "The truth is," says Mr. Gueshoff, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, in his book, "The Balkan Alliance," "that when we conveyed to them (the Serbians) the urgent counsels of Russia, we invariably declared that we should do everything humanly possible to perform our duty under the treaty of alliance."

An interview of the Serbian minister at Paris with the Russian ambassador in the same city in the early part of December deserves to be mentioned, as of great significance in judging of the designs of Serbia in the drive she made for the Adriatic. The interview took place almost immediately after the Serbians had occupied Durazzo and before they had made up their minds to withdraw from it. In this interview the Serbian minister declared to the ambassador "that in the event of non-compliance with the Serbian demand for sovereign ownership of an Adriatic port, Serbia would be forced to look for compensation beyond the frontiers fixed by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonoff, in having been informed of the above declaration of the Serbian minister, expressed his disapproval of it to the Russian minister at Belgrade in the following words: "A violation of the territorial understanding between the two countries, which has been attained at the cost of so much labor, can find in us neither sympathy nor support."

To the contention of Serbia that circumstances had arisen which rendered the revision of the treaty necessary, the Bulgarian Government replied by denying that such was the case. In order to find a way out of the difficulty the Bulgarian Government, two months before the outbreak of the second Balkan War, proposed to Russia to settle the dispute by arbitration. Serbia procrastinated in giving her consent to arbitration, as it becomes apparent from a telegram of Sazonoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs,

dated June 18, 1913, i.e., eleven days before the beginning of the Second Balkan War.

In my opinion, Serbia had no desire or intention to submit the question in dispute to arbitration. She demanded the revision of the whole treaty. Bulgaria insisted upon the carrying out of the treaty except the question of the contested zone, which was subject to Russian arbitration.

Even if Bulgaria had agreed to have the whole treaty revised and arbitrated upon, I doubt if the Serbian Government would have accepted the arbitration unless it gave Serbia the lion's share. My doubt is based upon the following facts:

(1) As early as March, 1913 (please remember that the Second Balkan War began June 29, 1913), the Roumanian minister at Belgrade reported to his Government the following: "All those with whom I have spoken tell me that, from the general to the last soldier, the Serbians under arms refuse to abandon Monastir and the other towns claimed by the Bulgarians in virtue of the treaty of alliance, and would rather be killed by Savoff (the Bulgarian acting commander-in-chief) than give up what they have conquered."

(2) On April 19, 1913, the Serbian minister at Bucharest made a formal proposal to the Roumanian Government for the contracting of an alliance against Bulgaria. In the month of May, Serbian and Greek delegates were sent to Constantinople to try to induce the Turkish Government to join in an alliance for the same purpose.

(3) On May 29, 1913, Serbia concluded a secret

treaty of alliance with Greece, which, after partitioning the occupied territory in Macedonia between the two States, stipulated that the Serbo-Bulgarian and the Greco-Bulgarian frontier lines would be established on the principle of the effective occupation and the equilibrium among the three States. The two contracting parties also engage not to enter into any private understanding with Bulgaria regarding the division of the territories of Turkey in Europe, to lend one another constant aid and to act always in accord in mutually supporting their territorial claims and the boundary lines delineated in the treaty.

(4) The military party in Serbia, with the Prince Regent at its head, openly declared that the army would under no circumstances evacuate Macedonia. General Boyanovitch, the Serbian Minister of War, in making the above declaration said that he declined all responsibility for the consequences that might result from the disregard of this temper of the army, hinting of course at a military revolt or pronunciamiento. General Poutnik, the commander-in-chief of the Serbian army, was more outspoken. On May 9, 1913, while the negotiations for arbitration were still going on, he addressed a memorandum to the Prime Minister of Serbia, in which he declared that "it would be a terrible iniquity and an unpardonable sin, a treason to the most important interests of the fatherland, to cede to Bulgaria a single inch of the occupied territory."

Both in Serbia and Bulgaria public opinion was greatly excited over the delay in settling the question, and mutual press recriminations were not wanting. In order to make the dispute intelligible to the people of

the two countries, the Bulgarian Government proposed to that of Serbia to make the treaty public. The proposition was rejected, because evidently the Serbian Government did not wish to have its people know the obligations it had contracted in regard to Macedonia.

The discontent in the ranks of the Bulgarian army grew more pronounced every day. The soldiers, who are really the people, tired and disgusted with being kept under arms and inactive for such a long time in the trenches and the open country, demanded either war or demobilization. On the night of June 29, 1913, orders were given, unbeknown to the Bulgarian Cabinet, to the second and fourth Bulgarian armies to attack, without a previous declaration of war, the Serbians and the Greeks. The order, which has been rightly called "criminal folly," started the Second Balkan War, which proved disastrous to Bulgaria, led to the Bucharest treaty of August 10, 1913, by which Bulgaria was dispossessed not only of Macedonia and Eastern Thrace, but also of Southern Dobrudja, the most fertile part of Northern Bulgaria. This territory, containing a population of about 275,000, was annexed to Roumania, which entered the Second Balkan War unprovoked and unjustifiedly, although the Roumanian portion of the population is less than seven thousand.

The firm conviction of the Bulgarian people was that Serbia had played them false, and that from the very beginning of the war, when Macedonia was occupied by Serbian troops, she set herself to persecuting the Bulgarians and forcing them to declare themselves Serbians. The feeling against Russia was also very

strong, for everyone believed that Russia had not exerted her influence determinedly enough to force Serbia to keep her treaty engagements and to prevent Roumania from attacking Bulgaria while the latter was engaged in fighting with Serbia and Greece. Russia in 1878 by the treaty of San Stefano had drawn the boundaries of the territory peopled by Bulgarians; now, she was believed to have receded from her former position and to have transferred her favors to Serbia. The spoliation of Bulgaria at the Conference of Bucharest was laid at the door of Russia, although eleven years before she had concluded a military convention with Bulgaria undertaking to defend with all her forces the integrity and inviolability of her territory.

The anti-Russian feeling in Bulgaria gained in strength when in May, 1914, the Russian Tsar paid an official visit to the Roumanian King. At a banquet given in his honor, the Tsar toasted the King as the "pacifier" of the Balkan Peninsula, and accepted the honorary colonelcy of the Roumanian regiment which had been the first to cross the Danube in the invasion of Bulgaria the year before. Considering that the territory of which Roumania despoiled Bulgaria had been freed from Turkish rule thirty-five years before by Russia, the action of the Tsar created discontent and indignation even among those Bulgarians who were avowed friends of Russia.

Such were the feelings and dispositions of the Bulgarian people towards their neighbors and Russia at the outbreak of the world war in 1914. Bulgaria, like Greece and Roumania, declared her neutrality, which



she could have maintained, if the war were to be of short duration, but not, if it were to be prolonged three or four years. When, three months after the beginning of the war, Turkey entered it on the side of Germany, it was evident to any one that, owing to her geographical position, Bulgaria would be unable to remain neutral and sooner or later must be drawn into the conflict.

Bulgaria had no treaties or conventions that bound her to the one or the other side: she was free to choose the side she would espouse. Attempts were made quite early in the war to win her over to the side of the Allies. The demands of Bulgaria were that the wrong done her by the treaty of Bucharest should be righted, or, in other words, that Macedonia, which Greece and Serbia had appropriated, and the Dobrudja, annexed by Roumania, as well as the Enos-Midia line in Thrace assigned to Bulgaria by the London Conference, should be restored to her. The Allies could not make Greece, Serbia, or Roumania yield the territory demanded of them. In the propositions which they presented to Bulgaria on their part, the Allies agreed to the immediate occupation of the line in Thrace by Bulgaria, which meant that Bulgaria would have had to fight against Turkey for securing this boundary. In regard to Macedonia they promised to guarantee to Bulgaria, at the end of the war, possession of a limited part of it, but even this promise was made subject to the two conditions: (1) that Serbia shall receive equitable compensation in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and on the Adriatic coast, and (2) that Bulgaria shall not occupy any part of Macedonia until the conclusion of peace. In regard to the cession of the seaport of Kavalla, the

Allied Powers pledged themselves to use their efforts to assure the cession, while in regard to Dobrudja they expressed themselves "disposed to look with favor upon the negotiations which Bulgaria and Roumania may desire to open for the settlement of the question."

The Bulgarian government considered the proposals too vague and unsatisfactory, and demanded more precision in their statement. The Allies could not or would not commit themselves any further for fear of alienating the sympathies and losing the actual or potential coöperation of the three Balkan States. Negotiations, therefore, for inducing Bulgaria to join the Allies reached a deadlock. Popular feeling in Bulgaria was favorable to neutrality, if that could be maintained, but if Bulgaria had to enter the war, the people would have preferred to be on the side of the Allies. Whatever ill-feeling there might have been against Russia for her past conduct towards Bulgaria, religious and racial ties were too strong to make the people at large willing to take up arms against her. Besides, Bulgarians had not forgotten that they owed their political emancipation to Russia. On the other hand, there was no Bulgarian officer or soldier who could have been induced to fight shoulder to shoulder with Serbians, Greeks, or Roumanians, unless they were made to let go the booty they had unjustly seized from Bulgaria. No Bulgarian was inclined to put any faith in the promises or pledges of Serbia, Greece, or Roumania, and the Bulgarian government interpreted aright popular feeling when it declined to accept vague declarations and demanded definite and effective resti-

tution of territory recognized as ethnically Bulgarian. Bulgaria could not very much longer delay in declaring her attitude, for the Central Powers in their anxiety to open communication with Turkey would not have hesitated in invading and marching through the country. It is not to be denied that the influence of the ex-King Ferdinand, with a Cabinet of Ministers avowedly pro-Austrian and distinguished by docility and subserviency to the royal will, was the determining factor that drove Bulgaria into an alliance with the Central Powers.

The mutual distrust that existed between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Bulgaria, and the intimate ties which bound the latter to the Austrian Emperor and Court, offer an explanation of the King's conduct. Popular feeling might have overridden the will of the King and counteracted his intentions, if the Allies had presented more definite and concrete terms, which would have rallied public opinion in Bulgaria to their cause.

Those of you who wish to know more about the conduct of the negotiations between the Allies and Bulgaria might with profit read "Balkan Problems and European Peace," by Noel Buxton and C. L. Leese. Mr. Buxton is an Englishman who was sent to Bulgaria and the other Balkan States to try to win them over to the cause of the Allies. You will also find a chapter devoted to the same subject in the book, "The Secrets of the Crewe House," in which are described the means used and the propaganda carried on under direction of Viscount Northcliffe. I cite these two books espe-

cially because they are written by Englishmen who certainly have no reason to be very tender-hearted towards the Bulgarians.

Valuable information on the Balkan League is supplied by the articles published in *The Times* (London) of June 4, 5, 6, 11, and 13, 1914, by the late James D. Bouchier, for more than thirty years correspondent of the paper in the Balkan Peninsula, thoroughly acquainted with the Near East question, and who played no small part in bringing about the formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912.

The refusal of Serbia, Greece, and Roumania to make any concessions facilitated the task of the Central Powers to draw Bulgaria to their side. That Bulgaria entered the war solely with the object of securing her rights over territory that by official and international acts had been recognized as Bulgarian is proven by the fact that she refused to send any soldiers either to the western front in France or the eastern front in Galicia to help the Central Powers. Bulgarian troops were employed only in the Balkan Peninsula in defense of Bulgarian interests.

The prevailing sentiment among the soldiers about the object of the fighting they were called upon to do is best illustrated by their refusal to cross over to the left bank of the Danube and invade Roumania. They declared that the territory across the river was Roumanian, that they had fought the Roumanians on this side of the Danube in order to drive them out of Bulgarian territory, but, having accomplished that, they saw no reason for invading their territory. It was with the greatest difficulty that a few regiments were in-

duced into going across and taking part in the invasion of Roumania.

Another fact which proves the reluctance with which the Bulgarian soldiers went into the war has been brought out in an official memorandum presented by the Bulgarian Government to the Peace Conference at Paris. In this document the statement is made that in order to strike terror into the hearts of the soldiers and break any opposition on their part, the least infringement of military discipline was most severely punished, and during the war six thousand men are said to have been court-martialed and executed. For three years, from 1915 to 1918, Bulgaria remained in the war. During that time the chief task of the Bulgarian army was to defend the territory it had occupied in Macedonia against the attacks of the Allies. The relations between Germans and Bulgarians, in spite of the effusive declarations of rabid Germano-philés, were getting more tense and less friendly. The entrance of the United States into the war and the proclamation of the fourteen points of ex-President Wilson produced a great impression upon the people and the army of Bulgaria. The principles of self-determination, of government by consent of the governed; the declarations that "the relations of the several Balkan nations to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality"; that "every territorial settlement must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment for compromise amongst rival States," and that "all well-defined national aspirations must be accorded

the utmost satisfaction without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism"—these and other similar statements concerning the future readjustment of political conditions in the Balkan Peninsula and elsewhere were read and approved by the Bulgarian people as not incompatible with their demands and the objects for which they had entered the war. The soldiers informed their officers and the commander-in-chief that after September 15, 1918, they would not fight any longer, because they are perfectly satisfied with letting the cause and claims of Bulgaria be settled on the basis of the principles proclaimed by the President of the United States. I make this statement on the authority of the Bulgarian commander-in-chief, which I find corroborated by the German General Ludendorff, who in his work, "My War Memoirs," writes: "A few days after the 15th (September, 1918), a secret report of the French general fell into my hands, which made it evident that the French no longer expected any resistance from the Bulgarian army." When the Allied forces started their attack upon the strongly fortified Bulgarian positions, very little serious resistance was offered. Whole regiments refused to fight and, throwing down their arms, left the battlefield or surrendered.

It is well to bear in mind the events that I have tried to sketch briefly in discussing the question of a Balkan Confederation and the bearing of the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference for the settlement of the Balkan question upon the future prospects of such a Confederation.

The Balkan Alliance of 1912 was undoubtedly the

first great union of the Balkan States for common action, dictated by a community of interests. In the early part of the last century there were signs of a common feeling among the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula, which was due to their being fellow-sufferers under the Turkish rule. When the Greek war for independence broke out, thousands of Bulgarians and other Christians hastened to join the ranks of the Greek revolutionists. The movement is to this day known in Bulgaria as that "For the Faith."

Sixty years ago, during the reign of Prince Michael of Serbia, efforts at a union between Serbia and Bulgaria were made, in which Serbia hoped to play the rôle of a Balkan Piedmont. Concrete propositions were made for the liberation of the Bulgarians from the Turkish rule and the establishment of a South-Slavic Kingdom, under the rule of the Serbian Prince, composed of Serbia and Bulgaria, including in the latter Thrace and Macedonia. The plan, however, came to naught. According to the French diplomat Edouard Engelhardt, while treating with the Bulgarians for a Serbo-Bulgarian Union, Serbia was secretly negotiating a treaty with Roumania, the object of which was the partition of Bulgaria between the two.

During the eighties of the last century when Bulgaria, led by the late Stambolloff, was struggling against Russian predominance in the country, a proposal was made to the King of Roumania of a personal union between the two countries. Fearing to displease Russia the King declined the offer. A plan to form a Balkan Union with Turkey at its head was also

proposed by the Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee, which sought a personal union under the Sultan. In 1891 the Greek statesman Tricoupis proposed to Serbia and Bulgaria a plan of an alliance by which Turkey was to be partitioned. A Hungarian project, attributed to the late Count Andrassy, favored the creation of a *Zollverein* or Customs Union of Eastern Europe under the direction of Austria, which was to be the prelude to a Balkan Confederation. An Austrian plan bespoke the formation of a Confederation of the Danubian States and those of the Balkans under the presidency of Austria, modelled on that of the German Empire.

The idea of a Balkan Confederation found many supporters outside of the Balkan Peninsula. In the beginning such a union was urged as a barrier to Russian and Austrian advances into the Peninsula or upon Constantinople. Later on it came to be considered as the best means of settling the Near East question, and by raising the slogan "the Balkan lands for the Balkan peoples," it was sought to prevent foreign interference with Balkan affairs. Addressing himself to the Balkan people, Mazzini wrote: "Unite yourselves in one Confederation and let Constantinople be your Amphyc-tionic city, the city of your central powers, open to all, slave to none." The Italian statesman Crispi declared that "the Italian National party would like to see the establishment of a Balkan Confederation with Constantinople for its capital. . . . The Mohammedans may find a place in it, if they wish to live as brethren and not as masters; but the Tsar must stay in his



possessions of to-day and the Sultan must go over to Asia."

In discussing the Balkan situation in 1886, the International League of Peace in its meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, passed the following resolution: "The most efficacious and surest means of escaping sordid lusts would be a federative organization sanctioned and neutralization guaranteed, by Europe." The late Serbian statesman Ristitch expressed the opinion years ago (in 1884) that the Balkan Confederation was not a chimera, and that, owing to the awakening of the sentiment of nationalities, "the unity of the Balkan Peninsula is not possible now except under the form of the union and the federation of the Balkan peoples."

The desirability of a Balkan Confederation is patent to everyone and the possibility of its realization seems to be taken for granted, and yet no serious efforts have been made to realize it. The reason is that under the name of Balkan unity, Balkan federation, or Confederation, people have understood different things. In the sixties of the last century, during the reign of the Serbian Prince Michael, Balkan union or federation meant for the Serbians a political constellation in which Serbia was to be the star of first magnitude. She was to play on the Balkan Peninsula the rôle Piedmont had played in the unification of Italy. For the Greeks Balkan federation meant the realization of the "Great Idea," the resuscitation of the Byzantine Empire with Constantinople as its capital. As a means for the carrying out of this plan the Hellenization of the Balkan people was necessary. The refusal of the

Bulgarians to submit to the process of denationalization is censured by Greek historians as having upset the plan of attaining unity through the elimination of national distinctions.

Leaving Roumania aside as not being, properly speaking, a Balkan State, there were up to the year 1878 three Balkan States: Serbia, Greece and Montenegro. Although of the same race, language, and religion, Montenegro and Serbia were not on very friendly terms. Their disagreement proceeded chiefly from the claims they laid upon leadership among the Serbian speaking people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Personal and dynastic considerations tended to strain the relations still more. The relations between Serbia and Greece were maintained as normal, with some efforts for an understanding about the future disposition of the territory comprised within European Turkey. The understanding did not lead to any practical results, and when in 1876 Serbia declared war on Turkey, Greece did not render her any aid.

By the creation of the Bulgarian principality in 1878, a new Balkan State became a political factor in the Peninsula. If Serbia had ever cherished the idea of territorial expansion by appropriating regions inhabited by Bulgarians, that idea had now to be abandoned. From the very beginning Serbia showed her unfriendly disposition towards the new Bulgarian State, by claiming and, by Austrian help, obtaining the annexation of territory inhabited by Bulgarians and recognized as Bulgarian. When in 1885 Eastern Roumelia or Southern Bulgaria declared its union with the Principality of Bulgaria, Serbia, without a

formal declaration of war, invaded Bulgaria on the plea that the union disturbed the balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula. No Serbian interests whatever were injured or violated by the union, for it affected no Serbian population.

How far Serbian ill-feeling towards Bulgaria extended is best shown by Professor Tsviitch of Belgrade University, a prominent Serbian writer, deprecating even the simple declaration of Bulgaria as an independent Kingdom as a destruction of the equilibrium in the Peninsula! In his opinion "it is a mistake to allow the existence in the Balkan Peninsula of a State twice as big as its neighbor. There will be no peace, unless the territorial equilibrium between these states is strictly observed." It is not necessary to dwell upon the relations existing between the Greeks and Bulgarians, as the subject has already been dealt with in my lecture on the Church Organization. The erection of a Bulgarian State did not tend to improve those relations.

The joke of the matter is that a few years earlier Serbia had done just the same thing—declared herself an independent kingdom. Evidently, by that act she did not "disturb the equilibrium of the Balkan Peninsula."

The greatest stumbling block to Balkan Confederation has been and is the territorial adjustments along national lines. It is not altogether true to say that the dissensions over territorial redistribution are due to outside intrigues. Foreign powers, especially those immediately concerned in the future fate of the Balkan

Peninsula, have availed themselves for the furtherance of their own selfish purposes, of the already existing national aspirations or lusts and have tried to stimulate them. A union among the Balkan States would certainly not have been welcome to these powers; but their influence in preventing such a union would not have been great, if the way could have been found for an amicable settlement of the territorial or national claims of the various States. How these claims are to be settled is the point upon which agreement has been very difficult. In order to make my opinion clear, I may take a concrete case, that of Macedonia, to which both Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians lay claims. I do not exaggerate when I say that in the opinion of all who have written on the subject knowingly, dispassionately and without any bias, and according to official acts and documents, the great majority of the Christian population of Macedonia has been recognized as Bulgarian.

By Article XXIII of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 Macedonia was to be granted autonomy or home-rule under Turkish sovereignty. An International Commission, composed of delegates of the Great Powers of Europe, worked out the organic statutes for its administration. The opposition of the Turkish government and the lukewarm pressure exerted upon it by the Powers have deprived Macedonia of the enjoyment of self-government, to which the solemn promise of an international treaty entitled it. This self-government might have been secured if the three Balkan States which profess to have interests in Macedonia had acted together and insisted before the signatory

powers of the treaty to carry out their promise. Bulgaria is the only one of the three that has invariably stood for and demanded the execution of the twenty-third article and the granting of autonomy to Macedonia. Neither Serbia nor Greece has ever been in favor of Macedonian autonomy; on the contrary, they have opposed it. Why? Because they knew that their claims rested upon a weak foundation, and that their inconsistency would be easily exposed by a free ballot and a free press.

With the disappearance of Austria as a great Power and with the hope that Russia will one day find herself not as an autocratic and bureaucratic Power but as a democratic and liberal State, there is no danger of a Balkan Confederation meeting with outside opposition. The danger is from within and not from without: from want of solidarity, of linguistic unity, of national cohesion, of common ideals and aspirations. The policy that these Balkan States have tried to follow till now has been how to get something away from one another and how one could benefit at the expense of his neighbor. No small share of responsibility and reproach falls upon the Balkan politicians for the part they have taken in stirring up instead of appeasing troubles between their peoples. I am inclined to believe that were the plain people of these Balkan States allowed to come together and talk over their differences, they would be much more likely to reach an agreement upon disputed points. "There is no room," said the late Serbian politician Garashanin, to a Bulgarian diplomat, "there is no room in the Balkan Peninsula for two Slavic States. Either you will have

to knock us down or we will have to knock you down." Contrast with this language of the politician the following words of Levski, a man of the people and a champion of Bulgarian liberty: "We Bulgarians desire to live like brothers with all our neighbors, particularly with the Serbians and Montenegrins, and with the Roumanians with whom our destiny is closely connected, and together with all of them we wish to form a federation of free States."

At the end of the World War the Peace Conference at Paris had a good opportunity of settling in a satisfactory way the Near East question, which has caused so much trouble to Europe. The results of the decisions of former Congresses and Conferences that had dealt with the question ought to have dictated to the recent Paris Conference wiser and saner counsels. In deciding upon the adjustments made necessary by the war, the Powers in whose hands the decision rested should have been guided by the two following considerations: first, to make as fair a settlement of the Balkan question as was possible, and second, to impose that settlement upon friend and foe alike.

Some people deny ~~that~~ any fair settlement of the Balkan imbroglio ~~is~~ possible, because the Balkan Peninsula is such a tangle of nationalities. The statement, in my opinion, is exaggerated, but whether it is true or not can be proved only by a thorough investigation. When in 1878 political freedom was to be granted to the territory south of the Balkan mountains, which the Bulgarians claimed to be essentially Bulgarian in population, the Greeks by elaborate statistics

and finely worded memoranda tried to prove that south of the Balkan mountains there were no Bulgarians, and only Greeks had existed there from time immemorial. The very first census taken disclosed the fact that the Greeks numbered over fifty thousand as against over six hundred thousand Bulgarians. In the ensuing elections the Greeks secured only two deputies to the Provincial Parliament out of a total of fifty-seven.

The Peace Conference, however, has not sought a fair settlement of the Balkan troubles. Its decisions bear the mark of vindictiveness, in the opinion of those who from personal experience are competent to judge of its actions. In the distribution of territory it has confirmed the mistakes and injustice of the Bucharest treaty of 1913 and has even aggravated them. It has left the whole of Macedonia under Serbian and Greek rule, although in the opinion of impartial and competent observers like Lord Bryce, who has travelled in the country, "the population of Southern Macedonia all the way from Okhrida and Monastir on the west as far as Serres on the east, that is to say, all the way from the lake of Okhrida to the rivers Vardar and Struma, is inhabited by a Bulgarian population." It has given to Roumania Southern Dobrudja, the granary of Northern Bulgaria, where, as I said, out of a population of about 275,000 Turks and Bulgarians, who over forty years had lived happily and contentedly under Bulgarian rule, there are less than 7000 Roumanians. For strategic reasons territory inhabited by 92,000 Bulgarians and no Serbians has been annexed to Serbia, bringing thus the Serbian frontiers to within cannon shot of the capital of Bulgaria. Western

Thrace where the Greek population, according to a census taken by the French military authorities, forms less than one-fourth of the population, has been given to Greece. Three-fourths of the population, consisting of Turks, Bulgarians, and others, in vain begged the Conference not to hand them over to Greece, but either to continue the French administration or restore Thrace to Bulgaria.

The promise to Bulgaria of an outlet on the *Ægean* Sea is illusory so long as the sovereignty over the port is to be in Greek hands. At any rate, up to the present nothing has been done to give effect to the prescription of the treaty relating thereto. The treaty stipulations about the treatment of minorities by granting to them church and school privileges have remained so far a dead letter. Bulgarian schools all over Macedonia and Thrace have been closed, and the teachers have been expelled. No Bulgarian newspapers or literature of any kind is allowed to reach the people, and everyone who dares to stand up for his Bulgarian nationality is persecuted and maltreated.

While the military forces of Bulgaria have been limited by the treaty to 20,000 soldiers, and her armaments have been curtailed, those of her neighbors are left intact, which causes a constant menace to the safety and security of the country. Besides, Bulgaria is not allowed to have military conscription. Her army must be recruited from volunteers, who engage to serve for twelve years, a costly system and impossible to apply in a country 82% of whose population are farmers.

The Powers that signed the treaty of Sevres have



already recognized the mistakes in it and have tried to correct them. Will they do so with the treaty of Neuilly which they imposed upon Bulgaria? Unless they do, the situation that the Conference has created in the Balkan Peninsula will not be stable and will not make for peace and concord among the Balkan peoples. Already signs are not wanting of the Great Powers trying to play one Balkan State against another. Already separate treaties and agreements are being entered into by Serbia, Greece and Roumania directed against Bulgaria. The cry of "the Balkan lands for the Balkan peoples" will find its true justification when the territorial adjustments along national lines have been fairly settled, not when it serves as a cloak for the coalition of some Balkan States for the spoliation of a weak neighbor or overlordship in the Peninsula.

The decisions of the Peace Conference in regard to the Balkan Peninsula were taken without any reference to the wishes of the people concerned. The inhabitants of Thrace and Macedonia were denied the right of a plebiscite which was given to Silesia and the district of Klagenfurt and provided for the future for the Saar Valley. The petitions of the people were relegated to the waste paper baskets of the Conference. Instead of brushing aside all statistics presented by interested parties as tainted and ordering an investigation, under proper guarantees for impartiality, either now or at some future date, in order to ascertain the truth, the Conference based its decisions upon one-sided statistics, the veracity of which can be and has been disproved.

The conditions created by the Conference will not insure peace to the Balkan Peninsula nor pave the way to a closer union among the Balkan States. This could have been done if the territorial arrangements had been fairly and justly made, or if disputed regions had been put under an international control and their inhabitants given eventually the fair chance of declaring freely their wishes. I believe that if such a course had been followed, by which national aspirations could have been reconciled, and national rivalries mitigated, the Balkan States, once the cause of intrigues and mutual distrust and discord removed, would of themselves have come to the realization of the necessity and the benefits of a Balkan Confederation.

I wish to express to you my deep gratitude for the very kind and benevolent attention which you have so kindly given to me.

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